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Abstract 
In recent decades in Newfoundland, a sustained interest in Christian symbols, stories, 
and values has been paired with increasing criticism of Christian religious institutions 
and agents. Newfoundland’s burgeoning tradition of professional humour has reflected 
this changing set of relationships to Christianity. This robust young humour tradition 
richly reflects the ongoing pluralization and secularization of Newfoundland culture, 
and abundantly exemplifies humour’s distinctive potential as a means of addressing 
potentially contentious or vexing issues. Yet, surprisingly, literary criticism has almost 
entirely avoided the prominent stream of Newfoundland humour that addresses the 
island’s religious legacy. 
 This project aims to begin to correct this substantial critical omission, 
examining points of continuity among a number of works produced over the past four 
decades. It focuses on the works’ embrace of political and/or epistemological 
pluralism, typically married to religious skepticism and to misgivings about 
conventional arrangements of religious power.  
Chapter One provides an historical and critical context for the project, 
introduces subsequent chapters, and speculates on ramifications of the pluralistic 
current that runs through the works in the study. Chapter Two examines religious 
jokes in Newfoundland joke books. It emphasizes the jokes’ overall tendency toward 
(an often ambiguous) religious conservatism, as well as the books’ latent pluralism 
regarding interdenominational relations. Chapter Three focuses on journalist and 
playwright Ray Guy’s often fierce satire of Christian religious agents and institutions. 
It argues that Guy’s satire utterly rejects the legitimacy of religious authority in the 
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civic realm, largely on the grounds that transcendent truthfulness is often invoked as a 
means of justifying otherwise objectionable power. Chapter Four explores the 
ecumenical religious humour of columnist and memoirist Ed Smith. It focuses on 
Smith’s playful efforts to harmonize Christian faith and practice with a measure of 
religious uncertainty presented as a necessary foundation for humane coexistence. 
Chapter Five examines Ed Kavanagh’s novel The Confessions of Nipper Mooney. 
Primarily, it explicates and examines the novel’s liberal favouring of the individual 
moral conscience, and the symbolic association of its religiously dissident and/or 
marginalized protagonists with elements of the Catholic tradition. Chapter Six 
discusses Berni Stapleton’s comic play The Pope and Princess Di. The chapter 
emphasizes the play’s presentation of symbols’ constant subjection to alteration and 
hybridization, and its cautious regard for valuable symbols (religious or otherwise) 
that nonetheless become destructive when viewed as sacrosanct. 
 Chapter Seven concludes the study by considering the works’ participation in 
political, philosophical, and literary/dramatic movements that problematize long-
established religious modes and support a secular-pluralist outlook. It reflects on the 
role of humour in movements for change and on didacticism and popular humour as 
features of publicly engaged literature; it discusses other works of Newfoundland 
humour that approach religious matters from similarly secular, though less overtly 
political, angles; and it speculates on some social implications of the ascendancy of 
liberal, pluralistic values, considering these Newfoundland works in a more general 
Canadian cultural context. 
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1.   Introduction 
This study explores contemporary religious humour by Newfoundland writers working 
in a wide variety of genres. Through my discussion of diverse works that respond to 
Newfoundland’s Christian legacy, I address the significance of humour as a feature of 
these responses, and illuminate a range of themes and ethical perspectives that have 
been prevalent in Newfoundland writing over the past four decades. Considering a 
range of literary but also broadly sociological questions, I address the extent to which 
these writers reject the Christianity that was once so dominant in Newfoundland, and 
the extent to which they seek to preserve it. I discern which aspects of Newfoundland 
Christianity tend to be rejected, and which are embraced, as well as how these 
combinations shed light on Newfoundland’s religious legacy and what they suggest 
about changes in the island’s culture. I discuss the rhetorical effects of Newfoundland 
humorists’ frequent satirical depictions of Christian agents, institutions, and beliefs, 
and the implications of this ridicule for contemporary culture. And I consider how the 
writers’ use of humour as a mode of imaginative engagement reflects both the broader 
popularity of humour in Newfoundland writing and a particular set of relationships to 
Christianity. By pursuing these matters, I strive to account for the striking prominence 
of religion-focused humorous writing in Newfoundland in recent decades, and thus to 
begin to fill a considerable void in existing scholarship on Newfoundland writing.  
 Through their humorous depictions of Christian beliefs, doctrines, institutions, 
and agents, and of various relationships to all of these, the works discussed in this 
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study depict Christianity in Newfoundland at an ecclesiastical and theological crisis 
point. The secularization of Newfoundland culture is reflected in various ways and to 
varying degrees in Newfoundland joke books;1 in Ray Guy’s satirical newspaper 
columns and his first play, Young Triffie’s Been Made Away With (1985; published 
1997);2 in Ed Smith’s columns, his memoirs (1991, 2002), and his Brief, Twisted 
History of Newfoundland (1997); in Ed Kavanagh’s first novel, The Confessions of 
Nipper Mooney (2001); and in Berni Stapleton’s play The Pope and Princess Di 
(2004). Like many other contemporary Newfoundland works, those under discussion 
here are generally characterized by resistance to ecclesiastical authority and to certain 
central aspects of Christian theology, though they may positively depict elements of 
Christian belief and tradition amenable to other philosophical or ideological 
movements. The humour in all of the central works in this study emphasizes 
incongruities in the religious order and encourages an unsettled response to religious 
knowledge. Through their common emphasis on humour that instills doubt, the works 
are united by two related premises: they reject, to varying degrees, the traditional 
exclusivity of religious truth claims and, by implication, the notion that a religion can 
possess any kind of absolute authority; and they favour pluralism of one sort or 
another as a protection against authoritarian religion and as a prerequisite for an 
acceptable ethics. In this way, the works have been informed by, and have informed in 
turn, an ongoing shift in Newfoundland public culture, away from religious values and 
authoritarian politics, toward secular values and pluralism. 
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1.1   A Legacy of “Closedness:” Some Features of Newfoundland’s Religious 
History 
A problem posed by Catholic theologian Jean Vanier in the published collection of his 
1998 Massey Lecture series Becoming Human lies at the heart of this study’s various 
humorous treatments of Christian belief and religious politics. Vanier describes a 
perennial struggle in communities to balance “closedness, having a clear identity that 
fosters growth in certain values and spirituality, and openness to those who do not live 
with the same values” (65). Some of the works under discussion seriously 
acknowledge this tension and grant closedness some esteem, but the general tendency 
of even these works is to present openness more favourably. This tendency is perhaps 
a predictable reaction to Newfoundland’s history, which has been marked by a good 
deal more religious, political, and geographical closedness than openness. The 
spiritual and social primacy of the churches in Newfoundland, combined with 
politically abetted denominational antipathies and the geographical isolation of most 
of the island’s settlements, facilitated a religiously conservative culture within which 
“openness” was largely overwhelmed (Pottle 81-82; Rollmann, “Religion”). 
 Due in part to a dearth of other formal social structures, community life in 
Newfoundland has largely been organized around the churches (Webb, 
“Community”). The churches brought together strong traditions, familiar stories, and 
built-in principles, and most people returned to them again and again through the 
weeks and the seasons for religious and social occasions. The churches’ high degree of 
influence facilitated strong bonds within coherent communities, while also laying the 
 3
  
groundwork for the antipathy and abuse that has come to dominate many 
contemporary Newfoundlanders’ views of the island’s religious legacy. 
In addition to their central roles in the lives of Newfoundland communities, 
Christian churches and agents have been prominent players in Newfoundland politics 
since permanent settlement began on the island. Government agents were eager to 
develop allegiances with the major churches because of their capacity to influence 
large portions of the population (Greene 273; O’Flaherty, Old 204). The churches, 
looking to protect and advance their security and status on the island, were often eager 
to embrace and, at times, to exploit such allegiances (Fay 52, 54; Greene 2, 8-9; 
O’Flaherty, Old 203-04; Rollmann, “A Brief”). Despite such mutual interests, the 
agonistic climate facilitated by the island’s religio-political machinations came 
increasingly to be seen as unsustainable (Fay 54-55; Gunn 178-79).  
One nineteenth-century response to perennial, competing demands for 
government-sponsored privileges was the birth of Newfoundland’s publicly funded, 
church-controlled, denominationally segregated school system. Part of a broader 
movement toward equality of government representation that was designed to appease 
competing religious factions (Howley 233; Rollmann, “Religion”), the system served 
to further entrench denominational divisions even as it may have smoothed the edges 
of political conflict for the time being (Long 23; Rollmann, “Religion”). A second 
effect of the denominational school system was to strain limited financial and human 
resources (McCann; Sweet 56). Gradually, as Newfoundland’s culture secularized 
(Rollmann, “Religion”), the system’s shortcomings became harder to justify and its 
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social divisiveness came to be seen as more and more of a problem (McCann; Sweet 
53, 56).  
 The decades in which the works in this study were produced have been marked 
by a considerable decline in the public influence of Newfoundland’s Christian 
churches. Two widely recognized series of events during these years signify distinct 
changes in the relationship of the churches to government and public institutions in the 
province of Newfoundland and Labrador,3 and in the relationship of the public to 
religious influence and authority. In 1969, the major denominations in the province, 
except for the Roman Catholic Church and the Pentecostal Church, agreed to the 
formation of an integrated school system as part of a provincial effort to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of education in Newfoundland and Labrador (Wilson). 
This move marked the first major step toward the demise of the denominational 
schools; it might also be regarded as a sign of acceptance of a religiously pluralistic 
culture on the parts of the denominational proponents of the integrated system. From 
1969 until 1998, these integrated schools operated alongside separate Catholic and 
Pentecostal schools. But in 1997, a referendum on the question of creating a single, 
public school system for all children in Newfoundland and Labrador showed 73% 
public support for the change, and led to legislation ending denominational schooling 
in the province (Dion). 
 Beginning in 1989, The Mount Cashel Orphanage sexual abuse scandal raised 
serious questions about religious authority and accountability, particularly in the 
Roman Catholic Church. A Royal Commission investigation into alleged abuses 
tracing back at least to the 1950s led to highly publicized criminal proceedings, 
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numerous convictions, and civil suits against the Roman Catholic Church and the 
Christian Brothers of Ireland in Canada (Carter and Blom). Public probing of the 
matter revealed that such abuses had been widely suspected for years but had not been 
addressed, apparently due to fears of confronting the Roman Catholic Church with 
such scandalous allegations (cf. Harris). The legal processes surrounding the scandal 
took well over a decade to conclude; during that time, these abuses were never far 
from the public eye.  
 The public-sphere secularization of the province of Newfoundland and 
Labrador is marked by the transferral of authority from the churches to the 
government. Through this shift, the “closedness” of separated denominations and 
stable ecclesiastical hierarchies is, in part at least, replaced by an “openness” to a 
broader public and to dissident voices. In turn, proponents of this new openness, as 
well the administrative structures that protect it, begin to treat with a kind of 
“closedness” those who would defend the old “closedness.” This trend toward a 
secular public sphere has been concurrent with Newfoundlanders’ and Labradorians’ 
decreasing self-identification with the province’s major religious denominations (a 
roughly 10% decrease in each case from 1991 to 2001), as well as a significant  
increase (37% between 1991 and 2001) in the numbers of Newfoundlanders and 
Labradorians who identify themselves as having “no religion” (“Newfoundland”). 
Though these statistics may seem to suggest a secularizing trend on a private as well 
as a public level, the overwhelming majority of Newfoundlanders still self-identify as 
Christians, and it would in any case be presumptuous to interpret aggressively the 
personal, spiritual meaningfulness of such declines. Still, it may be safe to regard such 
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changes in religious statistics, in combination with the support of a distinct majority 
for secular schools and signs of widespread indignation regarding abuses of previously 
unquestioned religious authority, as tentative signs that an increasing number of 
Newfoundlanders have grown comfortable with being members of a secular public, 
whether or not they regard themselves as secular.  
 The works examined in this study present the historical roles of 
Newfoundland’s Christian churches in a variety of lights. While the works tend to be 
unified by their objections to religious “closedness” as manifested by denominational 
animosities and authoritarian ecclesiastical politics, they are less unified regarding 
which aspects of the island’s Christian heritage—or of Christianity more broadly—can 
be regarded positively. For instance, Guy’s occasional, scant affection for Christianity 
is largely language-based; Stapleton mines it for symbolic richness and ethical 
principles; and Smith professes himself a Christian and particularly praises the 
churches’ community-building capacity. Both the apparent unity of the works in 
criticizing religious closedness and their divergences on points of praise are consistent 
with the pluralistic outlook the works collectively tend to reflect. 
 
1.2   Contemporary Newfoundland Literature Confronts Ecclesiastical Authority 
Newfoundland’s village-based culture has had powerful effects on the island’s 
contemporary art-making: an enduring “folk” presence in the growing body of 
professional Newfoundland literature, drama, and song has been profound, if also 
profoundly flexible. One aspect of this legacy of community-based creativity has been 
the grounding of most contemporary Newfoundland writing in a specific culture that is 
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much more than an incidental backdrop. Such writing has consciously engaged with 
the island’s often fraught political history, and generally has reflected an inclination to 
criticize and to celebrate particular elements of the culture.4 Such didacticism has been 
a prominent feature of Newfoundland writing over the past decades, one often applied 
to the island’s Christian religious legacy. 
 The emergence in Newfoundland literature of open complaints about Christian 
religious power is strikingly, vehemently marked by Harold Horwood’s polemical 
novel Tomorrow Will Be Sunday (1966). The novel centres on Eli, a boy who grows 
increasingly disenchanted with the religiously framed parochialism, hypocrisy, and 
austerity of the novel’s evangelical Protestant outport community. Bullied by his 
father and sexually exploited by a locally stationed pastor, Eli becomes a student to 
several marginal figures in the community who represent the idealistically rendered 
liberal values of the cosmopolitan world beyond. Though Horwood’s novel is singular 
in its unrelenting moralizing, a measure of Horwoodian indignation is reflected in 
most of the works in this study, and in many other works of recent Newfoundland 
writing. A common, basic struggle is repeatedly depicted, that is the struggle between 
representatives of repressive, usually institutional power and those who are subjected 
to their direct or indirect abuses. Some writers, such as Horwood, criticize the 
marginal or oppressed for complicity or cowardice, but, generally speaking, the 
greater demons remain institutional.  
 Aside from those in my own study, striking examples of works that reflect 
such a politicized pattern of margin-favouring include a multitude of sketches by 
famed Newfoundland comedy collective CODCO. CODCO’s satirical representations 
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of sexually repressed, compulsive ministers, nuns, and especially priests, began with 
the troupe’s inception in the early 1970s. The troupe brought issues to the stage that 
had long been tacitly acknowledged but were not actively addressed or redressed until 
much later. CODCO repeatedly depict church agents whose struggles with their own 
desires lead to abusive conduct. Such satirical depictions provide an illuminating 
contrast to the troupe’s equal penchant for legitimating marginalized desire (prominent 
among these being homosexual desire). Together, the two strains imply that abuse 
often results from a repressive relationship with desires or identities that of themselves 
are, or ought to be, acceptable. CODCO’s brand of religious satire lived on and 
evolved in a variety of projects written and/or performed by its members, most clearly 
in work by Greg Malone, Tommy Sexton, and Andy Jones. The religious humour of 
CODCO and its alumni constitutes a rich though scattered body of material of 
sufficiently unique focus, form, and impact to warrant a study of its own. 
 Al Pittman’s play West Moon (1980; published 1995) reframes marginality by 
presenting mainstream members of a Catholic religious community as marginal to the 
real-world loyalties of the church and its agents. The play centres on a conversation 
among the dead in a small outport community on All Souls’ Night, shortly after the 
community has been abandoned by the living because of an economically motivated 
government resettlement program.5 The local priest’s advice to community members 
supports the government plan: he works to persuade people whose families have lived 
in the community for generations that they need to move away for the sake of their 
souls, since those who remain will no longer have a church or a priest. The rift 
between the priest’s position and the people’s needs is emphasized by the suicide of 
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one local man inside the church. In the eyes of many in the play’s community, the 
priest and the church have abandoned parishioners—whose spiritual needs are seen to 
be callously exploited—in order to serve a government agenda. 
 In Liz Pickard’s satirical fantasy play The ALIENation of Lizzie Dyke (1994; 
published 1997), the titular character attends a Catholic girls’ school and finds herself 
falling for a young nun, who also falls for her. Discovered in an intimate moment, the 
two are then treated in ways that situate them firmly outside the purview of acceptable 
Catholicism. A marginalized figure who rejects the church, Lizzie embarks on a 
fantastic journey of discovery and eventual fulfillment. Lizzie’s literally alien journey 
eventually provides her with a sense of belonging that was wanting in the milieu of 
repressive Christianity and militarized, apocalyptic capitalism within which she was 
raised.  
 One more example of Newfoundland literary didacticism targeting Christianity 
and centring on the marginal is JoAnne Soper-Cook’s novel Waking the Messiah 
(1999), which has a female protagonist with a multiple personality disorder who 
sometimes speaks as Jesus. Abuse suffered at the hands of her ardently religious 
Pentecostal father prompts the onset of her illness. She has a butch lesbian personality, 
as well as a Jesus personality that who is prone to resentment, envy, and lust, and she 
becomes involved in an exploitative affair with a therapist. The possibility in the novel 
that this traumatized, stigmatized woman actually is a reincarnation of Jesus 
symbolically extends Jesus’ identification with people who were objects of scorn and 
mistrust, as she embodies multiple marginal social identities including mental patient 
and sexual deviant. At the same time, her manifestation of Jesus casts a mocking eye 
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on his divinity by radically humanizing him. The protagonist “becomes” her father’s 
god, and presents this god as nothing more than human.  
 The works discussed above are diverse in their satirical approaches as in many 
other respects, but are unified by their critical portrayals of religious authority and 
their focus on the sufferings and the worth of religiously targeted or marginalized 
characters. The abundance of such works suggests that those in my own study 
participate in a broader literary pattern. All the works in this study seem to favour a 
decrease in the institutional and moral power of the churches, and emphasize the right 
of individuals to choose their own paths without fear of recrimination. Against a 
disfavoured religious centre that consistently leaves its margins struggling for survival, 
the writers in my study repeatedly imagine a pluralistic world of intersecting, 
sometimes colliding voices, in which the former struggling margins form the very 
substance of the culture. 
 
1.3   Critical Context: “The Particular and the Different” in Contemporary                                    
Newfoundland Literature 
Given the startling quantity and frequently impressive quality of Newfoundland’s 
literary, dramatic, and popular-press output over the past several decades, the general 
dearth of critical attention to it is striking and lamentable. That being said, a modest 
body of criticism on Newfoundland writing has slowly developed over the past three 
decades, more rapidly in recent years as contemporary Newfoundland literature and 
drama has acquired a limited cachet in Canadian literary and theatrical studies. 
Though it has received little critical attention, Newfoundland’s Christian legacy has 
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been a prevalent thematic current in Newfoundland writing, particularly in humour 
and satire. Such humour responds to a key element of Newfoundland history and 
culture, and substantially contributes to Newfoundland literary themes that have been 
objects of critical scrutiny. By addressing humorous responses to religious authority, 
my project contributes significantly to the growing critical discussion of 
Newfoundland writing. And by examining several works’ reflections of a shift toward 
a pluralistic outlook concurrent with Newfoundland’s combined modernization, 
urbanization and secularization, my study contributes to a critical discussion of such 
perceptual shifts informing Canadian literature and culture more generally. 
In an article on the often institutionally oriented satirical comedy of CODCO, 
Helen Peters discusses the troupe’s politicized, comic depictions of often complex 
struggles and relationships. Peters argues that CODCO’s comedy emphasizes the 
legitimacy and the value of diverse oppressed or marginalized groups, focusing on 
their multiplicity and insisting that such diversity cannot be “absorbed” into the 
mainstream (17). Peters’ interpretation of CODCO’s comedy recalls Linda Hutcheon’s 
focus, in her book The Canadian Postmodern, on contemporary Canadian writers’ 
emphasis on particularity and difference. Hutcheon notes that “feminists and ethnic 
writers,” as well as writers strongly informed by region, have preferred “the particular 
and the different” (175) over the generalizing and the unifying (which have, in the 
views of such writers, too often been conveniently deceptive).6 Describing CODCO’s 
comedy, Peters adds “homosexuals,” “the disabled,” the very young, the very old, and 
a variety of other groups to the list of those with resiliently particular experiences and 
“discourses” (17). My own project follows upon Peters’ and Hutcheon’s critical 
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concern with the representation of various marginal groups. Hutcheon’s “postmodern” 
writers have much in common with the “pluralists” in my study, and with the 
“pluralistic activity” that, according to Richard Plant, has increasingly come to 
characterize Canadian theatre (200). To the ongoing critical conversation on 
representations of plurality and diversity in contemporary Canadian literature, my 
study offers an examination of Newfoundland works that respond to the island’s 
religious legacy in ways that are unmistakably region-specific, but which nonetheless 
reflect a broader pluralistic pattern in Canadian literature and drama.  
Much of the existing criticism of Newfoundland writing focuses on thematic 
concerns more thoroughly developed within the better-established field of 
Newfoundland folklore studies. Elke Dettmer describes as “folklorism” the use of 
traditional culture by people who have “become conscious, interested and 
knowledgeable about their own folklore” (169). Critics have repeatedly observed 
evidence of “folklorism” in Newfoundland writing (though they have not named it as 
such),7 perhaps most dramatically via the self-conscious celebration of traditional 
culture in literature, music, drama and visual art that characterized the “Newfcult” 
trend in the 1970s (Dettmer; O’Flaherty, “Margaret”).8  
While a good deal of Newfoundland writing uses “tradition” nostalgically, 
often as a grounding point from which to critique contemporary practices and politics 
(Pat Byrne, “Tall”), critics have also observed that much contemporary Newfoundland 
writing is politically critical without being nostalgic, drawing instead on other, often 
quite contemporary vantage points (O’Flaherty, The Rock; Peters, “From Salt”). Some 
such works can appear anti-traditional, anti-folk, or anti-religious (O’Flaherty, 
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“Margaret” 637), and frequently depict struggles against traditional norms and 
traditional sources and patterns of authority. Such prevalent regional struggles are 
centrally depicted in all of the works in my study.  
Though the term regional has often been employed in literary criticism in a 
fashion that belittles the potential extra-regional relevance or interest of a given work, 
some critics of Newfoundland writing have regarded regionalism as worthy of detailed 
exploration, and have made questions of regional character, identity, or themes an 
explicit scholarly focus (Gingell; Goldie, “Al Pittman;” Kirwin). Indeed, this 
regionalist focus is characteristic of criticism of Canadian literature more generally, 
representing one movement within a broader effort among critics to provide 
reasonably accurate generalizations regarding Canadian literature as a national 
literature. 
  Wary of regionalist arguments—perhaps because of their frequently 
condescending implications—critics such as Adrian Fowler (“The Literature”) and 
Albert Reiner Glaap have discussed Newfoundland works through the lens of 
universal human themes, for which regional settings are the package but not the point. 
In these critical works, as in those with a regionalist focus of one kind or another, and 
indeed as in much Canadian literary criticism since it became a recognized field of 
study, broad themes are a focus and broad generalizations a goal. Nonetheless, over 
the last fifteen years another strain of Newfoundland literary criticism, which 
challenges such a generalizing approach, has become increasingly prominent. Such 
criticism emphasizes literary sophistication and the peculiarities of individual 
experience, and de-emphasizes or subverts large, unifying cultural themes (Lynes; 
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Peters, “From Salt;” Mathews; Fuller; Chafe). A critical focus on particularity, 
idiosyncrasy, and formal nuance now competes with a focus on regional themes as the 
predominant critical lens on Newfoundland writing. 
Within existing criticism, studies of Newfoundland humour and satire are 
relatively scarce considering the striking prominence of these modes in a wide range 
of genres over the past decades. A few book chapters and several articles have focused 
on works by particular, prominent Newfoundland humorists (e.g., O’Flaherty, The 
Rock; Pat Byrne, “Tall;” Lynes; Méira Cook; Narváez, “Folk Talk;” Peters, “From 
Salt”); but aside from a meandering, sometimes illuminating book by Newfoundland 
elder statesman Herbert L. Pottle, no extensive study of this central element of 
contemporary Newfoundland culture appears to exist. According to Pottle’s Fun on 
the Rock, the power of the churches, of the government, and of the traditional 
economic elite in Newfoundland came to seem less immutable over the course of the 
twentieth century, and hence became more vulnerable to humorous jabs. This is a 
useful if rough analysis, which acknowledges important cultural shifts that have, at 
least, facilitated the open publication of irreverence toward institutions such as the 
island’s Christian churches.  
Even more than Newfoundland humour and satire, Newfoundlanders’ literary 
responses to the island’s Christian legacy have suffered a paucity of critical attention, 
considering the abundance of such work continuing to this day. The spectre of 
Christianity in Newfoundland literature is frequently mentioned by critics, largely via 
discussions of the tragi-comic works of poet and playwright Al Pittman.9 Though 
critical attention to the employment of Christian themes and materials is neither deep 
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nor detailed in these references to Pittman’s work,10 in such references one begins to 
discern useful patterns that are developed in greater detail in my study. For instance, 
Terry Goldie observes an occasional tendency in Pittman’s and Tom Dawe’s poetry to 
depict Christianity positively as an integral aspect of a traditional culture under siege, 
though not to defend it in religious terms (“Al” 202). Goldie also describes an 
implication in Pittman’s poetry that “the concept of sin has been displaced. There 
seems to be no established set of values” (206). According to Goldie’s interpretation, a 
moral anchor seems to have been lost, a turn of events that threatens to lead to a kind 
of amoral drift. Glaap describes tensions in Pittman’s play A Rope Against the Sun 
between an advocate of religious conservatism and an advocate of “educational 
progress” (63). And in an article on celebrated Newfoundland author Wayne 
Johnston’s first, comic novel The Story of Bobby O’Malley, Jeanette Lynes echoes 
Goldie’s and Glaap’s observations regarding such gaps, tensions, and cultural shifts. 
Lynes’ article argues that the parents of the youthful protagonist provide him with two 
very different, mutually competing, and ultimately inadequate worldviews: one parent 
is an uncritical Catholic, and the other a virtual nihilist (144-45). In my own project, I 
explore writers’ various attachments to Christianity, ranging from religious belief to a 
nostalgic impulse such as Goldie outlines. I also discuss aversions to aspects of 
Christian doctrine, to the churches’ institutional practices, to the denominational 
school system, and to interdenominational antipathy. I further examine how the writers 
respond to the ostensible moral crisis Goldie observes in Pittman’s work, follow up on 
Glaap’s observations regarding tensions between religious orthodoxy and secular 
education, and explore different works’ presentations of the intersection of mutually 
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competing, possibly irreconcilable worldviews such as Lynes observes in Johnston’s 
novel. 
Given its emphasis on history, legacy, and issues that haunt a whole “people,” 
my project has a kinship with a slightly older generation of Newfoundland literary 
criticism concerned with broad, thematic generalizations. Because of my own 
longstanding interest in the relationship between storytelling and ethics, I am drawn to 
works that demonstrate an obvious engagement with, and implicit evaluation of, 
broadly held beliefs, attitudes, and practices: often, the kinds of works described as 
“thesis-mongering” by Newfoundland-based writer and critic Lawrence Mathews 
(“Report” 9-10). While my project consciously, extensively engages with broad 
“Newfoundland” themes (often in “thesis-mongering” works), as well as with even 
broader sociological questions, I make an effort to bring together my attention to 
literary, cultural, and political movements with significant if secondary attention to 
craft and literary form: particularly the appeal and utility of different brands of humour 
in popular, journalistic, literary, and dramatic works that engage with Newfoundland’s 
rich, fraught Christian legacy.  
 
1.4   Outline of Chapters 
The Newfoundland joke books I discuss in Chapter Two include jokes drawing on 
many aspects of Newfoundland history and culture, among which jokes involving 
religious politics of one sort or another are heavily represented. Social dynamics in 
religious communities, interdenominational animosity and prejudice, and the roles and 
power of the clergy, are all recurrent subjects of these mostly lighthearted jokes. 
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Common joke characters include “long-winded preachers” (Burke Five 14), prideful 
or presumptuous clerics, local strays or nonbelievers, overly ardent believers, children 
undergoing religious socialization, and disseminators of interdenominational 
antipathy. All of these are variously employed in individual jokes, though the jokes’ 
collection and repackaging in the joke books tends to have particular effects on 
presentation. 
Observing several basic joke scenarios that recur with some frequency in the 
joke books, I discuss prevalent representations of religious authority, as well as of 
religiously defined boundaries of acceptable behaviour and belief. Further, I explore 
evidence of renegotiations of such boundaries as the power and roles of Christian 
churches and beliefs have changed, and as informally circulating individual jokes have 
been repackaged in collections with more or less deliberately constructed overall 
tones, produced and published after the onset of such changes. I argue that 
Newfoundland joke books negotiate between the demands of inherited beliefs and 
traditions, on the one hand, and a burgeoning cultural liberalization on the other. I 
maintain that the books participate in a cultural shift, as a diversity of jokes largely 
arising from, and reflecting the values of, a religiously conservative culture come to 
presage the more obviously pluralistic tone of the works discussed in subsequent 
chapters. 
 Newfoundland journalist and playwright Ray Guy, whose apostate religious 
satire is the subject of Chapter Three, is best known for his columns for the St. John’s 
Evening Telegram and other papers since the mid-1960s. Having gained his initial 
reputation largely due to his satire of Liberal premier Joseph R. Smallwood and his 
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government, Guy remained Newfoundland’s premier popular satirist for several 
decades. Well before he turned his hand to drama and a smattering of literary 
publishing, Guy was lauded for the literary quality of his journalism: for the poetic 
richness of his language, as well as for his use of fictional or quasi-fictional scenarios 
as means of commenting on current issues. Guy’s plays sustain his propensity for 
biting satire, as his first play Young Triffie’s Been Made Away With amply 
demonstrates: the title character of Triffie is killed before the play even begins, and her 
father—Guy’s most sustained religiously satirical caricature—is a violent, pedophilic, 
lunatic pastor with an apparent fondness for killing and mutilating sheep.  
Though apparently willing to target just about anyone, Guy has generally 
reserved his harshest satire for politicians or other authority figures. Secular and 
religious authorities in Guy’s work are generally depicted in similar ways: such 
figures are generally autocratic and are often obsessed with their own, frequently 
bizarre, visions for the well-being of “the people.” Guy is suspicious of any strong 
authorities, and of lofty-sounding justifications for power. In his satirical assaults on 
Christian institutions and agents, as in his satire of governmental politics, Guy 
displays a related fondness for the open clamour of clashing ideas that characterizes 
political pluralism (cf. Held 187-92). In Guy’s religious satire, this state of affairs 
seems to necessitate the removal of God from the public sphere, because of God’s 
utility as an ultimate justification for authoritarian desire. 
 Ray Guy’s satirical interest in authoritarian religion is reflected in the 
theologically liberal, ecumenically minded humour of newspaper columnist and 
memoirist Ed Smith, whose work forms the basis of Chapter Four. But whereas Guy is 
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prone to a bilious, Juvenalian response and flatly rejects the legitimacy of religious 
authority, Smith’s Horatian satirical responses are generally characterized by 
playfulness and mitigated by an appreciation of the ostensible benefits of religious life. 
He is a religious insider, good-humouredly satirizing elements of a religion in which 
he participates. In a regular column published in newspapers across Newfoundland, in 
two memoirs and a comical history of the island, and in his freelance commentary, 
Smith writes with a playfulness that suggests patience with human folly, a sense of 
being susceptible to folly himself, and a prevailing concern for social harmony.  
In Smith’s religious humour, a sustained engagement with moral and 
ontological questions is apparent beneath a rhetorical surface characterized by 
humorous second-guessing, self-deprecation, and contradiction. Through this 
combination, Smith gives religious matters sustained consideration while rejecting a 
firmly authoritative position. Smith explicitly embraces a broadly ecumenical religious 
outlook, complementing the rhetorical effects of his humorous style. He commits 
himself to his own religious tradition while remaining open to believers of other 
ontological accounts. To an extent, he is willing to live with the paradoxes, as well as 
the religious uncertainty, that emerge from this double commitment, though his 
interpretation of Christianity is such that the paradoxes, if not the uncertainty, tend to 
be minimized. Smith’s overall rhetorical practice encourages openness to the 
possibility of religious experience, while encouraging religious adherents to consider 
the likelihood that their religious traditions are neither perfect nor complete.  
 The ostensibly vast imperfection and incompleteness of the Catholic Church in 
1960s Newfoundland is at the heart of the religious themes in Ed Kavanagh’s first 
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novel, The Confessions of Nipper Mooney. The subject of Chapter Five, Kavanagh’s 
novel focuses on the experiences of Catholic youths from the fictional farming village 
of Kildura, near St. John’s. The story begins on the day of the death of Nipper’s father, 
and follows Nipper from this point, through his primary years at a small Roman 
Catholic school in the village, then through his middle- and high-school years at All 
Angels Academy, a St. John’s school run by the Christian Brothers. The novel’s end is 
punctuated by Nipper’s graduation and by the death of Brendan O’Brien, a local 
eccentric and mystic who has become a mentor to Nipper. Along the way, Nipper has 
to grapple with his growing disenchantment with a church that seems abusively 
authoritarian and disinclined toward self-correction. 
 Nipper develops bonds with several other, mostly stigmatized characters in 
various stages of alienation from the church; together they develop a sense of kinship 
outside the purview of institutional Catholicism. The novel’s episodes of lighthearted 
humour among its protagonists, as well as its clearly non-humorous depictions of 
aggressive joking among antagonists such as some of the Christian Brothers, tend to 
support the protagonists’ alienation and their growing kinship. Through the guidance 
of Brendan and the practical examples of several young dissidents and outcasts, 
Nipper gradually comes to trust his own moral intuition, to suspect the wisdom of his 
religious and moral instruction, and to love the diversity he has often been encouraged 
to despise. Kavanagh’s novel comes closest of all the works in this study to the liberal 
romanticism of Horwood’s Tomorrow Will Be Sunday: human diversity is celebrated 
enthusiastically, while forces that hedge it in are, at times, virtually demonized.  
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 Whereas the religiously critical streak in Kavanagh’s novel is focused on 
external, institutional sources of oppression, the characters in St. John’s-based 
playwright Berni Stapleton’s play The Pope and Princess Di are caught in oppressive 
emotional cycles, which have developed over a span of years, and whose relationship 
to institutional sources is often indirect. The play, discussed in Chapter Six, centres on 
Bernadette and Diana, two women recently diagnosed with breast cancer. During 
regularly scheduled hospital visits, they challenge each other’s accustomed ways of 
viewing, and confront their very different submissions to patriarchal pressures and 
symbols. They are helped along on their healing journey by several strange characters, 
including the titular pair, who at various times are idols, spirits, symbols, and 
projections. The Pope and Princess Di’s characters grow gradually and messily 
toward healing, through often painful confrontations between new, challenging 
experiences and the patchworks of beliefs the characters have accumulated and come 
to rely on. 
Blending realism, fantasy, satire, and warm-hearted caricature, Stapleton’s 
play is the most thematically intricate work discussed in this project.11 The play 
satirically challenges prevalent social norms and entrenched symbolism while keeping 
a critical eye on ways of understanding that would sweep in to replace them. It 
sustains a cautious appreciation of traditions, and a critical focus on the inevitable 
limitations of any world view. Through its humorous explorations of the power and 
pitfalls of symbols, the play argues against the immunity to criticism or change of any 
object of devotion, and gives earthly needs primacy; it subverts the traditional 
Christian emphases on transcendance and service to the godhead by demanding 
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service of the godhead in the here and now. The play refrains from endorsing a facile 
ethical pluralism (its characters are not self-aware enough for this), yet it presents 
freedom from unquestioning deference to any source of authority as a necessary 
prerequisite to well-being, and implies that whatever one may think of it, pluralism is 
simply the way of things: people will always have to grapple with the challenging or 
complementary impact of other ways of viewing than those to which they are 
accustomed. 
 Throughout the chapters, I refer with some freedom, though also with a 
consistent underlying rationale, to a range of terms more or less related to humour. For 
the purposes of the project, I consider humour to be a mode of speech or writing that 
invites a pleasantly surprised response through the creation or emphasis of 
incongruity. Humour, defined in this way, constitutes an anchor for related terms as 
they are used in this thesis. For instance, while satire need not be humorous (as long as 
it is somehow artful or stylized), in this study satire is treated specifically as a form of 
humorous ridicule. Accordingly, I explicitly note occasional instances in which 
ridicule ceases to be humorous, and otherwise use the term ridicule to refer to satire. 
Just as I sometimes use ridicule as a substitute for satire, I sometimes use terms such 
as comic, comical, comedic, or funny in place of humorous, as a means of avoiding 
tedium; they can be read as synonyms. Other terms used in the study have a looser 
relationship to humour. Occasionally, I use playful as a term to describe verbal wit 
that may or may not be funny, but which reflects some measure of the surprise and 
incongruity by which I define humour. Also, I use critical and related words to 
describe an apparent authorial position relative to an object of either satirical ridicule 
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or earnest objection: a critical depiction may be humorous, but this is not the point 
behind my use of the term. Other, more specific technical terms are used as they are 
needed, according to conventional definitions. 
 
1.5   Closedness Under Openness: Pluralism and Shifting Intolerance in the 
Works in this Study 
In the joke books discussed in Chapter One, an emergent embrace of liberty and 
openness coexists with residual affirmations of the coherence and stability provided by 
conservative religiosity; hints of a budding pluralistic outlook are recurrent but largely 
latent. In Ray Guy’s religious satire, pluralistic implications emerge through apostate 
ridicule of religious authority and a generally thoroughgoing skepticism. Ed Smith’s 
pluralistic orientation is more directly apparent, and his playful humour, his general 
sense of doubt, and his religious ecumenism are obviously linked to one another. In Ed 
Kavanagh’s Confessions, often scathing depictions of an authoritarian Roman Catholic 
Church and its ostensibly hubristic agents are contrasted with congenial depictions of 
a range of alienated protagonists; the novel thereby delegitimates the church’s moral 
authority and celebrates diversity. And the frequently biting humour in Berni 
Stapleton’s The Pope and Princess Di emphasizes the gaps and contradictions that 
permeate all worldviews, and cautions against abuse arising through overriding 
confidence in, or attachment to, an accustomed point of view. In all these cases, the 
generally high valuation of individual freedom, equality, and diversity suggests the 
influence of contemporary movements such as liberalism, secular humanism, 
feminism, and religious ecumenism. An operative embrace of pluralism, common 
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among the works, draws together these various influences under one unruly umbrella. 
This embrace is evident in the works’ rhetorical support of variety in both lifestyle and 
belief. Yet, necessarily if paradoxically, this pluralistic “openness” imposes its own 
“closedness,” its own limitations upon the very tolerance it values. That is to say, any 
authority that would hedge in such diversity by disciplining and constraining non-
coercive deviance is depicted, more or less on all counts, as intolerable.  
Two interrelated strains of pluralist thought reflect values embedded in the 
works under discussion. Political pluralism describes a political system and political 
activity characterized by competition for influence among many diverse groups,12 and 
epistemological pluralism suggests that fundamental truths (truths capable of 
explaining the nature of things in a general sense) are plural and often 
“incommensurable” (Talisse 2-4). Neither of these pluralistic principles justifies 
claims to religious ascendancy, or affirms exclusive possession of truth. Both share as 
an operating principle the notion that settling on a particular account of reality is not in 
the nature of human beings,13 a principle that also underpins humour, with its reliance 
on incongruities, disjunctures, and foibles.  
For dedicated humorists, people’s resistance to agreement is not only 
inevitable but acceptable and even desirable. In a book on the social roles of humour, 
Michael Mulkay argues that it is in the nature of humour to celebrate “multiplicity” 
(213-214). In the works discussed for this project, this multiplicity constitutes 
sufficient grounds for being suspicious of any claim to the authority to dictate values 
and practices. This is consistent with Pottle’s argument that an increased sense among 
Newfoundlanders that traditional sources of power are not immutable has 
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corresponded with a rise in humour targeting these institutions. Concordantly, the 
works discussed in this study tend toward anti-authoritarianism, and to reflect a 
corresponding reticence regarding moral or religious regulation.  
 At the same time, several of the works explicitly acknowledge the importance 
of people’s need for rules and limits. And all of them, to some degree, reflect such a 
need by favouring particular, fairly consistent moral boundaries. These boundaries are 
aligned with the works’ general rhetorical support of the non-hegemonic coexistence 
of multiple beliefs and lifestyles. From such an outlook, moral regulation premised on 
anything but the now privileged principles of tolerance and openness becomes 
problematic, and certain outlooks can accordingly be judged and, in some cases, 
rejected because of their incompatibility with the ethical demands of pluralism. In the 
works in this study, Christian denominations’ traditional claims to adherence and 
obedience, especially paired as they have been in Newfoundland with power in the 
legislative realm, are judged on these grounds. The works exemplify a tendency, 
prominent in contemporary Canadian literature, to defend the legitimacy of various 
cultural margins against the hegemony of centralized sources of power.14 Works by 
Ray Guy, Ed Smith, Ed Kavanagh, and Berni Stapleton, as well as Newfoundland joke 
books in their more mitigated fashion, reflect Newfoundland’s participation in the 
imaginative construction of a pluralistic world, a cultural movement that has played a 
significant role in the development of Newfoundland’s—and, more broadly, 
Canada’s—current social, political, and religious climate. 
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Notes 
1 Secularization is a controversial topic among scholars of religion. Scholars question 
whether secularization accurately describes contemporary cultural movements, and 
argue about which contemporary cultures are usefully described by the term. Scholars 
also debate what the term secularization even means, since definition has become 
difficult due to the term’s application to a wide range of disciplines with differing 
points of focus. These points of focus include the institutional influence of religious 
bodies, church affiliation and attendance, religious self-identification, and novel 
adaptations of religious beliefs (Dobbelaere); such focuses yield different answers to 
the question of whether a given culture is undergoing secularization. For a quick 
overview of some of the main issues surrounding secularization as an object of 
scholarly debate, see Karel Dobbelaere’s article on secularization in the Encyclopedia 
of Religion and Society. Major contributors to the scholarly debate include Peter 
Berger, Thomas Luckmann, Rodney Stark, William Sims Bainbridge, and Frank J. 
Lechner.  
 In asserting that secularization characterizes Newfoundland culture in recent 
decades, I refer primarily to secularization on a “societal level” (Dobbelaere). That is 
to say, while the works in my study address a fairly wide range of religious and 
ecclesiastical issues, the cultural trend which I observe, and which, I argue, the works 
support, is the gradual loss of Christian churches’ and explicitly Christian values’ 
influence in public-sphere realms such as legislation, education, and the media. 
 27
  
                                                                                                                                                                       
2 Although in Voices From the Landwash the title of the play is Young Triffie 
Been Made Away With, in the advertisements I have seen for several stage 
productions, in most general references to the play (except for some that specifically 
cite Lynde’s text) and in the new film adaptation directed by Mary Walsh (who was 
involved in commissioning the play and who directed its initial, 1985 production) and 
co-written by Ray Guy, the title includes “Triffie’s Been” rather than “Triffie Been.” 
On a manuscript of the 1985 version of the play, the title is Young Triffie Has Been 
Made Away With, which bears a closer grammatical relationship to “Triffie’s Been” 
than to “Triffie Been.” Hence, I have opted to call the play Young Triffie’s Been Made 
Away With, though I quote from the version in the collection. 
 3 Throughout this project, I discuss only Newfoundland, and not Labrador. 
Labrador is culturally very distinct from Newfoundland, and is part of the same 
“place” only in certain, very limited ways. Hence, post-confederation Newfoundland 
is described as an island rather than a province. The province of Newfoundland and 
Labrador is only mentioned in discussions of post-Confederation legislative policy or 
province-wide statistics. 
4 For an engaging chapter on the role of the novelist as an ethically engaged 
public intellectual, and on an ostensible contemporary rift between the culture of 
“serious” literature and the literate public, see John Ralston Saul’s 1993 book 
Voltaire’s Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West. 
5 The 1960s resettlement program in Newfoundland responded to a belief by 
some that the traditional economy and population patterns on the island were doomed 
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to failure, and an attendant belief that some form of urbanization and industrialization 
was a necessary response. See Webb, “Community.” 
6 This is only partly true, given regionalism’s tendency to generalize the 
regional experience; Hutcheon is clearly focusing on differences among regions rather 
than commonalities within them. 
7 Such literary “folklorism” includes the literary adaptation of dialect (Kirwin) 
and of conventional folk-tale genres such as the tall tale (Pat Byrne, “Tall”). 
8 This cultural movement, described by Patrick O’Flaherty in a 1977 article as 
“tiresome and patronizing” (“Margaret” 637), drew Canada-wide attention to the 
Newfoundland arts scene (Dettmer 172). 
 9 Pittman’s first, 1966 book of poetry The Elusive Resurrection set the stage 
for a preoccupation with Catholic Christianity that spanned his career. Pittman is, to 
the best of my knowledge, the only significant practitioner of religiously-focused 
humour among Newfoundland poets—though even in Pittman’s poetry such humour 
remains sporadic and mostly slight. 
10 The vast majority of the considerable body of existing scholarly work on 
Newfoundland religion has been historical or folkloric. 
11 This assertion excepts Andy Jones’ one-man show To The Wall, which I 
discuss only briefly. 
12 In David Held’s Models of Democracy (1987), political pluralism is 
described as competition for influence among many groups, in an environment that is 
structurally receptive to their mutual contention (187-92). 
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13 In his 2003 essay “Can Democracy Be a Way of Life?”, Robert B. Talisse 
suggests, “[D]isagreement over Big Questions is endemic to the human condition,” 
and is not merely the result of the shortcomings of particular systems (3). 
14 Canadian literary works outside Newfoundland that offer religiously focused 
examples of this tendency include Timothy Findley’s satirical 1984 rendering of the 
story of Noah and the Ark, Not Wanted On the Voyage; Louise Halfe’s “Der Poop” 
poems in her 1994 poetry collection Bear Bones and Feathers; Tomson Highway’s 
semi-autobiographical 1998 first novel Kiss of the Fur Queen; Margaret Atwood’s 
dystopian 1986 novel The Handmaid’s Tale; Antonine Maillet’s La Sagouine, a 1971 
first-person narrative of the daily life of an Acadian washerwoman; and Adele 
Wiseman’s 1974 novel Crackpot, a mythically infused tale of the life and struggles of 
an obese, Jewish prostitute in 1930s Winnipeg. 
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2.   Agonistic Amusements in Pluralistic Packaging: Religious Power and 
Boundaries in Newfoundland Joke Books 
 
2.1   Introduction 
Despite the relatively conservative slant of much of the religious humour in 
Newfoundland joke books as compared to the works studied in later chapters, the 
themes and the targets of ridicule that dominate these jokes are generally consistent 
with those in the later works. In addition, the joke books tend implicitly to endorse a 
pluralistic vision of inter-religious relations that foreshadows the other works’ more 
obviously pluralistic perspectives. A number of jokes hinge on broadly shared 
religious knowledge, treating religion primarily as an aspect of culture and 
foreshadowing the various attachments to Christian culture in the works discussed in 
later chapters. Aside from such “religion-as-culture” jokes, religious jokes in 
Newfoundland joke books are generally characterized by the playful negotiation of 
boundaries of acceptable behaviour and belief. Some depict power dynamics within 
religious communities, typically centring on mild forms of deviance, their 
relationships to power and to religious truth, the insights they potentially reveal, and 
the limits that are set upon them. Others emphasize differences or antipathies among 
Christian denominations, often using stereotypes that are sometimes undermined as 
part of the joke. The joke books’ humorous depictions of the sometimes uneasy 
negotiation of religious boundaries reflect common religious tensions between moral 
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rigour and personal freedom, between faith and doubt, and between socio-religious 
centres and margins—tensions that variously underpin works by Guy, Smith, 
Kavanagh, and Stapleton. Such frictions were alive in the Newfoundland culture in 
which most of the jokes were created or adapted as informal, piecemeal responses to 
lived experiences of Christian religion. And they continue to resonate, sometimes with 
explicit shifts in tone and emphasis, in the joke book producers’ calculatedly nostalgic 
yet latently pluralistic collections of Newfoundland’s humorous heritage.  
 As a form of popular literature that bloomed in the 1970s, Newfoundland joke 
books have flourished on the island and abroad; Bob Tulk’s first book of Newfie Jokes 
alone “is said to have sold 100, 000 copies a year for five years” (Thomas, “Newfie” 
142). These books capitalize on the association of Newfoundland with funniness that 
developed through the twentieth century. Some of them openly exploit the “Newfie” 
joke tradition that began to emerge in the first half of the century.1 The most obvious 
examples of these are Bob Tulk’s and (later) the Tulk Family’s series of stereotype-
soaked books of Newfie Jokes. Another, apparently more affirming strain of humour is 
favoured by a number of Newfoundland joke book producers. The most famous 
practitioner of this strain is “Uncle” Al Clouston, though J.C. Burke is similarly 
prolific and his tone is similarly amicable. Clouston avoids peddling obvious 
stereotypes;2 instead, he markets a myth of Newfoundland that ascended in the early- 
to mid-twentieth century, largely through radio personalities such as Joey Smallwood 
and Ted Russell. It is a myth according to which Newfoundlanders’ essential character 
is hardy, good-humoured, and clever, and in which these characteristics have emerged 
out of—even as a direct result of—the crucible of Newfoundland’s politically fraught 
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and often perilous history. Clouston’s marketing of a preferred version of 
Newfoundland identity leads to fairly elaborate preambles to many of the jokes he 
tells, and to a tone that encourages the general belief that all is well in Newfoundland. 
As it pertains to humour about religion, Clouston’s affable stance limits the extent to 
which jokes that are vigorously critical of ecclesiastical power can be included: such 
jokes seem largely to have been filtered out of his works through selection and 
presentation. This is especially apparent when one compares his books to the Tulks’. 
On the other hand, Clouston’s general affability tends to delimit the conservative 
ridicule also most apparent in the Tulks’ books, in which the mockery of marginal 
characters such as the unbeliever or, conversely, the enthusiast, is considerably 
stronger.3  
While joke books are an often depreciated and dismissed form of popular 
literature,4 the subjects of their humour, as well as some of the stereotypes they 
exploit, are fundamental to the development of professional humour in Newfoundland. 
For instance, the emphases on power relations, institutional privilege, and abuses and 
moral failures among the clergy that imbue so much of Newfoundland’s published 
humour about religion are abundant in Newfoundland joke books, though in a 
generally milder form. Newfoundland communities have tended to be conservative, 
having regarded much of the existing order as “sacred,” or at least as “basic” to their 
lives (Anthony P. Cohen 115-16). However, they simultaneously have sustained a 
prickly, often discontented relationship with status quo agents (Taft 92). Most 
published Newfoundland humour in recent decades has tended to emphasize this 
discontent without being very concerned about preserving the values and beliefs of a 
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waning status quo. Instead, they prefer the pluralism of an emerging ascendancy. 
While Newfoundland joke books reflect some of this discontent and this emergent 
pluralism, they also tend—either as a result of the jokes’ relative intimacy with their 
community sources or the book producers’ own predilections—to reflect the 
conservatism that has been a prominent feature of the island’s religious culture. 
 Due to their formal ambiguity, jokes cannot be considered clear means of 
conveying coherent points of view. Yet joking is a prominent way of negotiating 
meaning, exploring difficult social or epistemological problems, and tacitly discerning 
points of agreement and disagreement. And despite the ambiguity built into humour, 
many jokes have obvious political tendencies. Addressing the question of what the 
jokes under discussion “do,” I speculate on some likely characteristics of their oral 
circulation in communities, and address the impact of selection, collection and 
publication in commercial books. Throughout, I quietly draw on some useful, general 
ideas from humour scholars Edward L. Galligan and Michael Mulkay, folklorist Diane 
Tye, and Catholic theologian Jean Vanier.  
From Galligan, I have borrowed the premise that good comedy typically 
emerges from a recognition of the prevalence of injustice in human affairs, and is, in 
part, a means of managing the resultant rough waters (152). At the same time, I try to 
heed Mulkay’s caution against a view of joking as instrumental speech with social 
change as its object. Mulkay argues that those jokes least bound by status quo values 
tend to be the most removed from structured social environments, and therefore are 
constrained, in terms of their potential political utility, by a murkier context and less 
certain interpretation (176-77). Conversely, those jokes that operate in intimate 
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relation to “reasonably well defined social contexts” tend by and large to “conserve 
the dominant pattern of social relationships” (177). 
 I use Tye’s study of “local characters” in Amherst, Nova Scotia, as a reference 
point for my cautious speculations on the role of religious joking within communities. 
Among Tye’s hypotheses is the double proposition that the existence and narrative 
elaboration of “local characters” within a community encourage mainstream residents 
to find ways to accommodate difference and sustain a critical consciousness of power, 
while also acting as a warning to residents not to deviate too far from the norm, given 
that local characters occupy the very edges of the community’s idea of itself.5 
 From Vanier, I borrow an idea related to Mulkay’s descriptions of social 
joking and to Tye’s description of the dual effects of local character stories. As I note 
in Chapter One, striving to balance “closedness” and “openness” is, for Vanier, crucial 
to the creation and sustenance of humane community. He cautions, “It is not easy to 
strike [such] a balance,” and asks, “Isn’t this the challenge of all religions and of all 
Christian churches?” (65). This tension is at the heart of this chapter, this project, and 
the jokes themselves. 
 
2.2   Restless Conservatism: Jokes about Power and Roles in Religious 
Communities 
Vanier’s observations about the tension between closedness and openness, stability 
and flexibility, coherence and scope, are richly reflected in the large body of jokes in 
Newfoundland joke books that focus on social and ecclesiastical dynamics within 
religiously-defined communities. Patterns of depiction among these jokes suggest a 
 35
  
favourable interest in the maintenance of coherent religious communities, within 
which roles and structures are defined with considerable clarity and consistency. 
Further, the jokes poke fun at non-attenders and non-believers who (to borrow from 
Tye as well as Vanier) occupy the outer edge of the community’s capacity for 
openness. On the other hand, the jokes ridicule the clergy more than any other role-
defined group, and they make fun of religious zealotry as an apparent excess of 
closedness. Overall, a mild, slightly nostalgic conservatism tends to characterize those 
jokes in the joke books that depict religious dynamics within communities—but it is a 
restless conservatism, one which acknowledges the potential for abuses of power, and 
which at least toys with the potential veracity of a variety of marginal positions. 
 Many ecclesiastical jokes in Newfoundland joke books involve confrontations 
between clerics and laypersons. In most of these, the cleric is the primary butt of the 
joke. Clerics are routinely depicted as know-it-alls, as arrogant or uptight, or as 
morally pushy and sometimes hypocritical: traits related to their role-defined 
difference from their parishioners. In an essay on the role of the priest as confessor, 
Anglican priest John Gaskell argues that, historically, such perceptions have been 
reinforced by the behaviour of the clergy. Gaskell describes the clergy as a group 
“who often do understand yet greatly disapprove, who constantly go on record as 
being shocked or upset at how ordinary human beings live, and who as constantly give 
the impression of difference or superiority.” He argues that while “such superiority is 
a delusion[,] [t]his false impression is . . . often to be found among church people” 
(152). Jokes targeting the clergy in Newfoundland joke books tend to reflect a 
common attitudinal tension regarding clerical power, routinely depicting both 
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suspicion and acceptance of clerical superiority among the jokes’ parishioner 
characters. Folklorist Michael Taft writes, “There is a long tradition of jokes in 
Newfoundland which show disrespect for important community figures such as 
clergymen, teachers, doctors, politicians, judges and policemen.” But Taft cautions 
those who would overestimate such anti-authoritarianism: “[A]lthough these symbols 
of authority are laughed at, they are at the same time respected and feared” (92). 
Overall, clergy-ridiculing jokes do not generally condemn clerics or favour any kind 
of overhaul of the traditional religious status quo, as most of the works discussed in 
subsequent chapters seem to do. Rather, taken as a body, the jokes call on the clergy to 
merit their unequal power by constraining their arrogance, moderating their hypocrisy, 
opening themselves to their parishioners, and generally staying tolerably close in their 
practice to the virtues they preach. Such a call for clerical worthiness presages Ed 
Smith’s religious humour, which is exceptional among the works discussed in 
subsequent chapters in terms of the room it allows for something like traditional 
religious arrangements. The sheer quantity of jokes targeting the clergy, combined 
with the admonitions implicit in the consistency of their themes, suggest that clerics 
have been perceived as having a particular obligation not to deviate from religious 
mores because of their ecclesiastical authority and their heavy symbolic identification 
with the religious life of the community. 
One regular scenario in jokes targeting clerics is the comic, temporary 
overturning of status differences between clerics and laypersons via depictions of 
clerics’ ignorance in matters in which they have assumed themselves superior. In one 
such joke told by J.C. Burke (himself a minister of the United Church of Canada), a 
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minister’s moral presumption is ridiculed, and his scriptural expertise unsettled. He 
goes to a parishioner’s door to visit, hears footsteps though no one answers, and leaves 
the following message: “Revelations 3:20 ‘behold I stand at the door and knock: If 
anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in to them.”6  The next week 
the woman he has tried to visit hands him a card that reads simply “Genesis 3:10.” He 
does not know the passage, and has to look it up later. It reads, “I heard thy voice in 
the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself” (Burke, Laughs 
Along #22).7 The minister’s presumption that he is being ignored is false, and he also 
fails to recognize the biblical passage cited by his parishioner, who undercuts the 
normal expectation that he will possess superior biblical knowledge. Yet, this joke 
reinscribes the distinct roles of the minister and the parishioner even as it temporarily 
unsettles them. The minister’s choice of a joking Biblical reference depicts a 
messianic perspective and divine power, while the parishioner’s joking reference is 
earthy, taking the point of view of a human responding to the divine. If the parishioner 
gains a measure of relative status in the joke, it is contained within a role that is 
generally fixed. Correspondingly, the cleric’s authority is not seriously disrupted. The 
implicit reinscription of conventional status differences is a common tendency among 
apparently critical religious jokes in Newfoundland joke books. The tendency to 
present the ecclesiastical hierarchy as basically immutable, though its agents be 
subject to criticism, anticipates Ed Kavanagh’s presentation of the Catholic hierarchy 
in The Confessions of Nipper Mooney. But while Kavanagh’s novel generally favours 
rejection of a system presented, on balance, as oppressive and harshly resistant to 
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change, the jokes, taken as a body, allow for the acceptability, or even the desirability, 
of submission to an imperfect system operated by imperfect agents. 
Among such imperfections as they are presented in the joke books, clerical 
pride is particularly prominent. This is consistent with the observation of humour 
theorist John Morreal that “people . . . who ‘put on airs,’ who act as if they are richer 
or more important than they really are, and in doing so take themselves completely 
seriously” (67) are common joke targets. Burke tells a lengthy joke in which a local 
priest attempts to correct the behaviour of a young boy, who in turn inadvertently 
draws attention to the priest’s arrogance and stand-offishness. The joke’s ridicule of 
the priest is reinforced by the age and inexperience of its vehicle. Though the boy 
initially demonstrates a lack of mannerly finesse by barging into the priest’s house 
with a salmon he has brought as a gift, he is ultimately shown to be more considerate 
and generous than the priest. When the boy is instructed to act the part of the priest—
to see how he feels when the priest similarly barges in—the boy responds, “Thank you 
son, here’s fifty cents. Give the salmon to the maid and come and sit down and have a 
bite of breakfast” (Treasury 98). Rather than correcting the boy’s impropriety, the 
priest displays his haughtiness and lack of gratitude. Given that most priests and 
ministers in Newfoundland communities, as elsewhere, have been from outside the 
communities they have served, usually educated if not born and raised in faraway 
centres, certain gaps between parishioners and their clerics have tended to characterize 
Newfoundland communities historically. These include gaps in erudition and urbanity 
as well as heritage and belongingness—all this in addition to hierarchized role 
differences. In Al Pittman’s play A Rope Against the Sun, such differences take an 
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ominous turn, engendering mutual alienation and suspicion. In communities less 
characterized by antipathy than Pittman’s fictional Merasheen, relief of tensions 
brought about by cleric-parishioner differences might be brought to bear through 
joking about the gaps, bringing the cleric “down a peg” in a way that does not 
seriously disrupt the status quo, and might help community members to reconcile 
themselves to the cleric’s unique status and unusual power. 
Preaching jokes constitute a genre of jokes that clearly reflects the cathartic 
and conciliatory potential of humour targeting clerics. That preaching jokes have 
circulated widely and in great numbers in Newfoundland is apparent from their 
prevalence in joke books. They likely spread readily from one community to another, 
and have been heavily selected for commercial joke books, because the experience 
they describe is easily transferable. Preaching jokes contain an anti-authoritarian 
streak that could have a cathartic effect on people who might sometimes be frustrated 
by the cleric but who cannot change, or do not want to change, the status quo. Ted 
Cohen writes, “If your [anti-authoritarian] joke works, you will make people laugh at 
your oppressor, and if you are very lucky . . . , you may make your oppressor laugh at 
himself” (44). While “oppressor” is too harsh a term to apply to the typical butt of 
preaching jokes, the power relations and the role of joking Cohen describes are 
appropriate to a discussion of such jokes. Cohen’s last suggestion is especially 
pertinent to the genre because such jokes tend to be more playful than nasty: it is easy 
to imagine clerics laughing, for instance, at their own potential for long-windedness, 
especially since the circulation of such light-hearted jokes demonstrates a willingness 
to treat the matter lightly. 
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Christian parishioners have not typically been in a position to control the 
length or content of church proceedings to which they have been more or less 
obligated, a state of affairs bound to cause passing resentment even among generally 
contented parishioners. The joke books’ presentation of such responses presages Ed 
Smith’s playful depiction of his youthful struggles to pay attention to his own father’s 
lengthy sermons. In Smith’s memoir Some Fine Times!, this struggle is shared by 
many in the congregation, and is presented as an acceptable, even amusing feature of 
church life. A concordant joke told by Burke depicts the grim endurance of one 
parishioner, followed by a surprising request. In the joke, a guest preacher preaches far 
beyond his agreed-upon time frame. The local pastor, desperate for him to stop 
talking, tries to toss the hymn book toward him to remind him that his time is up. The 
hymn book overshoots its target and hits an old man in the front row between the eyes: 
“As the old fellow was passing into a state of unconsciousness he was heard to say, 
‘Hit me again I can still hear him. Hit me again I can still hear him” (Treasury 36-37). 
Like Smith’s treatments of church life, jokes about long-winded preachers encourage 
their circulators not to take clerics or their faults too seriously. Such a treatment 
discourages too much elevation or expectation of the clergy, while also encouraging 
reconciliation to the cleric’s special role. 
 Some preaching jokes recall the temporary status reversals that characterize the 
“Genesis and Revelation” joke and the “salmon” joke above.8 Some of these are 
variations on long-winded-preacher jokes,9 but a few, such as the following in which a 
Catholic woman responds to a Papal edict, are more doctrinally specific and obviously 
irreverent: “A priest was passing on a message from the Pope that no Catholic women 
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were to use the Birth Control Pills. An old lady in the back of the church stands up and 
says "He no play-a-da game, he no make-a-da rules" (Tulk, Newfie Jokes 22). Such 
obvious questioning of the moral authority of the churches, lighthearted as it may be in 
this instance, is unusual in the joke books, but comes to dominate the irreverent 
humour of most of the works discussed in subsequent chapters. In those works, 
questions about the power of the clergy are substantially informed by ostensible 
doctrinal problems, as well as by the unsuitable behaviour of individual clerics 
protected by the power of the church. However mildly, the latter issue dominates most 
of the joke books’ religious jokes targeting the clergy, while doctrinal issues are left 
largely unbroached. Overall, the joke books tend, in their depictions of clerics, to 
emphasize common tensions, mixed feelings, and miscommunications that have as 
much to do with community life, institutions, and power as they do with religious 
beliefs.  
Such earthly concerns seem to underpin the ambiguity of the joke books’ 
presentation of local clerics, who are sometimes depicted as haughty, and sometimes 
as down-to-earth, often depending upon the particular interactions in question. Like 
the above jokes targeting local clerics, jokes that depict relationships between parish-
level clerics and their ecclesiastical superiors turn on the power and status of the 
clergy. But jokes depicting relations within the clerical ranks tend to ennoble parish 
clerics based on their day-to-day association with parishioners, while bishops are 
placed in a position akin to that occupied by the parish cleric in the above jokes. In a 
joke of this sort told by Clouston, a bishop informs a vicar of his upcoming visit to the 
parish. The appointed Sunday comes and only three people are in church. The bishop 
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asks, “Did you let it be known that I was coming?” The vicar responds, “No, but it 
seems the word got around” (When 94). In another Clouston joke, a Bishop’s self-
importance is similarly attacked through Father Coady, a short-tempered southern-
shore priest who is not happy to receive visits from the Bishop.10 The Bishop bemoans 
the lack of indoor plumbing at Father Coady’s rectory, and tells him, “the next time I 
come to visit you, you have the plumbing in.” Father Coady does as he is told, and 
after the Bishop visits again Father Coady sends him the bill. The Bishop indignantly 
returns it, but Father Coady sends it again, with the following note: “I didn’t want it. 
You wanted it. You used it. You pay for it” (“Come ‘Ere”). Senior clerics in the joke 
books are usually prideful, out of touch, and presumptuous, while local clerics may 
sometimes embody these traits but at other times are depicted in solidarity with 
parishioners, over and against bishops. On the one hand, parish clerics are objects of 
scrutiny and a paradoxical blend of suspicion and reverence that draws attention to 
gaps between the cleric and parishioners. On the other hand, they are social and 
spiritual advocates who know their parishioners and their needs reasonably well, and 
who may be seen to protect their interests in the face of remote, largely alien 
ecclesiastical structures and agents. While the open religious alienation that 
characterizes much of the work discussed in the following chapters is not similarly 
perceivable in the joke books, one can discern in them a measure of consternation 
regarding ecclesiastical power, specifically as it combines with a perception of gaps in 
point of view among the ranks within religious hierarchies, from bishops (where they 
exist) down to parishioners. Problematic combinations of religious power, inability to 
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relate to parishioners, and clerical attitude problems, are frequently depicted in the 
more openly critical works discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 The relatively small number of clergy-layperson jokes in which a layperson is 
the primary butt complement the conservative, conciliatory undercurrent of many 
jokes targeting the clergy. Jokes targeting parishioners typically emphasize a 
parishioner’s ignorance or self-importance. Most such jokes gently affirm 
parishioners’ place in the religious ranks, upholding the special status of the cleric and, 
thereby, the authority of the church.  
Clouston (I’se the B’y 95) and Burke (Treasury 117) tell similar jokes in which 
the special status of the cleric is affirmed. The joke centres on a church meeting in 
which the prospect of a new chandelier for the sanctuary is discussed. In Clouston’s 
version, the minister makes the proposal, to which the chair of the board responds, “I 
don’t think the board will recommend that, Reverend, and for three reasons. In the first 
place none of us could spell it. In the second place if we got one, there’s no one could 
play it. And in the third place what this church really needs is better light” (Clouston 
I’se the B’y 95). Given that the chair’s position signifies his importance in the life of 
the church, distinctions among laypersons submit to a hierarchized division between 
the cleric and laypersons. The minister’s status is positively linked to his apparent 
sophistication and arcane knowledge, while even a layperson with high status in the 
church community is characterized as a relative rustic, ignorant outside the realm of 
immediate concerns. At the same time, a typical, contrary undercurrent may be 
discerned, reflecting the dual-direction ridicule so common in the joke books. Here, 
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the minister’s own haughtiness in proposing a fancy, foreign-sounding “chandelier” 
instead of a more basic, familiar light source may be an implicit target. 
In addition to ignorance, moral flaws are used to target parishioners. Among 
moral targets, the most common is arrogance, just as it is in jokes targeting clerics. 
The joke books tend to suggest that a sense of humility regarding one’s place is an 
appropriate standard for clerics and laypersons alike. Accordingly, Clouston tells a 
joke that targets a self-important parishioner who hopes to buy his way into heaven 
through generous donations to the church. He asks the minister how much more he 
needs to give in order to be assured his eternal reward. The minister goes home to 
think about it, and tells the man a few weeks later that the amount is twenty-five 
thousand dollars. Then he adds, “One more thing. Be ready next Saturday” (When 5). 
The joke contains no real implication that the minister is prescient regarding the man’s 
fate—the suggestion seems to be strategic, designed to humble the parishioner, to 
bring in money for the church, or simply to entertain the minister himself. 
Intriguingly, the joke favours the minister’s disingenuous response to the parishioner’s 
spiritual pride. The minister’s display of one apparent virtue (prescience) suggests 
different actual virtues: possibly charity, but definitely cleverness, as distinct from any 
moral merit. However one interprets the minister’s motivation, the joke’s appeal is 
based largely on a sense that the parishioner “had it coming.” The cleric is elevated 
because he is, above all, clever enough to be the vehicle of a self-important man’s 
come-uppance. A widely recognized political fatalism has characterized the culture of 
Newfoundland’s working classes for centuries. Historian after historian has noted the 
common belief that little could (or, according to Anthony P. Cohen’s study of one 
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community’s political attitude, ought to) be done to disrupt the status quo. 
Extrapolating from this generalized resignation, it is easy to see how a self-important 
parishioner could be an object of ridicule, just as the arrogance of parish-level clerics 
is humorously targeted while their connectedness and groundedness—their proper 
place one small step up from their parishioners—is celebrated in jokes targeting their 
haughty ecclesiastical superiors.  
 Some of the playful explorations of standards and statuses dramatized in the 
above jokes are at their clearest in jokes involving clerics’ interactions with strays 
and/or unbelievers. In these jokes, the cleric occupies one marginal space 
(paradoxically, since they are also, in some sense, at the “centre” of the community), 
and the stray occupies an opposite, more obvious marginal space. These jokes are 
especially resonant in consideration of the emphasis on religiously marginal characters 
in Kavanagh’s Confessions, but their playful dramatizations of boundaries, and of 
associated tensions between doctrine and individual perception, presage all the 
subsequent works in this study. Because of their marginal social location, the strays in 
clergy-stray jokes make particularly good vehicles for ridicule directed at the cleric. 
Conversely, the cleric can be used to ridicule moral or religious deviance, as a way of 
defining social boundaries and standards. As they appear in Newfoundland joke 
books, clergy-stray jokes are typically characterized by dual-direction ridicule, 
targeting figures on opposite margins of the ostensibly normal, and upholding a 
standard that is more socially than religiously conservative. 
 A staple interaction in clergy-stray jokes is the confrontation between a cleric 
and a church non-attender whose deviation consists of non-attendance itself rather 
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than any active sin or obvious lack of belief. Later, Kavanagh critically emphasizes the 
social rather than the religious motivation that might underpin such a concern about 
church non-attendance. In The Confessions, expressions of concern regarding one 
character’s non-attendance transparently reflect a generalized anxiety about social 
deviance that is not treated with much sympathy. Clergy-stray jokes in the joke books, 
on the contrary, tend to gently imply that those who stray are rightfully brought back 
into the fold, though the common thread of dual-direction ridicule is usually 
discernible. In one joke, a “rather truant” parishioner who tells the minister he avoids 
church because it is full of hypocrites is rebuked by the minister, who tells him, 
“There is always room for one more” (Burke, Treasury 145). While this joke 
legitimates the parishioner’s observation (church is full of hypocrites), it deflates the 
parishioner’s use of this observation as an excuse for non-attendance, especially 
considering the joke’s circulation among people immersed in a Christian world-view. 
That is, church is a place of and for hypocrites, as well as all other manners of sinners, 
so the presence of hypocrites in the church, far from being a reason to avoid it, may be 
interpreted as evidence that the church is functioning properly.  
Another clergy-stray joke depicts the unqualified religious confidence of an 
evangelist challenged by an atheist at an open-air meeting. This joke combines a 
measure of religious conservatism with an undercurrent of anti-fundamentalist ridicule 
that legitimates a measure of religious doubt. Implying that normal religiosity 
occupies a moderate middle ground between no belief and no doubt, the joke focuses 
on figures who reflect these two poles. It has implications for what might be seen as a 
normal level of religiosity, and sets the stage for Kavanagh’s critical depictions of an 
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ostensible “normal-is-good” fallacy. The atheist asks the evangelist if he truly believes 
Jonah was swallowed by a whale. When the evangelist affirms this belief, he is 
pressed about the possibility of such an occurrence. The evangelist responds, 
 “When I go to heaven I will ask Jonah.” 
 “But supposing he’s not there?” 
 “Then you will have to ask him.” (Clouston, Best 67) 
While the strength of the evangelist’s belief might be regarded as a virtue, its ardency 
and detail is likely to be perceived as ridiculous, especially since it is paired with two 
unkind character traits. One is the pleasure the evangelist appears to derive from the 
prospect of the atheist’s eternal punishment in hell (marked in the book by the 
italicized “you”); the other is his greater apparent confidence in his own heavenly 
destiny than in Jonah’s. Like other jokes discussed in this chapter, this one stands as a 
reminder that while jokes may have ideological, religious, or social tendencies, joking 
grounded in social dynamics is typically characterized by an ambiguity that 
discourages those who would scrutinize such jokes for their possible social utility (as I 
do) from seeking an unproblematically instrumentalist view. Instead, such jokes invite 
consideration more in terms of their capacity to express possibly controversial 
positions or to release social or political anxieties in a lighthearted and ambiguous, and 
therefore relatively self-protecting, form. This lightheartedness and ambiguity might 
also be seen as a means of playfully exploring vexing issues with others, undercutting 
the urgency that might otherwise attend such questions while also discerning points of 
agreement and in-group dissent in a relatively safe fashion (Norrick 105-06). If, for 
instance, one considers ardent faith and ardent unbelief as opposite, possibly true 
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positions with considerable implications for the individual and the community, the 
circulation of jokes that express these possibilities provides an opportunity to 
acknowledge the potential truthfulness or falsehood of either or both. In turn, attendant 
anxieties about whether believers are living a lie or, conversely, whether nonbelievers 
are in fact endangering their eternal souls, could be acknowledged and also relieved 
for the time being in a moment of shared laughter at those with no doubt, and at those 
who doubt unreservedly. In a sense, such jokes are a way of managing anxieties about 
what lies beyond the edges of a socially accepted range of perceptions, in order, in all 
likelihood, to preserve the relative security of the status quo (cf. Mulkay 216). 
 Like clergy-stray jokes, jokes involving children in Newfoundland joke books 
hinge on the status of members of the religious community who are peripheral either 
in terms of their beliefs or their relationship to the community. Religious jokes about 
children mostly present children’s cognitive foibles as cute deviations from standards 
of religious truth, deviations which in all likelihood will be corrected in the course of 
time. Yet some such jokes echo clergy-stray jokes’ undercurrent of religious doubt, 
and some largely dispense with cuteness in order to depict less benign relations of 
influence and authority in religious communities. 
In some jokes that affirm the social and spiritual worth of mainstream religious 
beliefs and moral values, children already have an intuitive grasp of the Christian 
values in which they will be further initiated. Moore tells such a joke, in which a 
young girl comes home from Sunday School and is asked by her mother, Winnie, what 
she has learned: 
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 “I learned that you are going to heaven to be with Jesus,” said the little 
  girl. 
     “What do you mean,” asked he [sic] mother?  
     “Well,” said the girl, “they said it in a song: Winnie cometh, Winnie 
 cometh, to make up his jewels.” (80) 
The joke implies that the girl’s unwitting re-write is admirable if erroneous. Similarly 
affirming the social and religious duty to honour one’s parents is the surprising 
response of one joke’s young protagonist to her Sunday School teacher’s question 
regarding “who would like to go to Heaven.” The girl does not raise her hand, and the 
teacher asks, 
  “Why Linda, why wouldn’t you like to go to Heaven?” 
       “Because my Mommy said to come straight home after Sunday  
  School.”  (Clouston, I’se the B’y 53) 
While these girls’ honouring of their mothers veers toward a violation of the first 
commandment (Exod. 20.3),11 both girls are shown to have an intuitive understanding 
of the fifth commandment (Exod. 20.12).12 Their follies are presented in a warm light 
in which children are naturally disposed toward the good. All is well in the world of 
these jokes: the cuteness and benevolence of children, and the social and spiritual 
worth of the familial and religious status quo, are affirmed.  
 Some religious jokes about children hinge on the question of God’s presence. 
These lack the moralistic connotation of the above jokes, and recall the playful 
ontological undercurrent of jokes involving nonbelievers. In one such joke, a boy tells 
the Sunday School superintendent that God lives in his bathroom. When asked why he 
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believes this, he responds, “Cuz every morning in our house, Dad comes and bangs on 
the bathroom door and shouts, ‘GOOD LORD! ARE YOU STILL IN THERE?’” 
(Clouston, Best 40).  In another God-in-the-bathroom joke, a girl interrogates her 
mother on the question of the omnipresence of God, specifically God’s immediate 
presence in the room. When assured that God is in the bathtub with her, she pulls the 
plug and says, “Oops! There He goes down the drain” (Clouston, When 78). Jokes in 
which children tackle the mystery of God’s presence hold potentially unsettling belief 
questions within amusing, comfortingly ambiguous scenes, through which ontological 
questions can be acknowledged and also put to rest for the time being, without risking 
the discomfort or unsettlement that might arise from open questions. 
 In a third variety of childhood-innocence jokes, children’s perspectives are 
potentially unsettling, presenting a contrast to the innocuous naïveté that permeates the 
above jokes. These jokes depict child protagonists either possessing a raw kind of 
social wisdom, or misunderstanding a situation in a manner that exposes something 
generally unspoken. For example, in a joke told by Moore, a boy on his way home 
from Sunday School responds to his companion’s inquiry regarding belief in the Devil 
by telling him, “Don’t let them fool you. There’s no such thing as the Devil. It’s like 
Santa Claus: he’s your old man” (82). The boy in this joke conveys the variable 
character of fatherhood, focusing on the roles of benefactor and punisher. The boy’s 
equation of fathers with the Devil either misunderstands parental discipline or implies 
abusive or at least temperamental behaviour. In addition to recalling the God-in-the-
bathroom jokes’ capacity to acknowledge questions about religious belief in safely 
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ambiguous packages, such jokes are indicative of the common use of religious 
language to describe human roles and relationships.  
In another joke that similarly disturbs the notion that traditional authorities can 
be relied on to guide children properly, a young boy learns an unexpected lesson by 
observing a punishment meted out to his brother. A woman is advised by the local 
priest on how to correct her son Johnny’s incessant swearing: “Take him by the slack 
of the pants and give him [the] tanning of his life.  He won’t swear again.” Later, she 
asks Johnny what he would like for breakfast, to which he responds, “I’ll have some of 
them friggin’ corn flakes.” She punishes him, then returns to the room to ask her other 
son what he will have for breakfast. He responds, “I don’t want none of them friggin’ 
corn flakes” (Tulk Family, Even Funnier 61). This joke humorously depicts how 
children learn, while dramatizing the potential for punitive acts to have unforeseen 
effects. The younger son remains untaught in regard to the problem of swearing, and 
the priest’s vision of punitive justice fails to account for potential negative outcomes 
such as the propagation of fear that has no clear relation to the issue at hand. More 
irreverent than the God-in-the-bathroom jokes, these last two jokes are no longer very 
cute: by portraying children in possession of insights (or at least self-preserving 
instincts) learned outside the realm of what has been deliberately taught, and by 
drawing attention to flaws in the wisdom, and even the benevolence, of children’s role 
models, they call into question the value of lessons passed on from the adult world. 
Like jokes that target clerics in confrontations with parishioners, these jokes can be 
viewed as a reminder to authorities—parents and clerics alike—to merit their 
influence and their ascendancy. They can also be understood as a lighthearted 
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commentary on power and its sometimes arbitrary relationship to truth and moral 
value. This theme peppers the works discussed in subsequent chapters, to such an 
extent that it amounts to a critique of certain structures of power themselves, rather 
than simply of agents within those structures.  
 
2.3   Emergent Pluralism: Jokes about Religion as Identity 
Religious joking can be a lighthearted, comfortably ambiguous means of exploring 
and also reinscribing boundaries of belief and practice, and may also be a means of 
articulating expectations of (and misgivings about) clerical authorities without 
seriously unsettling the status quo. Religious jokes also explore other kinds of 
religious identity formation, either through the humorous use of religious materials as 
culture, or through comic depictions of interdenominational friction. Because of their 
reinforcement of a shared heritage, the circulation of “religion-as-culture” jokes, 
within communities familiar with the scriptures, hymns, prayers, and church-based 
rituals and occasions that underpin such jokes, could be attended by a comfortable 
familiarity and “insider” feeling regardless of the positions of particular circulators 
relative to religious belief and practice. Religion-as-culture jokes have a more 
aggressive cousin in denominational jokes, which also use religio-cultural identity as 
the cornerstone of their humour, but which rely on animosities or gradated 
comparisons between groups, frequently utilizing denominational stereotypes. With 
either religion-as-culture jokes or denominational jokes, Norrick’s observation that 
“jokes help us get to know each other, and to signal rapport [or its absence]” holds true 
(106). Yet religious-identity jokes undergo a substantial shift through their collection 
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into trans-denominational joke books. While the butts of denominational jokes, even 
in the joke books, are often particular denominations, the overall effect of the 
collection and retelling of various denominational jokes in this new format is to direct 
ridicule at denominational animosities themselves, and at those who would espouse 
them. For its part, religion-as-culture joking in the joke books favours broadly 
understood Christian religious knowledge over locally or denominationally specific 
knowledge, and jokes that require specific background knowledge often follow 
preambles that accommodate the books’ relatively unspecific audience and a 
detraditionalizing Newfoundland.13 
An attachment to religion as culture permeates all the works studied in this 
project, even those most ardently critical of church dogma and ecclesiastical power. 
All the writers enthusiastically engage with the language, scriptural sources, and/or 
rituals and occasions of Christian religious life, and hence are generally reluctant to 
dismiss it utterly. Jokes rooted in shared Christian culture suggest a power in Christian 
religion aside from its spiritual and moral power: its mythic stories and familiar 
rituals, when shared or even commonly understood, help to shape group identity, a 
sense of one’s place and people. Moore and Burke each offer the same religion-as-
culture joke, which centres on the church as a locus of social rituals and, thereby, of 
the strengthening of community bonds: 
 When some of the church associations wished to raise money, the 
 ladies would prepare a big feast (today known as a Jiggs Dinner) and 
 sell them to the public at a TIME (a church supper). This feast was 
 often called a Scoff. 
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     One day an old church member was asked to paraphrase the 
 following church saying for the Adult Bible Class: “Those who came to 
 scoff remained to pray.” 
     Thinking deeply for a minute, the old fellow said, “Those who came 
 to the TIME, stayed for the prayer meeting.”  (Moore 81) 
This joke, as it is told differently by Moore and Burke, is a good demonstration of the 
“in-joke” quality of good joking as described by Ted Cohen. The joke’s potential to 
amuse is lessened among readers for whom background information (supplied in the 
first paragraph by Moore but omitted by Burke) is necessary. As told among people 
known to be familiar with the terms, the above joke would begin with the second 
paragraph as in Burke’s version (Five 47), and listeners would automatically make the 
links that Moore provides for readers on whom he does not rely to have the necessary 
familiarity. Ted Cohen suggests that a teller cannot force an audience into the 
membership that will render a joke truly funny (40). Moore and several other joke 
book producers repeatedly attempt to widen their audience by explaining the 
backgrounds of jokes. The results are undoubtedly helpful to “outside” readers, and 
are sometimes pleasant, but are rarely very funny. Many religion-as-culture jokes in 
Newfoundland joke books follow an explanatory preamble because of the 
denominational or historical context they require—despite the fact that part of the 
humorous punch for an “inside” audience is the awareness that those on the “outside” 
cannot properly tell or hear this joke, since they do not have the appropriate shared 
knowledge. Such shared knowledge is the basis upon which jokes can act to 
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strengthen a sense of common identity, a basic characteristic of social joking that joke 
book producers regularly attempt to elide. 
Another religion-as-culture joke told by Moore hinges on the centrality of the 
church to community life, while also targeting the legendary avarice of Newfoundland 
merchants: “A lay reader was asked to read Scripture but, without much education, 
used to have trouble with some words. One Sunday, while reading, he came to the 
text, ‘Walk ye not in jeopardy’. When he read this word, it came out as the name of a 
local merchant: ‘Walk ye not in, G.O. Pardy’” (80-81). The joke is partly at the 
expense of the parishioner; but he is treated gently, while the merchant is the target of 
the joke’s sharper barb. While the parishioner, attempting to pronounce “jeopardy,” 
has pronounced the name of the merchant in error, the joke provides an opportunity to 
express a perception that the merchants have not, in important respects, shared in the 
moral life of Newfoundland communities or had a sense of obligation to them. The 
local church in the joke is identified with “the folk,” over and against merchants who, 
among Newfoundlanders, commonly have been perceived to be agents of oppressive, 
outside power. This joke resembles the denominational jokes from the following 
paragraphs in its reliance on a gradated comparison between an in-group—the folk, 
the “Christians”—and an outgroup—the merchants. Such inter-group comparisons 
form the foundation upon which denominational jokes rely. 
In denominational jokes, reinforcement of group identity through in-group 
likenesses is overshadowed by an emphasis on inter-group differences. Though some 
denominational jokes appear to indulge stereotypes and interdenominational 
animosities while others seem to undermine them, all rely for their humour on an 
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awareness of Newfoundland’s historical climate of interdenominational antipathy. As 
religious struggles dissipated in Newfoundland, a measure of interdenominational 
animosity and suspicion lingered, only gradually replaced by a more ecumenical 
understanding of Christian religious identity that runs parallel to the gradual 
secularization of the culture.14 By the time Newfoundland joke books came into 
vogue, the seriously fractious character of denominational group oppositions had 
largely dissipated, though the circulation of denomination-based jokes certainly had 
not. The presentation of such jokes in widely read books—in which jokes aimed more 
or less from and at every group are read in succession without a well-defined social 
context—implicitly recasts their meaningfulness. Aside from such rhetorical effects of 
collection itself, many denominational jokes, as they appear in books designed to 
appeal to cross-denominational audiences, are presented as expressions of a mostly 
playful antagonism, in which denominational stereotypes are framed largely as an 
aspect of regional heritage, not to be taken seriously. Other jokes ridicule, or 
favourably depict open challenges to, antipathetic denominational attachments. The 
tendency to criticize interdenominational animosities is mostly implicit in the joke 
books. Still, they can be said to presage Guy’s and Smith’s work in their latent casting 
of doubt upon church attachments that risk unrest among elements of an increasingly 
pluralistic culture. In Newfoundland as elsewhere, in place of the political 
fractiousness of groups competing over religious truth, religious truth itself has largely 
come to be regarded as fractured and partial if not altogether elusive,15 and has lost 
much of its justification as a focal point of intergroup conflict.16 
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The interdenominational antipathies that have characterized Newfoundland 
have been sustained by three central elements of intergroup conflict as proposed by 
Vanier:  
 One [is] the certitude that our group is morally superior, possibly even 
 chosen by God. All others should follow our example or be at our 
 service. . . .  [The second is] a refusal or incapacity to see or admit to 
 any possible errors or faults in our group. . . . [The third is] a refusal to 
 believe that any other group possesses truth or can contribute anything 
 of value.  At best, others may be regarded as ignorant, unenlightened, 
 and possessing only half-truths; at worst, they are seen as destructive, 
 dangerous, and possessed by evil spirits. (47) 
These elements have been persistent in the rocky religio-political history of 
Newfoundland. The stereotyping that accompanied the island’s interdenominational 
struggles has largely outlasted the political relevance of the struggles themselves; but 
according to Paul Mercer, open animosity is not a requirement for the circulation of 
ethnic jokes. Mercer writes that many ethnic jokes are “a way of letting off steam in a 
situation where two fundamentally different groups of people have to interact on a 
daily basis and still feel a need to retain their own group identities” (2). This 
observation helps to explain the persistence of denominational jokes in a 
Newfoundland now largely empty of serious interdenominational antipathy. One such 
joke told by Burke exploits a stereotype of covetousness among Methodists by 
defining a Methodist as “a person who keeps the Sabbath and everything else he can 
get his hands on” (Laughs From 4). Another invokes a common stereotype of 
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Pentecostals as ill-educated enthusiasts by depicting a Pentecostal minister concerned 
that the Devil will look over his shoulder should he actually write a sermon. He tells 
the local Anglican minister who is busily writing out his own sermon (bookishness is a 
stereotype of Anglicans), “Now, I don’t make any notes and when I get up to talk, 
neither me nor the devil himself knows what I’m going to say” (Laughs From 92). 
Christie Davies suggests that through ethnic jokes, “the people at the centre are 
laughing at what appears to be a slightly strange version of themselves,” and that such 
a “relationship may take a . . . religious form” (Jokes 1). Davies notes ethnic jokes’ 
role in defining community boundaries and in boosting the esteem of the joke-telling 
group. It is easy to imagine the use of the two above jokes for group distinction and 
affirmation even in the absence of conflict or hostility. But joke book producers have 
little control over the constitution of their audience, and the juxtaposition of jokes 
targeting the reader’s own as well as others’ denominations discourages taking any of 
the jokes very seriously. 
Though some jokes exploit the lingering appeal of various denominational 
stereotypes, others question such stereotypes and the animosities related to them. 
Clouston tells a lengthy joke, apparently a true story originally told by the professor 
who taught the class in question, in which a young man, new at Memorial University 
of Newfoundland, takes a course in world religions. He learns the basics of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, and, seeing truth and power in each, is vexed by the likelihood 
that this will make him have to reevaluate his views on Pentecostals (We Rant 100). 
One can see a relationship between the content of this joke and its ostensible source 
outside of “traditional” circulation, in an institution which, one might argue, is an 
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agent of value pluralism (Talisse 3). The joke is broadly ecumenical, its humour 
grounded in an incongruity of scale between the relatively momentous, varied 
religious perspectives to which the young man has gained some access, and his 
lingering ill feelings about Pentecostals as a particular local group. Talisse argues that 
different, mutually inconsistent or even incompatible religions can possess truth 
simultaneously, not because moral truth is agent-relative but because “the objective 
moral facts do not form an internally consistent set and hence actually conflict” (3). 
Though Talisse differentiates pluralism from relativism (3), and though the former 
seems better to characterize the above joke (whose protagonist is genuinely struck by 
the substance of each of the faiths about which he learns), in practice the two 
approaches to moral perception tend to blur into one another. For instance, an effect of 
either outlook tends to be that particular religious perspectives are expected not to hold 
any ultimate sway in the public realm (in this case embodied by the university). The 
ostensible desirability of this effect is affirmed in the joke, which reflects, in a more 
than averagely obvious way, Newfoundland joke books’ general presentation of the 
proper place of religious difference in the new Newfoundland. 
Accordingly, Tom Quilliam and Tom Furlong tell jokes in which 
denominations are depicted on a path to friendship and even kinship, in classic 
ecumenical style. In Quilliam’s joke, a priest at a funeral tells a young altar boy to get 
three chairs for a family of Protestants standing nervously by the door. It is their 
friend’s funeral, but the community is entirely Catholic except for them. The young 
boy, who is partially deaf, misunderstands the priest and shouts, “Three cheers for the 
Protestants, . . . Hip, hip . . .” (25). And in Furlong’s joke, an Anglican Canon is 
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approached by a Catholic nun who says, “Good morning, Father. Or is it Brother, I 
never can be sure with all the different collars.”  He responds, “It’s neither, Sister. I 
guess you could call me cousin” (Furlong). These two jokes do not necessarily emerge 
out of contemporary Newfoundland’s increasingly “cosmopolitan” social environment 
and ecumenical religious atmosphere. They may be older jokes that suggest, to often 
mutually antagonistic religious communities, that a measure of harmonious interaction 
might be called for. But within joke books published after such changes have begun to 
take place, and juxtaposed with a wide variety of jokes with a wide variety of targets, 
they work along with others like the previous joke to adapt village culture and values 
to this changing environment. Denominational animosities are thus viewed through an 
ecumenical or pluralistic framework, treated as aspects of heritage and history which 
are waning as they ought to. 
There are many denominational jokes in the joke books in which animosities 
hinge simply on the fact of denominational distinction itself. Because these jokes lack 
any trait-based rationale for feelings of group superiority, and because of the effects of 
joke collection to which I have alluded, they effectively frame denominational 
animosity as an anachronism, essentially without meaningful content. Bob Tulk 
(Newfie Jokes 26), the Tulk family (Newfie Jokes 37), and Clouston (Best 17) all tell 
versions of a joke in which a Catholic (in two cases a Catholic nun) overhears a person 
or persons complaining at length about the predominance of Catholics in a series of 
locales, until the Catholic bursts out, “Why don’t you all go to Hell, there are no 
Catholics there!” (Clouston Best 17). Such jokes recall Tye’s description of conflict 
humour and its uses: told in open circulation, they undoubtedly find their natural 
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homes through a politics of sympathies and shared understandings, and could be used 
to bolster the morale and strengthen the sense of collective identity of the group 
identified by a joke’s protagonist, at the expense of the group identified with the joke’s 
butt. But when circulated on a mass level through joke books, the jokes lose much of 
their impact in this regard.  
In Newfoundland joke books, jokes aimed at all of the island’s predominant 
denominations are brought together by compilers with commercial aspirations, 
without apparent strong denominational biases, and in many cases with a clear interest 
in personal celebrity or at least name recognition. Norrick writes, “[W]e tend to 
assume that the teller of any joke which targets a specific professional, ethnic, or 
religious group accepts some of the negative stereotypes associated with the group.” 
And on this basis, he cautions that “[a] teller of too many aggressive jokes may come 
to appear bitter and vindictive” (121). Clouston, committed to an amicable self-
presentation, tells one denominational joke that entirely avoids the invocation of 
stereotypes, to the point of avoiding even the naming of denominations. In the joke, a 
clergyman of an unnamed denomination is asked to visit a sick woman of another 
unnamed denomination. When he discovers her affiliation and asks her daughter why 
they asked him to visit her, the daughter responds, “Well, Reverend, you see Mom has 
a contagious disease and we did not want our own minister to catch it” (“Come ‘Ere” 
70). If for no other reason than the need to entertain and a desire to present themselves 
as congenial to their readerships, joke book producers seeking to appeal to a broad 
public are likely to be cautious about the presentation of charged stereotypes, aside 
from those related to groups or attitudes clearly marginal to the sympathies of the 
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books’ broad readerships. The only clear exceptions to this rule are the books of 
Newfie Jokes published by Bob Tulk and, later, the Tulk Family: their approach to 
religious stereotypes is to invoke many different stereotypes in about equal measure, 
creating a kind of rhetorical equivalency in which one identity is no more likely to be 
the subject of attack than a number of other, competing identities. In Newfoundland 
joke books as in Newfoundland literature, the targeting of denominational groups has 
tended to give way to a targeting of denominational animosity itself, which has come 
to be regarded as archaic and objectionable. 
  
2.4   Conclusion 
Many of the jokes in Newfoundland joke books can be traced to folk circulation, as 
Christie Davies discovered in his research at the Memorial University of 
Newfoundland Folklore and Language Archives (Jokes 173). Within folk contexts, 
Ted Cohen’s description of joking as a potential resource for facing topics that are 
“hard to confront, difficult to accept, and yet relentless in their insistence upon our 
attention” (40) is a powerful descriptor: their formal ambiguity, and the general levity 
that characterizes their circulation, accommodates the expression of potentially 
controversial statements, vexing spiritual or moral questions, or negotiations of group 
boundaries and standards, without seriously threatening the stability of the status quo 
in any of these areas.17 However, as Davies also discovered, the transition from folk 
circulation to publication in joke books is frequently characterized by the omission or 
“bowdlerization” of whole categories of orally circulating jokes (Jokes 173). Elke 
Dettmer’s description of “folklorism” as the self-conscious use of folklore materials, 
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or Narváez and Laba’s use of the term “folklure” to describe the commercial 
exploitation and reshaping of folkloric elements (3-4), are more appropriate lenses 
through which to view religious jokes as they appear in Newfoundland joke books. 
Most of these jokes dramatize a boundary of some kind, either a boundary that 
circumscribes acceptable limits of behaviour or belief, if only then to ask questions of 
it (imagine a circle), or a division between polarized behaviours or beliefs on opposite 
edges of the ostensibly normal (imagine a line). The “inside” of the delimited circle of 
behaviour or belief, in the first instance, or the pole closer to conventionally approved 
behaviours or beliefs, in the latter, tend to find favour in the overall tone of the jokes. 
Such is the case with jokes targeting both preachers and parishioners, as with jokes 
about children and clergy-stray jokes. In all these cases, the joke books tend to re-
present nostalgically a mildly conservative perspective on religious matters, and hence 
to legitimize the authority of religious institutions and agents, though only to a point: 
strict orthodoxy is typically unsettled in the jokes, and rigidly authoritarian behaviour 
among the clergy is consistently ridiculed. Further, the books’ more obvious reframing 
of informally circulating denominational jokes has substantial ramifications for the 
joke books’ overall conservatism. The obvious targeting of denominational 
animosities within the jokes themselves, as in a few instances of unabashed 
editorializing, casts an unsettling light on the books’ often nostalgic presentation of 
Newfoundland village culture: a general refusal to treat this aspect of religious history 
nostalgically begs questions about omissions and presentation in other genres of 
religious jokes. 
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While it is probable that many of the religious jokes told in Newfoundland joke 
books find their way back into oral circulation, their humorous potential in 
contemporary Newfoundland largely depends on their resonance with a changed set of 
relationships to the churches (religious institutions are subject to more open criticism, 
and the power of the clergy is less secure), upon the understanding among tellers and 
hearers of new background knowledge (Newfoundland’s religious “heritage,” in 
addition to religion as it is currently experienced), upon a new negotiation of roles and 
boundaries (the place of religion and religious affiliation in Newfoundland society has 
changed, relationships with non-Christian religion and secular society are shifting, 
etc.), and upon the mediating function of the joke books themselves. Thereby, they 
will likely change, fall out of use, or blend with new jokes that address the new 
Newfoundland. 
These cultural changes were already in process as Newfoundland joke books 
gained popularity in the 1970s. The books themselves have participated in the 
furthering of such changes via their presentation of religious issues and aspects of 
religious heritage in a nostalgic light that locates them in the past, and, at the same 
time, through a pluralistic lens that either complicates or delegitimates them, 
depending upon the understanding of pluralism one espouses. One might, along with 
Talisse, perceive that pluralism grapples seriously with difference because 
“disagreement over Big Questions is endemic to the human condition,” that it is 
“inevitable, irresolvable, non-contingent, and, in a word, permanent” (2-3). Or one 
might argue, with Paul Lakeland, that “the liberal metanarrative of pluralism . . . 
promotes a vision that differences don’t . . . really matter all that much,” and that 
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otherness as a meaningful category is essentially erased under religious pluralism, as 
thoroughly as it is forbidden under agonistic inter-religious relations (57). While one 
might contend that religious pluralism as it currently exists in Newfoundland is on a 
path toward such erasure (I am not equipped to argue this point), religion is still a 
sufficiently central aspect of life on the island, and its “big questions” still sufficiently 
pressing in many quarters, to render the former position a more accurate 
characterization of Newfoundland’s religious relations at least for the time being. 
A host of other writers in Newfoundland have, since the 1970s, further 
developed and adapted many of the humorous negotiations of boundaries, standards, 
and statuses depicted in Newfoundland joke books’ religious jokes. The points of view 
reflected in their work tend to occupy various positions along a pluralist spectrum 
informed by changes within Newfoundland and by broader historical movements. 
Some seem to offer a religiously pluralistic outlook, while others are apparently 
secular. Often, the comforting restraint from open criticism that characterizes most of 
the joke books, as well as the free-for-all irreverence of the Tulks’ books, is replaced 
by a greater sense of urgency or at least of political engagement, a blend of giggles 
and vitriol. For instance, CODCO began to address fear-mongering and child 
molestation among the clergy via grotesque satiric portraits in the 1970s, well before 
the abuses that underpinned their satire were publicly acknowledged. And playwrights 
such as Berni Stapleton, Amy House, and Liz Pickard continue to use satire and other 
forms of humour in works containing both feminist critiques of patriarchal religious 
culture and compelling portraits of female protagonists within that changing culture. 
Following the joke book producers who have creatively adapted and recast earlier 
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humorous responses to religious life, these writers continue to adapt and recast 
questions about Newfoundland’s Christian legacy through their humorous 
explorations of the politics of power, custom, and belief within the religious lives of 
Newfoundlanders. 
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Notes 
1 “Newfie” jokes are ethnic jokes about Newfoundlanders. Newfoundlanders 
are divided about whether such jokes are suitable, and about whether “Newfie” is an 
acceptable term of reference for Newfoundlanders. Nonetheless, the acceptance of 
Newfie jokes among many Newfoundlanders facilitated the creation and dissemination 
by Newfoundlanders of books of “Newfie” jokes that were sold to Newfoundlanders 
as well as to people from elsewhere. For a concise discussion of the rise of the 
“Newfie,” see Pat Byrne, “Booze,” 238. 
2 As if to distinguish his books from those, such as the Tulks’, that market 
what he views as negative stereotypes, Clouston does not regard his books as joke 
books. He describes them as collections of Newfoundland “folklore” humour—
humour of the people, creative works that can be sources of pride. 
3 Bob Tulk and the Tulk Family are anomalous among the main Newfoundland 
joke book producers: prone to the heavy exploitation of obvious stereotypes as well as 
to jokes clearly subversive of the status quo, they tend to reverse the moderating 
tendency of other joke book producers, in part, it seems, by placing fewer overall 
limits on selection. 
4 Matthew Strecher argues against such depreciation, writing, “[M]any . . . 
works that have been viewed as ‘high’ or ‘pure’ literature have proved extraordinarily 
dull, whereas in equally many cases, writing of ‘mass appeal’ . . . proves to be of great 
interest” (357). 
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5 Tye’s double view of the role of local characters recalls Michel Foucault’s 
descriptions of the process of “normalization” in his essay “The Means of Correct 
Training.” Foucault argues that “the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; 
but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix 
specialties, and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another” (196-
97). 
6 Newfoundland joke books are frequently published by very small publishers, 
or independently by the teller, who hires a printer. Hence, the grammar and syntax of 
the jokes tend to be idiosyncratic. I do not correct it, nor do I insert “[sic]”, because its 
insertion would be so frequent as to distract. In addition, where unconventional 
spellings are clearly representative of language variants, I leave them be; only when an 
unconventional spelling appears likely to have been the product of editorial error do I 
employ “[sic]”. 
7 Like their grammar and syntax, the referencing in the joke books is 
idiosyncratic. That is, while most include page numbers, others number the jokes 
themselves, while still others include no numbering system. In my citations, a straight 
number indicates a page number, while a number prefaced by the # sign indicates a 
numbered joke, and the absence of a number indicates that no numbering system is 
provided in the book. 
8 Temporary status reversals are a theme in Tye’s study of local characters. 
See, for instance, “Aspects,” p. 111. 
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9 An example of this kind is Burke’s joke in which a Scottish woman responds 
to her Presbyterian minister’s question, “And what shall I say more?” by telling him to 
“say Amen, man, and sit doon” (Five 14). 
10 Clouston depicts Father Coady repeatedly, drawing on different potential 
uses of his quick-tempered persona, and ultimately reflecting the ambiguity of clerical 
depiction in Newfoundland joke books. 
11 “[Y]ou shall have no other gods before me” (NRSV). 
12 “Honor your father and your mother, so that your days may be long in the 
land that the Lord your God is giving you” (NRSV). 
13 I borrow the term “detraditionalizing” from Anthony Giddens’ book 
Runaway World, which I cite in more detail in Chapter Three. 
14 Citing Rabbi Gordis, Robert McAfee Brown suggests there is a compelling 
argument to be made that religious freedom, on which ecumenism depends, is a gift of 
“the secularists,” and that secular culture may be considered a friend to minority 
religions in need of protection from the intolerance that historically has tended to 
characterize established religions (212-13). 
15 See Talisse, p. 3, re. value pluralism (the truth about values is internally 
inconsistent—it doesn’t add up to a coherent whole) vs. value relativism (the truth is 
“agent-relative”). 
16 I acknowledge the incompleteness of such a portrait; it is meant only to 
describe a broad cultural current from the middle of the twentieth century until now. It 
is not simply so, and recent domestic and global trends suggest a possible return to an 
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agonistic, competitive relationship among groups making bold claims to religious 
truth. 
17 The use of joking to protect potentially controversial expression in a buffer 
of ambiguity is well put by Christie Davies in his description of tensions within jokes 
about alcohol use: “Jokes about the inebriated can be interpreted as a warning . . . not 
to neglect the values of the rational world by allowing a potentially destructive drug to 
undermine their reason and self-control, but they can also be seen as jokes about the 
benefits of alcohol, as a means of escaping from an oppressively rational and work-
obsessed world” (Jokes 104); “In consequence those who take a moral stand against 
alcohol are often uneasy, lest what they see as disgusting behaviour be regarded as 
merely amusing, a venal fault to be indulged and laughed away” (135). 
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3.   “Unholy Writ:” Ray Guy’s Apostate Satire of Christian Religious Power 
 
3.1   Introduction 
Since his satirical voice began to take shape in the late 1960s, St. John’s-based 
journalist and playwright Ray Guy has been influential in the development of 
professional humour and political commentary in Newfoundland. To an extent, he 
inherited writer and broadcaster Ted Russell’s role as a mass-media voice of ordinary 
Newfoundlanders.1 But as much as Guy’s work sometimes echoes Russell’s 
amicability and cultural pride, Guy is equally prone to depicting a comic-horrific 
world such as that frequently reflected in the work of CODCO, to whose “black 
comedy and brutal satire” his work has “strong affinities” (Fowler “Review”). After 
graduating from Ryerson’s journalism program in 1963, Guy began his writing career 
as a reporter for the St. John's Evening Telegram. He soon gained a reputation as a 
satirical journalist, largely based on attacks on the Liberal government of Joseph R. 
Smallwood.2 Guy’s features for the Telegram and other Newfoundland papers, and for 
the Halifax-based magazine Atlantic Insight, have been collected over the years into 
several popular volumes. The literary quality of his journalism has led one of his 
columns to be adapted as a children’s book, An Heroine For Our Time, and others to 
be anthologized in collections of Newfoundland and Atlantic Canadian writing. In 
addition, he has won a number of awards for his print and broadcast features, 
including the National Newspaper Award for feature writing (1967), the Stephen 
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Leacock Memorial Medal for Humour (1977), the Atlantic Journalism Awards 
Citation of Merit (1982, 1986, 1996, 1997), and provincially, the Ted Russell Award 
for Humour as well as an honourary doctorate from Memorial University of 
Newfoundland (2001).  
Beginning in 1985, Guy turned his hand to drama, writing three satirical plays 
for the Resource Centre for the Arts Theatre Company in St. John’s. His first, most 
popular, and most coherent play, Young Triffie’s Been Made Away With, also contains 
his most elaborate, sustained religiously satirical caricature. Triffie has been produced 
repeatedly by companies in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, is published in the 
collection Voices from the Landwash, and is currently in development as a film. Guy’s 
other plays, Frog Pond and The Swinton Massacre, are political satires set in the early 
years of Smallwood’s premiership. 
In accordance with his perennial obsession with politics, Guy’s religious satire 
is political at its root: it is satire of relations among people and their institutions, only 
secondarily and cursorily addressing ontological questions. Guy’s main current of 
religious ridicule involves the alleged propensity of Christian institutions and agents to 
embody and even amplify, rather than to correct and constrain, human failures to act 
decently. His satire mostly targets abuses meted out through institutional channels. It 
also tends, often frustratedly, to call ordinary people to stop deferring to abusive 
leadership. Guy’s ridicule is repeatedly aimed at authorities that are, in some 
combination, autocratic and visionary. These traits, among religious or political 
authorities, routinely lead to neglect of the complex needs of the people in favour of 
the pursuit of power or a too-specific vision of the good. But power in Guy’s work is 
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depicted as actually being quite fragile, because it operates within a formal democracy 
and ultimately requires consent. As a secular-humanist critic of religious power, Guy 
rejects transcendental rationales for socially detrimental acts, and judges religious 
agents in civil terms; as a latent pluralist with a decidedly conservative streak, he 
favours caution in decision-making, a self-conscious ethical skepticism, and the 
tolerance and accommodation of difference; and as a satirist and general contrarian, he 
routinely defies these very standards in rhetorical attacks on those whose intolerant 
behaviour he cannot tolerate.  
 In describing the political outlook that underlies Guy’s satire, one can only 
describe a cluster of overlapping tendencies. Nonetheless, having a sense of his 
general political stance is crucial to an understanding of his satirical depictions of 
religious power. Several recurring themes in Guy’s work can be seen to constitute the 
main currents of his political thought, currents that persistently affect his outlook on 
religious power.  
In a column entitled “Down Comes the Old Church,” Guy shrugs off any 
religious attachment, telling readers, “I've no inclination to get purple paschal prosey 
over the passing of this rustical tabernacle—in fact, most of my churchy recollections 
are just as dreary, dismal, depressing and oppressive as they are anything else” (That 
Far 143). The narrator describes a few of his “churchy recollections” before ending 
the column as follows:   
 The old church is down.  
 Amen. So be it.  
 Ding dong. (145) 
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The column is simply dismissive, its narrator weary, even bored; the question of belief 
is entirely left aside. Elsewhere, Guy notes facetiously, “Unlike Joey Smallwood . . . , 
I don’t have a direct line to God.” And in setting the scene for one of his clerical 
caricatures, he suggests that in the absence of such divine revelation, he can only 
“anticipate the actions of the frail instruments of [God’s] wrath” (Ray Guy’s Best 50). 
Cumulatively, Guy’s repeated assaults on religious figures, in combination with his 
occasional disavowals of religious affiliation or insight, suggest that social rather than 
spiritual considerations are the proper grounds upon which religious beliefs ought to 
be defended or attacked. Further, they imply that religious belief, when attached to 
civil power, tends by and large to have antisocial consequences. Guy is indignant 
regarding high-minded rationalizations for acts that are, in his view, cruel or 
destructive on a human scale, and is impatient regarding what seem to be kinds of 
mystification that discourage people from clear-headedly appraising their true states of 
affairs.  
This is the point upon which Guy’s humanism, which gives moral and 
philosophical shape to his secularism, is evident. Guy ridicules Newfoundland 
churches and clerics for acting in ways that fail to live up to the “common moral 
decencies” described by secular-humanist ethicist Paul Kurtz. These moral principles 
include various types of integrity, trustworthiness, benevolence, and fairness. Kurtz 
argues that these principles are found, and have been variously valued, throughout 
history and across cultures, and that no religion has proven either to improve upon 
them or to substantially increase correspondence with them among those under its 
purview. In fact, the absolute quality that religious belief tends to afford moral 
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principles is ethically problematic for Kurtz, who argues that ethics are properly 
viewed in relative terms. By this, he means that they only make sense relative to actual 
lives and relationships, and that they are not absolute. For Kurtz, even generally 
worthy principles must be weighed against other legitimate principles which may 
impose reasonable limits upon them (63-96). It is evident throughout Guy’s work that 
when religious and civil-society interests conflict, religion should concede, largely 
because Christianity’s typical conception of a moral universe defined in absolute terms 
seems to have caused more harm than good in the world of affairs. 
Along with his secular humanism, Guy’s instinctive conservatism emerges in a 
piecemeal fashion throughout his religious satire. Guy has been claimed by some as a 
traditionalist: Pat Byrne, for instance, has argued that Guy favours a kind of deliberate 
“backwardness” and is a “master of [the] technique” of reaffirming “traditional 
values” through depictions of the “refusal or inability to adapt” (“Tall” 317-18). Guy 
is conservative in terms of political process, advocating caution, consideration, and a 
skepticism about change. But he is not a social conservative. His conservative streak is 
reminiscent of pluralistic “Tory” conservatism as it is described by Canadian 
journalist, Senator, and conservative political advisor Hugh Segal. In his book Beyond 
Greed, Segal advocates tolerance and a broad conception of community in addition to 
caution and restraint (9-10). He writes, “The reach and embrace we offer others 
reflects the range and breadth of our definition of community” (120). Guy’s satire 
tends to frame a corresponding acceptance of a variety of beliefs, interests, and needs 
as the only humane grounds upon which healthy communities can develop, and a 
cautious skepticism as the approach which best facilitates the balancing of a range of 
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interests and tastes. Religious agents in Guy’s satire typically lack both tolerance and a 
cautious approach. Instead, they are depicted as opportunistic, rash, manipulative, and 
narrow, exploiting people’s religious attachments to amplify sectarian tensions based 
on a feeling among adherents that they are beleaguered rather than enriched by 
difference. This effect increases the power and status of the clergy while discouraging 
the kind of pluralistic “reach and embrace” that Segal advocates.  
Such assertions regarding Guy’s pluralism and his aversion to sectarianism 
may surprise some who recall his early nationalistic excesses and nativist tendencies. 
But while these were probably sincere at the time, they were also responses to a 
perceived morale problem among Newfoundlanders. Once the “Newfoundland 
Renaissance” began to take off in the 1970s, and a sense of shame seemed largely to 
give way to proud public assertions of the merits of Newfoundland culture (a trend of 
which Guy was at the forefront), much of this strain of Guy’s work fell away. For 
Guy, nationalism and nostalgia apparently were useful correctives when the people 
seemed demoralized, but promoting nationalism when it was already dominant seems 
not to have interested him. In keeping with Kurtz’s promotion of a relativistic ethics, 
Guy’s declining use of broadly generalizing affirmations of Newfoundlanders and 
their culture reflects a sense that the value of many ideals is context-specific and ought 
not to be defended absolutely. 
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3.2   Pastor Pottle and his Column Cousins: Divine Revenge and Moral 
Hypocrisy 
Ray Guy’s clerical caricatures typically are paranoid, repressed, and obsessed with 
judgment, propagating bluntly conceived if elaborately articulated visions of divine 
revenge at the expense of ordinary human sympathy. His depiction of the fanatical, 
perverted Pastor Pottle, head of an independent church in Young Triffie’s Been Made 
Away With, is Guy’s most sustained satirical depiction of this type.3 Through Pottle 
and his column predecessor, the Rev. Barry Lee Phartley, Guy ridicules the ardent 
embrace of divine judgment and retribution. Pottle is also a medium for satirizing 
moral hypocrisy: while Pottle’s moral code is rigid, his behaviour is cruelly depraved. 
Such hypocrisy is given a different twist in Guy’s polemical column “Live and Let 
Die: Thoughts for an Easter Sunday,” in which nominal Christians are derided for 
their alleged failure to recognize, empathize with, and intervene to offset enormous 
suffering in the world, suffering which the culture in which they participate has helped 
to create. 
 In the hands of Guy’s Pastor Pottle, who himself causes a great deal of misery 
and embodies an extraordinary lack of empathy, the religious principle of divine 
judgment is manifested as a petty, vengeful impulse that justifies his own ostensible 
righteousness at the eternal expense of those he deems to be wicked. Pottle never 
ceases judging. He keeps a relentless watch on the sins and shortcomings of the 
residents of Swyers Harbour, the play’s fictional locale. He describes the local 
merchant, for instance, as “stiffnecked and prideful, bloated with avarice, snatching 
the mite from the widow and the orphan” (134). But in his judgmental fervour, Pottle 
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also treats benign forms of difference, such as the reclusivity of one local man, with 
suspicion (134). And rather than morally engaging with those he has judged, he simply 
classifies them as evil and dismisses them. Pottle’s repeated praise of “the blood of the 
Lamb,” which draws on several such references in the Book of Revelation, provides 
an apt summation of his theological centre: it is the Lamb’s blood in particular—his 
suffering, and his imminent revenge—that enthralls Pottle. 
To the Ranger who has come to investigate the recent killing and mutilation of 
sheep in the village, Pottle reveals the depth of his divine disgust, quoting Revelations 
14.10 in specific reference to the people of Swyers Harbour:  
 “For the same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is 
 poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation.”  “And they 
 shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy 
 angels and in the presence of the Lamb.”  “And the smoke of their 
 torment ascendeth up forever and ever.”  “Praise the blood of the 
 Lamb” (134). 
Pottle is obsessed with this blood (he begins to bleat at the conclusion of the above-
quoted speech). His devotion to a violent God comes to its most extreme conclusion 
when he attempts to kill his own son Billy (who does not know Pottle is his father) 
after discovering Billy has slept with his blood sister, Pottle’s daughter Triffie. Pottle 
justifies the attempt by comparing it to God’s test of the faith of Abraham (140). The 
depiction of Pottle’s obsession with blood reflects Guy’s general tendency to reduce 
the inner world of his target caricatures to simple reflections of their actions. Among 
political satirists, sincere explorations of motivations for abuse are typically scant. 
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This omission is supported by Noam Chomsky’s structural perspective on political 
power, which Guy’s approach to political satire often seems to reflect. Chomsky 
argues that the motivations of those in positions of real-world power, who thereby 
have the greatest capacity to abuse citizens, are largely inaccessible and largely 
irrelevant. It is adequate to know that those in power will do what they can to preserve 
and expand their power, and to recognize that certain kinds of abuses tend to arise 
from certain arrangements of power.4 The resounding personal flatness of religious 
caricatures like Pastor Pottle, as opposed to the mordant richness of Guy’s language 
that emerges through Pottle’s apocalyptic preaching, or to the vivid depictions of 
Pottle’s worldly machinations, reflects Guy’s lack of substantial interest in the 
psychological or spiritual backdrop of abuse, and his general preoccupation with 
political relations and social effects. 
The Rev. Barry Lee Phartley, a fictional American televangelist in one of 
Guy’s columns, whose preaching is characterized by a frenzy of terror and judgment, 
is a kind of precursor to Pastor Pottle.5 Guy’s narrator imagines what the Rev. 
Phartley might say to warn the “recalcitrant prick-kickers” of Newfoundland of their
eternal fates, were he to get fog-bound at Gander Airport after "having shot all the
gays, expelled all the Jews and Democrats and having consigned Mother Teresa of 
Calcutta to hell's flames" (Ray Guy’s B
 
 
est 50): 
 “The fingers of their little children, friends,” the Rev. Phartley, rotund 
 and sweating in his vanilla-linen suit, would roar into the cameras, 
 “Shall be held against EEEE-lekricly-driven emery wheels forevah!” 
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     “And likewise,” Barry Lee would continue in a purr, “the tiny little 
 toes of the wretched seed of them Commie-lovin' idolaters in 
 Newfoundland shall be ground away to bloody nubs against the 
 carborundum and, lo, there shall be no more OOOO-nanism and no 
 more shall their little feet stray from the paths of righteousness. 
 Hallelujah!" (50) 
The celebratory tone of the final sentence, followed by a rousing “Hallelujah!”, frames 
such punishment as a subject for unabashed celebration. Both Phartley and Pottle are 
sadistic and possibly lunatic, fixated on a violent transcendent vision and numb to 
ordinary human sympathies. In his depictions of both preachers, Guy strings together 
images of divine retribution, the cruelty of which seems wildly out of proportion to 
their targets. Phartley’s target is the children—“the wretched seed”—of 
Newfoundland, whose feet can no longer “stray from the paths of righteousness” 
because they have been “ground away to bloody nubs” (50).   
The similar dearth of basic human compassion in Pastor Pottle’s moral make-
up is strikingly drawn out in an exchange with the local postmistress Aunt Millie. She 
offers her condolences for Pottle’s “trouble”—the recent, violent death of his daughter 
Triffie—but Pottle seems not to need them. He rejoices in Triffie’s heavenly destiny, a 
rejoicing untempered by any personal sadness at her parting: “Trouble? Oh, no. I 
rejoice in the Lord and am glad. Sin cannot harm her there. She has long been 
delivered from the pit of hell. Trouble? Fools and idolaters may think so, perhaps, but 
never the truly born-again” (123). Bemused, Millie responds, “That’s one way of 
lookin’ at tings, I s’pose. If you’re happy and you knows it, clap your hands” (124). 
 81
  
When Millie asks about Triffie’s burial, Pottle responds, “Her earthly husk is of little 
concern to those who truly believe in the revealed word of God” (124), a rebuttal that 
displays a certain religious logic even as it reflects Pottle’s unwillingness or inability 
to grieve the loss of his daughter: his version of Christian love centred on the soul 
utterly excludes ordinary human love for the person. This renunciation is emphasized 
by Triffie’s intellectual disability, which seems to be featured primarily in order to 
emphasize the cruelty of various acts meted out on her by her father and others. For 
instance, at one point in the past, Pottle was so “concerned” about Triffie’s spiritual 
state when she innocently took a piece of gum from an American serviceman that he 
broke two of her ribs. In Pottle’s view, his daughter’s personality and physicality were 
vehicles of sin, only putting her soul at risk, and as such, not worthy of consideration. 
Gradually, the exchange between Pottle and Millie turns nasty: he makes 
accusing remarks about her violent, war-ravaged son Vincent, and when Millie 
responds with a surprising assertiveness, he retreats, describing her as a “soul-sickened 
Jezebel,” a “fornicator with the anti-christ,” and a “devil-ridden bitch,” and 
“consign[ing] [her] filthy soul to the pangs of everlasting hell” (125). Pottle cannot 
sympathize with Millie’s motherly concern or her understandable if ill-conceived 
defensiveness regarding her emotionally wrecked son’s violent behaviour, because 
Pottle cannot relate to emotional intimacy at all, and can only respond to sin with rage 
and indignation. Pottle’s loathing of worldly experience and everyday relationships is 
increasingly evident as the play goes on, as he justifies his own violence and eagerly 
proclaims the ultimate, divine violence to come. As indicated above, Guy’s satire 
consistently favours social over religious considerations should the two come into 
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conflict; moreover, he routinely implies that they are likely to do so. Accordingly, 
Pottle is characterized by a hyperbolic fixation on a framework of divine rewards and 
punishments that acts as an obstacle to ethical interaction.  
Pottle’s retributive religious perspective encourages a compensatory fantasy of 
divine revenge among his “flock,” as he propagates a point of view in which the saved 
are few and the majority are damned and can therefore be rejected. In the words of 
Mrs. Melrose, wife of the locally stationed doctor, his church is mostly comprised of 
people who are “at the bottom of the barrel right now, right. They come from the low 
end of the social scale. And the economic scale. They’re more or less despised . . . or 
at least . . . mocked by their neighbours” (107).6 This description is consistent with the 
below-average income levels, educational levels, and “occupational prestige” that has 
generally characterized adherents of North American evangelical sects until fairly 
recently (Hewitt 55). Given this demographic tendency and the frequency in Guy’s 
satire with which leaders manipulate public needs, Pottle can be seen to target the 
exploitation of marginalized people’s socially founded vulnerabilities in order to gain 
power and influence. Providing his parishioners with a viscerally satisfying account of 
divine retribution, Pottle acts as a catalyst for scapegoating: instead of engaging with 
the worldly factors that underpin his congregants’ earthly sufferings or, on a more 
pastoral note, facilitating spiritual healing, he perpetuates and even intensifies a 
destructive pattern of mutual judgment and rejection between the haves and have-nots 
of Swyers Harbour. Mrs. Melrose recognizes the immediate appeal of Pottle’s 
promise, noting that his congregation know revenge is “coming sure and soon. So they 
gloat. And that makes them happy. What a comfort religion is, to be sure, in more 
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ways than one” (107). In Triffie, Pottle exploits his parishioners’ shaken sense of self-
worth, encouraging divinely entitled religious prejudice as an ego-relieving 
counterpunch to the social prejudice to which they have been subjected.7 The fostering 
of religious prejudice among his flock increases Pottle’s own power: it is receptive to 
his particular rhetorical gifts (and apparently sincere predilections) in a way that the 
nuts and bolts of social action, or the nuanced demands of pastoral care, are not. bell 
hooks suggests that authorities on saving missions generally desire the existence of 
marginal people but not their troublesome “marginal specificities,” and certainly not 
their social agency: “No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want 
to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you 
in such a way that it has become mine, my own. . . . I am still author, authority” (343). 
By focusing his flock’s energy on compensatory gloating and passive prejudice, 
encouraging them to wait for God to act as the agent of their revenge, Pottle’s gift of 
divine retribution discourages his congregants from working to improve their worldly 
lots or to determine their own fates, and keeps them oriented toward his leadership.  
Guy’s ridicule of a religious orientation that does not attend to social needs 
echoes the frustration of those involved in the Christian social gospel movement. This 
movement attempted to reconcile Christianity to the needs of secular society by 
emphasizing Jesus’ ostensibly social orientation, and by asserting that true piety 
requires helping suffering people to improve their earthly lots (cf. Allen; Ramsay 
Cook).8 Yet, in its disregard for spiritual truth, Guy’s satire veers toward the more 
encompassing Marxist interpretation of religion as an opiate of the masses. In Guy’s 
work, religious belief is not intrinsically defensible, and can be quite damaging when 
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it takes primacy over everyday well-being. Further, as Guy’s depiction of Pottle (and 
elsewhere of Smallwood) makes clear, those most immersed in a visionary outlook 
are, in the world of Guy’s satire, in the worst position to evaluate the effects of its 
propagation. For Guy, religion, in order to be justified at all, must be fully justified in 
social terms.  
 In Guy’s satirical depictions of clerics, as in clerical portrayals by CODCO’s 
Andy Jones and Greg Malone,9 rapture often gives way to hysteria, moral judgment to 
paranoia, and all of it to fits of (often sexual) indulgence that not only violate the 
clerics’ own moral codes, but are clearly abusive to other people—often to the most 
vulnerable. As well as physically abusing his daughter Triffie and demonizing village 
residents, Pottle molests orphans, subscribes to child pornography, tries to kill his son, 
and, it is suspected, kills and mutilates sheep in a twisted manifestation of his 
obsession with the blood of the Lamb. Jones’ sexually repressed (and confused) 
Protestant preacher Reverend Percival Freep,10 and Malone’s satirical impressions of 
Jimmy Swaggart and Jim Bakker,11 offer similar depictions of evangelical enthusiasts 
who throw all skepticism and reason to the wind in a fervent embrace of what to the 
apostate often sounds like a wild, mythological fiction. The demands of this 
mythology are often at odds with the pluralistic tolerance these writers favour, and can 
seem to demonize earthly desires that Guy, Jones, and Malone clearly regard as 
understandable and perfectly tolerable. Abusive hypocrisy, usually in a sexual form 
and typically framed as an outcome of moral repression, is depicted by all three 
writers as an outcome of an excess of religious enthusiasm.  
 85
  
The success of Pastor Pottle’s hypocritical abuses hinges on his religious 
prestige among his congregants, which in turn relies on the divisive social climate that 
already characterizes Swyers Harbour. Within this climate, those who became Pottle’s 
flock were already accustomed to being “mocked” and “despised.” The majority of the 
people of Swyers Harbour seem to have rejected them before he came to town, and 
then, accordingly, abandoned them to his influence, though the boards of the mainline 
churches did what they could to protect their own congregants from Pottle’s influence. 
Reflecting Guy’s interest in politics, the play’s satire of the hypocrite Pottle also 
ridicules the antipathetic denominational climate within which he was able to gain 
(and is able to sustain) his power. Among independent evangelical churches, particular 
leaders’ prestige is often heavily reliant upon their own charisma, rather than on an 
institutional affiliation. This may lead to great authority being invested in individual 
preachers among their congregants, but it also leaves them particularly vulnerable to 
attack from outside, since mainstream-affiliated Christians as well as the unaffiliated 
often regard such charismatic leadership as crazy, often hypocritical, and probably 
fraudulent. Guy dramatizes such prestige and such vulnerability in Triffie, while 
legitimating the latter by depicting Pottle as crazy and hypocritical (though not 
fraudulent: there is no evidence that Pottle does not believe all that he says). 
In much of Guy’s satire of the powerful, “Live and let live” is an implicit 
standard, though it is a standard the characters in his often harshly satirical works 
rarely live up to. Guy’s severest ridicule is usually directed at people who for various 
reasons neglect to “let live” in their own living, and whose living ought, therefore, to 
be constrained. Pottle refuses to “let live” in two ways: though he does not fruitfully 
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involve himself in the moral life of the ostensibly degraded village, he relentlessly 
harasses and judges its residents; and, in a more shocking turn of moral hypocrisy, as 
indicated above, he beats his daughter, molests orphaned children, and tries to murder 
his own son. Several local residents finally (and lamentably tardily) refuse to let Pottle 
continue to live in a way that so profoundly does not “let live”: after Pottle is 
witnessed trying to kill his son Billy, they leave the pastor nailed by one hand to a 
table, waiting for the Ranger to come. The limit these characters finally set upon the 
principle of “live and let live” recalls the relativity with which Kurtz argues moral 
principles ought to be applied. A limitation is imposed upon one man’s living, and 
hence upon the extent to which “live and let live” is embraced as an ethical 
principle—in order, paradoxically, to better enable it to manifest overall. 
Guy’s social-satirical targeting of moral hypocrisy is similarly prominent in his 
polemical column “Live and Let Die: Thoughts for an Easter Sunday,” in which he 
expands his “let live” standard to include a moral obligation to “help live.” In the 
column, he depicts an alleged lack of social responsibility among Western Christians 
as a kind of hypocrisy, and questions whether the apparently blithe, self-satisfied 
orientation of many nominal Christians is not actually evil—an assessment that recalls 
the rejection of Swyers Harbour’s poor by the community’s other Christians, and 
Pottle’s lack of concern for the earthly state of his flock or even of his children. The 
focus of “Live and Let Die” is the great gap between the rich and the poor (especially 
across international divides), and an alleged lack of concern regarding this gap among 
professed Christians in an historically Christian culture whose exploits, Guy claims, 
are culpable for starvation in other parts of the world. Guy’s typical ridicule of 
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Christian ecclesiastical agents’ perennial failures to behave ethically, especially given 
their high moral rhetoric, is rooted in his (like countless other satirists’) chronically 
confounded assumption that it is reasonable to expect individuals or groups to live up 
to their moral declarations. This strain of clerical ridicule is expanded in “Live and Let 
Die” to target Western Christian culture more generally: historically, through 
imperialist exploits; and currently, through a complacent neglect among the 
privileged, largely Christian inheritors of the West’s ill-gotten gains.  
Guy chooses the heart of the Christian religious calendar as an apt context for 
his allegations of idle hypocrisy among Western Christians, whose spiritual 
celebration at the resurrection of their suffering Lord is transformed in Guy’s column 
into an orgy of consumptive self-congratulation within a culture that is greedy beyond 
all measure. Guy observes that the churches are generally filled at Easter more than at 
any other time, but suggests that with people in other parts of the world “dying in such 
vast numbers while those responsible for their deaths are fully informed of the 
situation, it is hard to see how churchfuls of burping people being cheerful at Easter is 
not more devilish than anything else” (You May Know 144). Of the West, Guy writes, 
“This half, so rich that not to be able to eat beefsteaks every other day is considered a 
‘hardship,’ cries out that every little shortage is a crisis, while people in other parts of 
the world gnaw at the very ground in their last agonies” (144). Then—strikingly, 
considering his depictions of Rev. Phartley and Pastor Pottle—Guy acknowledges the 
potential usefulness, if not the cosmic reality, of hell. Noting the decreasing popularity 
of hell among mainstream Christians, he wonders about this turn of theological events. 
He notes, “We wish to be left comfortable. We don’t want the few rotten and flimsy 
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bandages we have wrapped around our consciences to be stripped away. We want to 
hang on to the attitude of ‘every man for himself and God for us all’” (144). And he 
writes, “The prospects of hell combined with the magnitude of the sin being 
committed by us daily against our brothers in the other half of the world would, if 
preached strongly enough from the pulpits, drive congregations away from the church 
in stark terror” (144). Still, one can only assume that a similarly uneasy relationship 
with a Pottle-esque Christianity would not receive such a harsh treatment—that it 
would, in fact, be preferable to devotion. Taking his broader body of religious satire 
into account, Guy’s real concern in “Live and Let Die” seems to be the maintenance of 
a humane sense of social obligation, one that the religious orientation of the column’s 
ostensible Christians does not seem to imbue in them.  
Especially given his satirical portraits of the retributively obsessed Pottle and 
Phartley, one ought not to assume that Guy’s ridicule of a facile Christianity in “Live 
and Let Die” implies a belief that a Christianity with a proper regard for divine reward 
and punishment could avoid such profound ethical pitfalls. Mostly, Guy seems to 
reject the whole model, salvation and damnation alike, while concerning himself with 
worldly dynamics in which Christians participate, and which are affected by their 
beliefs. For wealthy Western Christians, the reassuring promise of salvation for 
believers makes sense of their disproportionate wealth, while the troublesome threat of 
damnation might make demands on their privilege: hence, hell has to go. In the world 
of “Live and Let Die,” it is this, and not an actual growth of compassion and love, that 
accounts for the softening of the Face of God. The column ridicules the failure of the 
privileged West to acknowledge its own global culpability and responsibility, and uses 
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the spectacle of Easter feasting to accuse Christianity of failing to act as a booster to 
public morality in a culture in which it is the dominant religion.  
 
3.3   “A Spirit of Wisdom and Grace”: Guy’s Satire of Newfoundland’s 
Denominational Education System 
In his attacks on Newfoundland’s denominational school system, Guy continues his 
rhetorical attacks on the churches’ ostensibly vast moral failures, suggesting they have 
worked against the common needs of resource-strapped Newfoundlanders by keeping 
them needlessly divided. Until quite recently, there has been a general reticence in 
Newfoundland to support non-denominational schools despite complaints from many 
quarters that such “luxuries” as proper language and science education were sacrificed 
“when scarce resources [were] put into busing children long distances to attend a 
specific religious school—or when small communities support[ed] three, even four, 
schools” (Clyde Wells qtd. in Sweet 56). Depicting a denominational system rooted in 
sectarian territorialism, Guy rejects religious justifications for educational segregation, 
depicting them as ethically repugnant. In a 1995 column on the ongoing debate over 
the future of denominational schools, Guy bluntly states that those who warn against 
the imminent demise of the denominational system are motivated “by the foolishest 
philosophy that ever was. ‘We are absolutely right and everyone else is absolutely 
wrong.’" He calls them “the sort of crackpots and zombies who insist that you've got 
to pay taxes to teach their children that your children are satan's spawn and will burn 
in hell for ever more” (“Early Deadline, Please” 3).12 Though the educational content 
of denominational schools was mostly controlled by the churches themselves, 
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denominational schools in Newfoundland were largely funded by the government 
(Mol 202), a combination repulsive to secular critics such as Guy, given the alleged 
cost in terms of quality of instruction and the propagation of prejudices. Guy judges 
the denominational system in terms of its alleged effects on secular education: on 
these grounds, it and the institutions that have perpetuated it are judged harshly.  
In a column entitled “A Spirit of Wisdom and Grace,” Guy accuses supporters 
of separate denominational schools of having neglected the real logistical challenges 
of educating children in small, often isolated communities (That Far 1-6). Guy’s 
religious satire is rarely subtle, often teetering on the edge of invective or, in “A Spirit 
of Wisdom and Grace,” spilling over that edge and dispensing with humour altogether. 
Guy writes that there were several communities in the area in which he grew up that 
could have worked together to build a decent school that could have attracted qualified 
teachers. He argues that the reason they did not is because “these half dozen 
communities represented three or four different denominations. Christian 
denominations” (5). In his later column “Early Deadline, Please,” Guy takes a similar 
line, writing of the defenders of the denominational system, “Jesus and/or the Holy 
Father, to their way of thinking, are foursquare behind an education system that is in 
no small way responsible for the highest rate of illiteracy north of the Rio Grande” (3). 
In Guy’s view, religious denominations have overlooked the substantial improvements 
in the well-being of their young parishioners that might have arisen from a solid 
worldly education and the absence of interdenominational animosities, and instead 
have been willing to do wrong by their children in order to keep them religiously 
segregated. In Guy’s satire, sectarianism and the dogmatism that supports it are too 
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easily embraced and too convenient for religious authorities, whereas tolerance and a 
measure of skepticism are challenging and even counterintuitive, yet necessary for 
humane relations. 
Though “A Spirit of Wisdom and Grace” largely ridicules the virtues of 
outport teachers themselves, the central problem and underlying object of attack is the 
churches’ support of a system untenable for populations too small to handle further 
division while maintaining a decent standard of education. Guy describes the teachers 
in the often tiny denominational schools of his youth as “mostly . . . eighteen and 
twenty-year-olds who had barely scraped their heels through grade eleven and a few 
weeks of summer school and who couldn't teach a chimpanzee to peel a banana” (5). 
He writes that these unqualified teachers typically “sat day after day growing more 
frustrated and bitter and twisted, lashing out with the strap and the smash in the face 
and whatever other tortures they could dream up to get the gas off their stomachs” (5). 
The column exemplifies Guy’s willingness to sacrifice humour in favour of didactic 
clarity. His point is made abundantly clear toward the end of the column, when he 
requests of his readers, “Don't talk to me about the glories of denominational 
education. Because I may vomit” (5). 
A humorous column on school primers called "See Dick and Jane Run. See 
Lucy Bite the Dust" provides a lighthearted complement to the polemical spirit of “A 
Spirit of Wisdom and Grace.” In “See Dick and Jane Run,” Guy makes two casual 
digs at the denominational education system, belittling its importance via the 
trivialization of educational differences from one denomination to the next. First, he 
shrugs off denominational education in two sentences: "There used to be separate 
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schools for Church of Englanders, Wesleyans, Roman Catholics, Salvationists, 
Pentecostalists and Seventh Day Adventists. Except for the Papists and the Pents, the 
rest have pretty much amalgamated now" (Ray Guy's Best 9). The passage contains no 
critique; aside from the belittling nicknames Guy uses for the two denominations who 
have not yet amalgamated, it is merely factual. The combined effect of the nicknames 
and the passage’s banality is to downplay the meaningfulness of denominational 
education: it is a needless system to which only two silly groups still cling. The muted 
satire of this passage is complemented by a second, wry dismissal of the meaningful 
content of denominational education. Having described "Dick and Jane" books, Guy 
notes, "In Catholic schools, Spot was the canine prodigy of David and Anne. David's 
and Anne's kindergarten had a crucifix above the blackboard and a Bride of Christ to 
teach them such spiffy conversational gambits as 'Oh, oh, oh. Look, look, look. See 
Spot run'" (9). Here, Guy implies that various denominations have been overly 
attached to inconsequential differences in religious instruction.  
An implication of the two passages taken together is that schools of all 
denominations have been more or less the same, and that most denominations have 
come to recognize this and have therefore amalgamated. Rhetorically, this option is 
presented as the only sensible choice. Coupled with columns like "A Spirit Of 
Wisdom and Grace," “See Dick and Jane Run” contributes to a satirical accusation 
that denominational schools have strained scarce resources and divided communities 
against themselves in order to maintain insubstantial educational differences. The 
column’s use of trivialization—a rhetorical tactic Neil Postman suggests is usually 
evidence that the object of attention is not taken seriously—is transformed by its 
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coexistence with more polemical columns into politicized irreverence, which, Postman 
argues, indicates the opposite attitude (167). Because of the civil authority Christian 
churches have wielded in Newfoundland, it seems to have been necessary, in Guy’s 
view, to decry their alleged abuses and shortcomings vigorously, variously, and 
persistently.  
 
3.4    “A Few Passages From Unholy Writ”: The Continuity of Guy’s Political 
and Religious Satire 
In his biblically parodic column “A Few Passages From Unholy Writ,”13 which 
remains one of his best-known columns, Guy exploits the cultural and moral authority 
of scripture to target then-Premier Joseph R. Smallwood and his political associates, 
and to a lesser extent the Newfoundland public, whom Guy challenges (yet again) to 
cast off “King Joe”’s leadership. The column’s use of biblical language to lampoon 
Smallwood exemplifies Guy’s often mordant attachment to the literary and cultural 
power of Christian scripture. Guy’s satire of Smallwood recalls his religious satire in 
its critical depiction of leadership that is too autocratic and too visionary, too caught 
up in its own idea of the good to attend to the particular needs of particular people in a 
particular time and place. King Joe’s sense of divine entitlement echoes ridicule in 
Guy’s religious satire of the misguided presumption that one, or one’s group, has 
exceptional spiritual authority. In Guy’s satire, any such presumption is intrinsically 
misguided and hubristic and is, therefore, a worthy target of satirical ridicule. 
 During the last half-decade of Joseph Smallwood’s twenty-three-year 
Premiership, Guy made it part of his journalistic mission to persuade 
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Newfoundlanders that Smallwood's careless, visionary leadership had been harmful to 
their culture, livelihoods, and sense of self-worth. Among the recurrent topics of 
Guy’s concern were Smallwood’s aggressive aversion to dissent—an autocratic 
impulse that Guy treats in a similar fashion to religious agents’ ostensible use of their 
authority to manipulate people in order to serve their own desires. In “A Few 
Passages,” Guy also ridicules Smallwood’s legendary sense of prerogative to act in 
accordance with his often scattershot vision of Newfoundland and Labrador’s 
industrial future, and mocks Newfoundlanders’ willingness, despite extraordinary 
upheavals, industrial failures, and ongoing political intimidation, to accept 
Smallwood’s word that he held the solutions to their woes. Newfoundlanders’ ongoing 
receptivity to Smallwood’s promises seemed particularly to bother Guy, whose 
curmudgeonly love for the people of Newfoundland was both frustrated and 
intensified by this apparent mass brainwashing or national lapse of common sense. 
Written in chapter-and-verse format, “A Few Passages from Unholy Writ” is 
classic high burlesque, treating, in language reminiscent of the King James Bible, 
content that is by turns base and pedestrian. The column is set during a visit to 
Labrador to christen “Lake Smallwood” (the Smallwood Reservoir), a headpond 
created by the Churchill River hydroelectric project (You May Know).14 The column 
ironically depicts industrialists and political lackeys as kings and prophets, and 
Smallwood as a kind of Messiah. In one passage, Smallwood is referred to as the 
“bridegroom,”15 who “cometh like unto an mighty rushing wind,” in a travesty of 
God’s biblical appearances that brings to mind Smallwood’s notorious knack for 
ranting (86). King Joe tells those gathered for the christening of the headpond that he 
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is “the king of all these lands[,] anointed by the Lord to rule over them even unto the 
end of time” (86-87). In addition to emphasizing King Joe’s sense of entitlement to 
power, this declaration is a dig at voters who voted the real-life Smallwood into office 
for over two decades.  
As I note above, the political vision reflected in a piecemeal fashion in Guy’s 
satire significantly recalls Chomsky’s structural understanding of political power. To 
take a second example, Guy is generally suspicious regarding the political roles of 
“Great Men.” The presentation of King Joe in “A Few Passages” suggests that the 
reasons those at the centre of narrow concentrations of power are depicted as saviours 
of a kind by themselves and their supporters are self-serving, more often than not. 
Idealism may play a part, but according to Guy’s presentation, this idealism, however 
genuinely felt, is usually consistent with the interests of power. In Understanding 
Power, Chomsky warns against the disempowering political construction of “Great 
Men,” which, he argues, has always been a prominent means of assisting the 
concentration of power. He argues that “Great Men” are products of rhetorical 
distortions of the facts, and asserts, “That’s part of how you teach people they can’t do 
anything, they’re helpless, they just have to wait for some Great Man to come along 
and do it for them” (188-89). In Guy’s satire, Smallwood’s very desire to be a “Great 
Man” is a trait that hampers his capacity to govern well. King Joe recognizes that his 
status as the bridegroom relies on the people’s continued ignorance of the true nature 
of his authority. He explains, “Let stunnedness pass from the Kingdom of Joe and we 
shall all be undone even like unto a draft of gutted haddocks” (85). King Joe’s 
contemptuous perspective on the people of Newfoundland and Labrador is a satirical 
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distortion of Smallwood’s own perspective: however hostile Smallwood was to 
opposition, he seemed genuinely to regard himself as a populist, and to love at least 
some imagined version of Newfoundlanders as a people. King Joe’s utterly cynical 
remark is a transparent rhetorical challenge on Guy’s part: he entreats 
Newfoundlanders not to be so “stunned” as to allow Smallwood to continue as 
Premier, given his obviously autocratic behaviour and his arguably destructive 
policies. This satirical distortion recalls Pastor Pottle’s hyperbolic incapacity to value 
ordinary human sympathy, which serves as a rhetorical caution against grounding 
ethics in a visionary, otherworldly perspective. In both cases, leaders come to identify 
themselves and their visions so intimately with the needs of the people that they begin 
to seem inseparable.  
The alleged over-identification of leaders’ own “higher” ideals with the well-
being of the people is an identification Guy cannot abide. He shares with many writers 
and public figures in twentieth-century Newfoundland an ongoing concern about the 
fatalism which has come largely to characterize the Newfoundland public’s attitude 
toward politics, an attitude that has enabled leaders to make policy decisions without 
due consultation or accountability. Although Guy has, at times, written proudly of 
Newfoundlanders’ endurance, invoking it as a positive national attribute,16 this 
endurance has been paired with a collective sense of having been, to some degree, 
hapless pawns of the British and French empires, the churches, the merchants, “St. 
John’s,” and later the Canadian federal and Newfoundland provincial governments. 
Especially in the early years of his career, Guy was preoccupied with challenging 
Newfoundlanders to repair a damaged national self-image. This period of his work is 
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peppered with rhetorical efforts, as in “A Few Passages From Unholy Writ,” to shake 
Newfoundlanders out of their political fatalism and habitual deference. Discussing the 
relationship between the unscrupulous businessman Josh Smith and the general 
population of Mariposa in Stephen Leacock’s Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town, 
Gerald Lynch argues, “[I]f Mariposans did not possess serious shortcomings reflective 
of Smith’s glaring faults, he would not be able to manipulate and exploit them as he 
does” (72). In the case of Newfoundlanders’ relationship with Smallwood, one might 
consider that a sense of awe in the face of power and a naïve hope for a panacea to 
persistent problems were widespread “faults” among Newfoundlanders during the 
Smallwood era, characteristics that also describe Smallwood himself with some 
accuracy. Lynch argues, “It might . . . be said that Smith brings out the worst in the 
Mariposans, the shadows” (72). For Guy, Smallwood’s (and religious leaders’) 
capacities to attend effectively to their communities have been stunted by their own 
ambitions and the primacy of their visionary ideals, which have taken precedence over 
the messy details of lived experience. The “worst,” in Guy’s view, that such 
tendencies among leaders brings out in the general population is complicity in a 
visionary outlook that operates contrary to their own best interests. Guy’s basis for 
hope, and the root of much of his haranguing of the Newfoundland public, is his 
apparent belief that they possess a quality akin to Mariposans’ “concern for their 
community, a concern which is second nature to them” (Lynch 72). 
Throughout “A Few Passages,” it is implicit that Smallwood’s autocratic 
leadership has lost sight of real needs, but also that his charismatic tyranny is fragile, 
existing only by its persuasive power, under democratic structures in which the people 
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ultimately have the authority to reject their government. If one is unconcerned about 
the prospect of rewards and punishments after death, and uninterested in the 
possibility of transcendent truths or obligations, as Guy seems to be, the power of the 
churches likewise can and ought to be rejected if it fails to serve the people. 
 
3.5   “My Steady Decline into Sin”: Guy’s Narrative Stance as a Rhetorical 
Alternative to Authoritarian Relations  
In some respects Guy’s sweeping, secular attacks on religious abuses recall 
Horwood’s novel Tomorrow Will Be Sunday. But Horwood’s book presents a 
comprehensive rejection of its version of outport values, opting for a blend of 
humanism, libertarianism, and Romanticism as imported to the community by the 
novel's secular saviour, Christopher Simms. Herein, a critical departure from Horwood 
is evident in Guy's work. This departure is grounded in Guy’s conservative suspicion 
of any broadly emancipatory systems or outlooks that would cavalierly replace 
existing ones. While Guy’s own roughly conceived political outlook is, in a limited 
way, taken to have emancipatory potential, it is at the same time cautious of any 
totalizing systems or visionary escapes from existing circumstances. Through Guy’s 
satire, a view of human nature arises, bearing the mark of the Christian tradition from 
which it emerges, in which human beings are everywhere and always susceptible to 
sin. But Guy’s vision lacks a redemptive element beyond the same, sinful human 
beings—this is the source of both moral responsibility and moral failure in Guy’s 
satire, and it is the reason why visionary solutions like Horwood’s are rejected as 
fantasy. For Guy, vigorous debate, caution in decision-making, self-consciousness, 
 99
  
and a general skepticism are essential to the correction or constraint of human moral 
faults in any context. As if to drive the point home, in a good number of his columns, 
he casts a self-conscious, skeptical eye upon himself. 
Guy’s humorous uses of, and satirical attacks on, religious institutions and 
agents reflect an overall voice that is by turns brutal and compassionate, polemical and 
comical. Though he has sustained an abiding affection for the culture, language, and 
people of Newfoundland, this affection is not always obvious, given his equal 
penchant for excoriating critique and cruel caricature. Because of the harshness of 
most of his religious satire, little of Guy’s amicability is apparent in the works 
discussed for this chapter. His “friendly” voice comes through in columns on the 
details of outport life, the hyperbolized perils of life in the capital city, and the pitfalls 
and rewards of Newfoundland gardening, as well as in recurrent caricatures who are 
likeable if ridiculous, and in anti-heroic first-person narratives that have helped to 
cement Guy’s rhetorical persona outside the self-serious intelligentsia and political 
classes.17 Guy’s column “My Steady Decline Into Sin” develops his amicable side 
while offering a humorous (and likely fictional) account of the early development of 
his satirical predilection. In “My Steady Decline,” Guy makes fun of his own tendency 
toward irreverence, treating it as something akin to a personality defect, emerging 
early in his life and having no discernible usefulness. The action of the column takes 
place in Sunday School, though as a religious context it is meaningful mostly for the 
backdrop of ecclesiastically supported and divinely associated propriety that it 
provides—propriety that Guy’s youthful persona can then violate. 
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Early in “My Steady Decline,” Guy jokes about his own, ever-apparent lack of 
respect for authority. Describing his catechism lessons, he writes that “the last phrase 
to be crammed in before the hatches were shut was, funnily enough, ‘To order myself 
lowly and reverently to all my betters’” (You May Know 1). Later, the column’s 
Sunday School teacher disciplines a boy named Benny who, in all innocence, has 
proclaimed to the class, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s arse!” After Benny’s 
punishment, a near-mutiny takes place in the class (2), but the students ultimately 
submit to the teacher’s authority. Bemoaning the “wicked little creatures,” the teacher 
shows them a picture of a donkey in a book of Bible stories. Though he also submits, 
Guy’s narrator insists upon making the most of his new knowledge by drawing a 
picture of “Thi Neybours As,” hoping it will afford him some subversive pleasure 
later. Guy’s child narrator is an anti-hero who declines to stand up for his abused 
classmate, and whose later attempt at juvenile, anti-authoritarian self-indulgence is 
quickly rendered fruitless by another authority figure in the person of his father. The 
boy gets out his picture at the kitchen table and says, “Sigh! I wish I had an ass. Make 
a nice pet, an ass would. Don’t think he’d eat much oats. We could keep him in the 
stable with the sheep. Georgie says his father is getting him an ass for Christmas. I 
dare say an ass would be good for hauling wood, too.  If I had an . . .” (4). Predictably, 
Guy’s narrator is “chopped off in [his] sins” by his father. While Guy’s overall 
persona is critical and contrary, it is simultaneously self-deprecating; he routinely 
makes fun of his own alleged incompetence, calls his own motives into question, and 
suggests his efforts to effect even trivial change have been largely fruitless. 
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Morreal suggests that laughter at one’s own failures demonstrates freedom 
from “an egocentric, overly precious view of [one’s] own endeavors” (106). For a 
political satirist such as Guy, whose rhetorical effectiveness depends in good measure 
on a non-elite self-presentation, being openly subject to folly and failure is a useful 
strategy. Among other things, it may facilitate a sense of kinship by engaging readers’ 
sense of their own limited powers and mixed motives, granting them a kind of 
permission to laugh at themselves while also legitimating their right to indignation and 
strong opinions despite their flaws and limitations. As much as Guy is sometimes 
obviously proud of his irreverence and his willingness to take controversial stands, he 
is also open about his use of irony as a form of equivocation, and about the ambiguous 
effects of satire in the public sphere. His complicated self-presentation rejects the 
autocratism of which he accuses those for whom he reserves his harshest ridicule.  
 
3.6   Conclusion  
The perception that a crucial, and cruelly overlooked, tenet of Christian morality is an 
obligation to social service and a striving after worldly justice is central to the 
critiques of many religious and secular writers who have engaged critically with the 
lived values of their Christian cultures. Guy participates in this critical tradition as an 
apostate satirist: he echoes these writers’ predominant social concern, basing his 
ridicule on a humanistic ethical standard, and making no claims to any transcendent 
belief. As North American evangelical and fundamentalist Christians frequently rail 
against what is broadly termed “secular humanism,” Guy could easily be regarded as a 
secular humanist dogmatist railing back. This is true, to an extent, in that Guy is 
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clearly troubled by the more stringent, dogmatic strains of Christianity at the same 
time that he is, while in the midst of a rant, equally prone to damning dismissals 
untroubled by apparent self-consciousness. Undoubtedly, part of the reason Guy is so 
good at parodying fire and brimstone preaching is because he is so adept at 
expressions of moral outrage himself, and is quite willing to pull out all the rhetorical 
stops in his own enthusiasm for judgment. Guy’s penchant for a brand of rather 
damning rhetoric creates rhetorical and ethical complications, considering his 
profound lack of respect for religious and political dogmatism in others. Guy goes to 
great lengths to express his own intolerance of the autocrats and visionaries he 
satirizes. Yet, the other option open to Guy—tolerating them—would render him 
culpable in their intolerance. This paradox illuminates the ethical limitations of the 
standard of tolerance, while supporting Kurtz’s relativistic conception of ethics, in 
which moral principles have inevitably limited application and often exist in mutual 
tension. 
  A pattern of explicit self-deprecation, including a great number of columns 
devoted to depicting himself as an anti-heroic and curmudgeonly hack, has always 
mitigated, to some extent, the blunt judgmentalism of Guy’s political satire, tending to 
contextualize it as the product of a writer aware of his own limitations. His critiques of 
religious (and political) dogmatism attack particular values and their worldly 
enactment, while his broader self-consciousness presents an alternative to an 
autocratic rhetoric of right that discourages self-doubt as well as questioning by others. 
Robert J.S. Manning argues that the act of accusation often appears to produce justice, 
but that this appearance is misleading. For Manning, the fact that the accuser 
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represents one party against another skews the accuser’s perspective and distorts his 
representations of the accused (289). As a form of artful accusation, satire is quite 
openly not involved in the production of formal justice. It never makes any real effort 
to seem fair or balanced, and invokes as a matter of course all manners of distortion in 
the service of entertainment and outrage, encouraging a sense of superiority, shame, or 
resentment depending upon the ridicule expressed and the position of an audience 
relative to it. It creates obvious rhetorical imbalances deliberately, often to compensate 
for perceived existent imbalances, and perhaps to criticize the audience itself in a way 
that is palatable because it is funny. More idealistically, some satirists hope to 
encourage practical responses to social abuses via the instilling of indignation.18 A 
reading public familiar with a satirist’s work is apt to recognize these tendencies, and 
may even be encouraged to do so by the satirist. This is certainly true in Guy’s case. In 
all likelihood, when Guy rants, regular readers feel free to recognize the rant as one 
mode of a familiar literary persona, to be listened to in a “friendly” way, which 
includes being freely doubted and disagreed with (Booth qtd. in Ward 28).  
Though Guy never attacks religious faith in any sweeping or coherent way, the 
general anti-authoritarian tenor of his satire, including his ridicule of the actions of 
Newfoundland churches and his more general satirical depictions of clerical 
autocratism, does not allow for much legitimacy among most Christian churches in 
anything like their current form. It is true that Guy’s conservative streak occasionally 
leads to satirical cautions against an utterly unstructured relinquishment of power and 
discretion to the people.19 But more frequently and vehemently he rails against an 
opposite excess: the imposition of visionary, autocratically oriented central authority 
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upon members of a civil society whose interests only cohere in an ad hoc and partial 
manner. Dispensing with eternal considerations in all but the most rhetorical sense (as 
in “Live and Let Die”), Guy judges the churches according to the same rough 
calculation as he does other institutional bodies: according to the extent of their 
apparent capacity to see beyond their own vision to the concrete needs of the people, 
and by the degree of their willingness to acknowledge their own fallibility in their 
interactions with those whom they govern. In his religious satire, Guy rejects the 
Christian premise that fallible humanity is redeemed by an infallible God, to whose 
will Christians have some revealed access. For Guy, there is no infallibility, at least 
none apparent to human beings. All we have upon which to base policy and practice is 
some measure of rough agreement regarding what is best in human nature. This is the 
basis of Guy’s secular humanism, and it is why political skepticism directed at all 
institutional bodies, and a willingness to work from the messy basis of a civil 
pluralism when determining policy, are such consistent implicit standards in Guy’s 
satire. 
Guy’s work may be seen to reflect conservative commentator William Safire’s 
pluralistic assertion that “[a]uthority is obligated to remain engaged, to be reachable, 
in order to stay alive . . . [, that] the heated clash of ideas, parties, philosophies, and 
interests keeps a political system from icing over and stopping cold” (141). For Safire, 
the accountability of authority is important on a pragmatic level, because it best 
facilitates a robust pluralism. This account is consistent with David Held’s description, 
in Models of Democracy, of political pluralism as a model in which “the overall 
direction of public policy emerges as a result of a series of relatively uncoordinated 
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impacts upon government, directed from all sides by competing forces, without any 
one force wielding excessive influence” (191). To a great extent, Guy’s satire is 
accurately read as a “competing force,” perennially engaged in tension against 
whoever seems at the time to be “wielding excessive influence” in an imperfectly 
pluralistic society, and working to keep authorities accountable. Chomsky takes his 
cautions against unaccountable authority further, embracing an outlook which Safire 
(given his belief in the necessity of hierarchical power and the need for authorities to 
make decisions that violate people’s desires in order to serve their needs) cannot 
unabashedly accept, but which puts into plain terms an undercurrent of Guy’s anti-
authoritarian, anti-visionary satire. Chomsky’s premise for most of his political 
arguments is simple: no authority has any “prior justification;” “every form of 
authority has to prove [to the people] that it’s justified” (201-02). Authority can justly 
be held only when the body holding it is able to consistently defend its decisions in 
terms of balancing people’s varied interests, rather than in terms of any overarching 
ideal regarding what these interests ought to be. Though Guy’s political satire is most 
often directed at power-holders and power-seekers who market and rely upon political 
or religious visions, he explicitly if inconsistently acknowledges the power and 
responsibility of the people, under democratic structures, to refuse to grant authority to 
visionary leaders. According to Guy’s piecemeal satirical advocacy of a messy, 
pluralistic political environment, for authority to be legitimate people’s varied interests 
must be the source of decision-making, rather than a product of persuasion by people 
possessing institutional power and devoted to a vision. To argue against this position 
from the perspective of a transcendent authority (whether conceived politically as an 
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overarching ideological vision or religiously as divine rule) is to come to an inevitable 
stalemate with writers like Guy who consistently reject the existence of politically 
relevant transcendent truths.
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Notes 
1 Russell was the writer and performer of the popular 1950s Fishermen’s 
Broadcast radio series “The Chronicles Of Uncle Mose” for the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, episodes of which have been collected into volumes edited 
by his daughter, Elizabeth Miller. 
2 The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador’s Heritage web site 
suggests Guy’s attacks on Smallwood were politically influential: “Guy's columns 
made Smallwood a figure of fun rather than someone to be feared, and helped 
galvanize a new generation of politicians to challenge Smallwood's hegemony over 
government” (Webb “Provincial”).  
3 Undoubtedly, Guy creates mad preacher characters partly with his own 
aptitude for comic vitriol and floridity in mind; such caricatures provide opportunities 
for him to indulge his facility for hyperbole and grotesquery. 
4 This outlook is apparent throughout Understanding Power, as in other works 
by Chomsky. 
5 Both Pottle and Phartley seem inspired by characters such as Father Dinn and 
Rev. Percival Freep, developed by Andy Jones of CODCO fame. Both blend judgment 
and repression with hypocritical outbursts of behaviour apparently related to the 
combination of the first two traits. 
6 Mrs. Melrose herself is an object of satire, in that she has an enormous 
general loathing for the people of the village, and deals with her misery through the 
intensive use of her husband’s drug supply. Yet, because of her loathing and her 
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delicate mental state, she is a good vehicle for satiric attacks directed at others in the 
play, since she unself-consciously expresses generally taboo observations. 
7 Psychologist Erving Goffman notes that “the stigmatized individual in our 
society acquires standards which he applies to himself in spite of failing to conform to 
them,” and that this makes it “inevitable that he will feel some ambivalence about his 
own self” (106). 
8 This late nineteenth-century movement advocating the secular application of 
gospel principles had a resurgence under the broader rubric of Christian social justice 
beginning in the 1960s, which responded to a surge of critiques, largely among 
Christians in colonized countries, of Western churches’ moral failures in the social 
realm (cf. Williams). 
9 Andy Jones played Pastor Pottle in the Resource Centre for the Arts’ 
premiere production of Young Triffie’s Been Made Away With in 1985. 
10 Jones’s standby Catholic caricature Father Dinn is similarly depicted, 
implying that, in Jones’s view, such deluded enthusiasm and attendant repression can 
be found in any denomination. 
11 These impressions recur in Malone’s work, but good examples of both can 
be found in his one-man show Pocket Queen. 
12 This column is available on the internet through a link provided by the 
Newfoundland Catholic Anti-Defamation League, which has included at least two of 
Guy’s columns in its “Hall of Shame.” 
13 “A Few Passages From Unholy Writ” is cited with admiration by Pat Byrne 
in his article "Tall are the Tales that Fishermen Tell” and by Shane O’Dea in his 
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oration honouring Guy on the event of his honourary doctorate from Memorial 
University of Newfoundland. 
14 The one-hundred-year contract signed with the Quebec government for the 
sale of power from the project has been a notoriously bad deal for Newfoundland and 
Labrador. 
15 “The bridegroom” is a biblical metaphor for Christ. 
16 In his column “A Fortuitous Distillation,” Guy writes,  
 A long and determined assortment of harriers and exterminators, both 
  native and imported, have struggled relentlessly through the years to rid 
  the fair face of the world of this unlovely and irksome breed.  
  But there are some ugly weeds you can’t root out of your pretty 
  garden, misters, and there are some varmits you can’t eradicate”  
 (You May Know 114-16). 
17 Pat Byrne writes of Ray Guy’s anti-hero columns, “Guy turns coping with 
modern household appliances and conveniences, and the simplest daily tasks into 
Rabelasian adventures of mythic proportions. A malfunctioning toilet is a menace not 
to be underestimated” (“Tall” 318). 
18 These are staple discussions among satire theorists. See, for example, 
Edward A. and Lillian D. Bloom’s Satire’s Persuasive Voice, or George A. Test’s 
Satire: Spirit and Art. 
19 Cf. “Ah, The Never Fading Charms of Bung Hole Tickle” (Ray Guy’s Best 
25-28). 
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4.   Play-Wrestling With the Angel: Ed Smith’s Ecumenical Religious Humour 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
Born in 1940, Ed Smith moved with his family from one Newfoundland community to 
another during his youth, due to his father’s career as a United Church minister. As a 
young man, Smith himself served three years as a student minister, but opted to go 
into teaching. He taught in several communities in Newfoundland, eventually settling 
in Springdale where his education career shifted toward administration, from which he 
retired in 1996. Smith's wife Marion encouraged him to begin writing a column for the 
local paper in Springdale in 1980. "The View from Here" was quickly picked up by 
several other papers, and is now published regularly in the province's two dailies, 
several community papers, and the Downhomer.1 Several collections of Smith's 
columns have been published through provincial publishing houses, as has a memoir 
of his childhood entitled Some Fine Times!, another humour book called Fish ‘n’ 
Ships: a Brief, Twisted History of Newfoundland . . . Sort of, and a second memoir 
entitled From the Ashes of My Dreams. Although Smith is extremely well known in 
Newfoundland, he was almost unknown outside the province until he began writing 
nationally on disability issues after a 1998 motor vehicle accident, since which he has 
lived with quadriplegia. Smith won the Best General Columnist Award from the 
Atlantic Newspaper Association (1994), and has been nominated for the Stephen 
Leacock Memorial Medal for Humour (1989). In addition, the Canadian Association 
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of Nurses awarded him their annual prize for excellence in radio broadcasting (2001), 
and the Catholic Academy of Communication Arts Professionals awarded him the 
Gabriel Award for broadcasting that "uplift[s] and nourish[es] the human spirit" 
(2001), for a series of reflections on his rehabilitation after the accident, accounts 
which eventually developed into his second memoir. Since then, Smith has continued 
to write “The View From Here,” as well as freelance features on disability issues. 
Smith has been entertaining and provoking a gradually increasing readership 
since he began publishing columns in 1980. He has maintained a remarkable 
consistency of voice, which undoubtedly has helped him to develop a rapport with 
readers who could not help but become increasingly savvy decoders of his rhetorical 
play. The generally limited scope of his audience (his work, at least until the 
publication of his second memoir, has been that of a Newfoundlander writing for 
Newfoundlanders) aids in the development of such a familiar relationship. As he shifts 
among a wide range of uses of religious materials and explorations of religious 
matters, his readers should generally be able to fit his latest tirade, tease, or fit of fun 
into an overall authorial "personality" they have inferred over years of reading his 
work, and to interpret new contributions in that light. In his playful treatments of 
theological questions and religious politics, certain dominant concerns gradually 
become apparent. In a diversifying cultural environment that Smith readily welcomes 
despite episodes of half-hearted resistance, he negotiates between paradoxical 
commitments, to God and Christianity on the one hand, and to epistemological 
uncertainty and his sense of its apparent social benefits, on the other. The theological 
perspective that emerges piecemeal through Smith’s work recalls a particular 
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ecumenical outlook advocated by liberal theologians such as Robert McAfee Brown 
and Hans Küng. Brown describes this brand of contemporary ecumenism as “a desire 
to reach out in fraternal love to all men” (19), and distinguishes it from the term’s 
common ecclesiastical usage to describe a movement toward Christian church unity. 
Smith’s negotiations between a dearly held faith and a comfortable uncertainty fit 
Brown’s claim that the duty of the ecumenical Christian in the contemporary world is 
“simply to live the life of ‘Christian presence’. . . , leaving to God what he will do 
with this witness, and being willing to live with a certain degree of agnosticism about 
the coincidence of the lines of the visible church and the lines of the redeemed 
community” (273). Smith’s comic style tends to reinforce his broadly ecumenical 
outlook. Making frequent statements of religious opinion, though in a style 
characterized by self-deprecation, rhetorical shifts, and deliberate paradoxes, Smith 
encourages readers to participate actively in exploring the challenges of faith and 
practice in their “detraditionalising” environment (Giddens 45).2 
 Smith's love of rhetorical play, characterized by almost constant comic 
destabilizations of meaning, is intimately related to his speculative approach to 
religious questions and his general concern about the limits of the knowable. These 
concerns are laid bare in his 2002 rehabilitation memoir From the Ashes of My 
Dreams, whose religious passages further illuminate earlier, humorous treatments of 
religious matters and materials. From the Ashes of My Dreams describes Smith’s, and 
his family’s, journey to recovery and renewed life after the 1998 accident.3 The 
memoir follows Smith from the time of the accident through seventeen months of 
rehabilitation in St. John’s and in Scarborough, Ontario, ending when Smith and 
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Marion return home to Springdale. In the memoir, Smith grapples with grief, despair, 
and anger, gains an acute awareness of problems in the medical establishment, 
experiences the prejudice that people living with disabilities routinely face,4 and gains 
a deepened sense of the warmth and generosity of his friends, family, some total 
strangers, and many health care providers. There is a vitality in the choice of a phoenix 
metaphor for the memoir’s title, which is particularly powerful considering the tragedy 
typically overlaid onto disability in the public imagination. The memoir’s title frames 
Smith’s injury as a kind of death, though it is not Smith’s death, even metaphorically 
(especially in his more recent work on disability issues, he cringes at such 
melodrama). An inconsistency between Smith’s metaphor and the phoenix myth on 
which it draws sheds light on the title’s meaning: unlike the phoenix, who rises from 
the ashes of a previous phoenix (or from his own ashes, depending on the account), 
Smith re-emerges, changed but intact, not from his own ashes or some “previous” 
Smith’s ashes, but from the ashes of dreams—the ashes of abstractions only. In 
addition to making a statement on his own recovery and on acquired disabilities more 
generally, the title has ramifications for Smith’s humorous treatments of religious 
questions and materials. It emphasizes the person who keeps on living through the 
changes. Dreams that previously had made sense for him fail to make sense in his new 
situation, so he grieves them, but then lets go of them so he can move on. Abstractions 
serve real life. This is a premise Smith promotes in his religious humour, which tends 
to unsettle hardened abstractions—including theological abstractions within and 
outside of the Bible—in favour of a journey-centred approach to faith and religious 
ethics. 
 114
  
Throughout, the memoir emphasizes the value of personal experiences in 
struggling toward understanding. This emphasis is reflected in several lengthy 
passages in which Smith directly reflects on his religious beliefs. The religious 
passages in From the Ashes of My Dreams constitute Smith’s most extended, serious 
published discussion of religious matters. In two chapters, he addresses God directly; 
and elsewhere, his wife Marion’s rejections of friends’ well-intended spiritual advice 
are described. The memoir provides a kind of theological anchor for Smith’s otherwise 
piecemeal, playful forays into religious matters. In the end, the process of collapse and 
rebirth that forces Smith to scrutinize his own beliefs largely affirms beliefs he had 
already alluded to in his earlier columns and in Some Fine Times! 
In From the Ashes of My Dreams, Smith comes to several conclusions 
regarding his belief in, and relationship to, God, and describes the interweaving of 
reason and faith in the process that leads to them. Although Smith admits doubt about 
his own notions of God and even, on one occasion, about the existence of God, he also 
prays, preaches, and talks to God directly, and states that despite his doubts and 
misgivings, he nonetheless believes.5 And he accepts that people have different ways 
of perceiving God despite his personal, ethically premised rejection of some of these 
ways. Theologically, Smith is of the “God is love” school. As such, God is also the 
source of forgiveness, hope, and joy. Godly principles such as power, force, and 
judgment rank low in the Smithean scheme. Divine intervention is rejected on the 
premise that God’s love is not a demonstration of power or preference, but is 
universal. In Smith’s piecemeal theology, God’s love is akin to a wellspring that can 
be tapped into, but does not act except through those who have tapped into it. Lastly, 
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despite all that may be believed of God by Smith or anyone else, God is fundamentally 
beyond understanding.6 Hence, the propagation of strife based on accordance with the 
will of God is, at best, problematic, as are assertions of God’s activity in the world. 
Smith is inclined to attribute only passive virtues to God—largely, it seems, because 
this is the only way he can practically harmonize a particular belief in God with a 
pluralistic openness to incompatible beliefs. 
Smith’s playful rhetorical style supports his pluralistic outlook; their symbiotic 
relationship becomes increasingly evident as one reads more and more of his work. 
Through general familiarity with Smith’s writing, a reader may easily discern patterns 
in Smith’s playful rhetoric. Hence, such a broad acquaintance is helpful in 
understanding his voice in any particular instance. For example, Smith’s narrator is 
always closely identified with Smith the writer, but is, nonetheless, often presented as 
being unreliable. Such conscious employment of an unreliable narrator recalls Guy’s 
use of such personae, though for Guy this practice is sporadic, whereas Smith’s 
playful self-deprecation is a prominent feature of the majority of his work. Smith often 
treats his opinions as tentative, incomplete, and even mutually contradictory, though at 
times the concluding statements of his columns or of sections of his books lack this 
playful touch and veer clearly into didacticism. As Canadian columnist Charles Lynch 
suggests is true of many writers of newspaper features, Smith is more an entertainer 
than an informer (Tataryn 36). But he is also a moralist, in his way. Sometimes 
Smith’s willingness to advocate particular religious and social values openly is 
explicit, as in the conclusion to his column “Ghosts of Christmas Past,” in which he 
asserts, “Perhaps the solution to many [contemporary problems] is as simple . . . as it 
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was intended to be on that first Christmas in Bethlehem so long ago. Forgiveness and 
love” (Take it 70). Yet Smith’s rhetorical stance is often self-problematizing, and in 
his religious humour he uses rhetorical flip-flopping and self-deprecation to 
acknowledge that absolute certainty about the nature of God and the demands of faith 
is probably beyond human capacity, and certainly beyond his. Though Smith generally 
depicts himself as shallow, his shallowness is, as Sam G. Riley writes of the simplicity 
of Langston Hughes’ column character Jesse Simple, “a well-crafted illusion” (76). 
To readers generally familiar with his work, Smith’s “shallow” persona is a 
familiar ruse, and his playful engagement of his readers gives the impression of a 
writer who is not rhetorically positioned “above” the people but is rather “on their 
level.” His conclusions are always tentative to some degree; he presents himself as 
unsure about his own opinions, a stance which creates the impression of kinship with 
“regular folks.” Yet at times he quite forthrightly embraces the very opinions about 
which his playful stance suggests a measure of uncertainty. This could have an 
empowering influence on readers who are reluctant to express their own beliefs and 
doubts because of uncertainty or embarrassment. Overall, the high level of reader 
engagement encouraged by Smith’s playful style suggests that the negotiation of 
important questions of values and beliefs is a task for everyone, and not the province 
of experts. 
 
4.2   Cultural Bonds and Ethical Axes: Scriptural References in Smith’s Humour 
Though Smith writes humour that has obvious religious implications or directly 
addresses religious institutions or agents, he is also prone to the use of Christian 
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religious materials to other ends. In many instances, his overtly trivial biblical 
references are akin to the lighthearted “religion-as-culture” jokes discussed in Chapter 
One. These uses of scripture are not religious per se, but rely on religious knowledge 
and the seriousness associated with it to create humour that bonds writer and readers 
in a common cultural background without making moral or spiritual demands on that 
shared heritage. Elsewhere, Smith makes similarly playful religious references that 
also address moral or political concerns, often with secondary religious implications. 
For instance, Smith approaches the biblical apocalypse from different angles in 
different columns: in one he laments its frequent utility for people who would use their 
religion to vilify other people; in another, he explores its cautionary potential for 
human beings who have been unworthy stewards of the earth. Smith approaches 
scriptural stories and figures from multiple angles, exploring various ways in which 
the material can be meaningful and the various ways people interpret it. Smith’s 
relationship with scripture is abiding but complicated, and his playful, varied uses of it 
suggest an ongoing exploration of how, rather than whether, it ought to be taken 
seriously. 
In his “religion-as-culture” references to scripture, Smith sometimes subverts 
its rhetorical power to comic effect, not to truly undermine it but to develop his 
persona as a shallow hack. Smith’s most intensive use of such frivolous scriptural 
references is in Fish ‘n’ Ships: a Brief, Twisted History of Newfoundland . . . Sort of. 
For instance, he uses several biblical comparisons to describe William Coaker, who 
founded the Fishermen’s Protective Union in 1908: “Like John the Baptist, he was a 
herald of things to come, even if his voice was lost in the political wilderness. Like 
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Jeremiah, he was a prophet of the future. Like Simon Peter, he was interested in 
fishermen (harvesters, persons). . . . Like all three, he is dead” (121).  Here, Smith 
makes light of strained, habitual allusions to the Bible, undoubtedly including his own. 
The first and second comparisons are illuminating, even slightly poetic, if a tad 
overblown. The third, though, is trivial, neglecting the different meanings of fishing 
and employing a weak comparison (“interested in”), which suggests the likeness is 
vague. This effect is amplified by Smith’s second-guessing of the gender-specific term 
fishermen, which further strains an already weak comparison via a distracting 
problematization of the language. Last, readers are faced with a simile that is entirely 
useless. Smith uses scriptural figures to fashion a substantive interpretation of 
Coaker’s historical role, then slides incongruously into silliness for comic effect. 
Newfoundlanders have generally been familiar with the main stories and characters of 
the Bible, and with the depth and importance it is normally granted among the 
religious. The incongruity between this depth and importance and Smith’s shallow 
treatments is the source of the comic potency of such frivolous biblical references. 
Sometimes the apparent frivolity of Smith’s scriptural invocations is a bit of a 
ruse, veiling a more serious point. For instance, in his column “Winners and Losers” 
Smith invokes Armageddon ironically, implicitly criticizing literalist interpretations of 
biblical apocalypse, and possibly his misgivings about the material itself. In a passage 
that reflects his general emphasis on forgiveness and inclusion, Smith rhetorically 
aligns himself with the judged rather than the judges, as a means of questioning this 
pervasive human tendency and the use of scripture to support it.  
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That Smith, while a professed Christian, does not advocate a strictly deferential 
relationship to scripture, is apparent in “Winners and Losers,” as elsewhere. Smith 
begins “Winners and Losers” by telling readers the Bible states that at the last 
judgment people will be divided into sheep and goats, “with the goats headed for that 
last Big Barbecue down under” (Not a Word 76-77).  He suggests his “goat points” 
always seem to outweigh his sheep points, and laments, “Somebody’s always dividing 
people into groups: good and bad; rich and poor; beautiful and ugly; saved and 
unsaved; and I always end up in the wrong group: bad, poor, ugly, unsaved and a goat 
to boot. It’s very discouraging” (77). This sort of playful self-deprecation is a common 
strategy in Smith’s work. By following a list of his own ostensible personal and 
spiritual defects with the anticlimactic “It’s very discouraging” (77), and leaning on 
deliberately flimsy metaphors such as his description of hell as a big barbecue, Smith 
exploits the idea of a literal apocalypse that does not really concern him, as a trope for 
scrutinizing a social attitude. The tendency to divide “us” against “them,” the column 
implies, is pervasive and lamentable. The biblical apocalypse is a familiar 
dramatization of an absolute division, a tool for Smith’s playful exploration of social 
values. Yet, for Smith, social values have religious implications, and make demands 
on claims to religious truth. Accordingly, by belittling human invocations of the 
apocalypse via barbecues and goat points, he rejects the notion that humans have the 
capacity or the right to make distinctions between the saved and unsaved. Juxtaposing 
such judgments with a variety of common secular value judgments and social 
divisions, and aligning himself with the ostensible losers on all counts, Smith 
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implicitly declares the tendencies to judge, divide, and rank to be purely human 
impulses, and problematic ones at that.  
While Smith uses an ironic reference to biblical Armageddon in “Winners and 
Losers” to explore human attitudes, in another column he uses both Creation and 
Armageddon as critical tools for evaluating humanity’s effect on the planet. While the 
column does not affirm the literal truth of the biblical Creation, it employs a Judeo-
Christian understanding of humans as “the Special Creation” with dominion over all 
others as a satirical standard for ridiculing our actual behaviour. And while Smith does 
not appear to regard the biblical apocalypse as literally true in a predictive sense, he 
does deem it to be at least figuratively true, in what might be considered a more 
broadly prophetic sense.7 Here, Smith finds Armageddon to be, at least, a worthy 
cautionary tale. 
Smith begins with a reference to his readers’ alleged impatience with his 
shallowness. He writes that they have pleaded, “‘Give us something to make us think,’ 
. . . ‘give us something with meat on it!’” (100).  Smith responds, “Okay,” then 
launches into a partly serious description of human beings’ impact on the earth. He 
begins by proposing a one-year model of the planet’s entire history. According to 
Smith’s model, “there would be no sign of man at all until 11:45 on December 31,” 
and “the entire period of man’s written history would occupy only the final sixty 
seconds before midnight.” According to Smith, upon our arrival “the neighbourhood 
went all to hell.” He invites readers to notice “how much we’ve loused up in a 
minute,” and to speculate on “what things would be like if we had been around for an 
hour or two!” (Take It 100). The remainder of the column bears quotation: 
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 Just to get us off to a good start, we were given dominion over the 
 animals. We can take lessons in forgiveness from dogs, in patience 
 from horses, in work from oxen, in humility from cows, in organization 
 from ants and in procreation from rabbits. 
      It’s a wonder that the Archangel Gabriel doesn’t have whoever 
 wrote that bit about man being a little lower than the angels sued for 
 defamation of character. We’re told that there’s a strong possibility of 
 class action on the Last Day. 
      To top it all off, no one in his right mind would bet more than a 
 Jackie sculpin that we’ll make it through the first minute of the next 
 year. 
      Now is that serious or what? (100) 
Smith’s invocation of the Last Judgment is only partly playful. It is a joke surrounded 
by other jokes; thus, it is not presented as true in any literal sense. But it is juxtaposed 
with an expression of concern that we may genuinely be doing ourselves in, that some 
form of apocalypse may indeed loom. 
Although Smith often uses playfulness to trouble coherent critique in the 
service of fun and reader engagement, in columns like this one, playfulness is used to 
sugar the pill. Smith challenges readers to consider their own behaviour and to ask 
themselves how, and whether, they are fulfilling their stewardship obligations. His 
reference to final judgment is paired with a description of humans as the “Special 
Creation,” in order to challenge Christian (and other) readers to consider their own 
actions in terms of these foundational stories: in terms of humans as the apex of 
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Creation with attendant responsibilities, and in terms of judgment by an all-seeing 
God. If these stories are meant to provide a moral compass to followers of the religion, 
and if they maintain some measure of guiding function for many non-believing 
members of a Christian culture, then perhaps, the column playfully implies, they ought 
to be taken seriously. 
 
4.3   Whose God is God?: Smith’s Ecumenism 
It becomes apparent as one reads Smith’s work that the Bible is an abiding anchor for 
his spirituality and ethics; it is also clear that he does not understand it primarily in 
terms of rules, or as a literal expression of transcendent truth. Rather, it is a largely 
figurative expression of truth, with all the attendant ambiguities of figurative 
expression. Thus, its meaning can be worked out only gradually, unevenly, and 
partially through the course of a life. Smith generally denounces fundamentalism—in 
part, it seems, because its rigidity is incongruent with his more speculative, process-
driven approach to the journey of faith, but more explicitly because he regards it as a 
threat to humane coexistence. In a column and a memoir excerpt that recall Guy’s 
“See Dick and Jane Run,” Smith ridicules an alleged fixation on often trivial religious 
distinctions among Newfoundland denominations that have perpetrated and 
perpetuated social strife based on such superficial differences. He repeatedly explores 
the development of popular images of the divine, implicitly suggesting humans have 
shaped these images largely according to our own perceived needs. His rejection of 
the idea that God intervenes, providing assistance to those who have the correct belief 
or sufficient faith, reflects his sense that it is important to maintain a critical 
 123
  
relationship with images of God, to use one’s intellect and moral sense to consider 
whether these images are God-worthy. Smith’s concern for the alleged overvaluation 
of religious differences, his rejection of selective divine intervention, and his 
uncertainty about knowledge of God, underpin the ecumenical flavour of much of his 
religious humour. 
 Unlike Ray Guy’s thoroughly secular opposition to interdenominational 
animosities, Smith’s similarly pluralistic engagement with the problem of social strain 
across religious divisions reflects an ecumenical religious perspective. Smith strives to 
find a sustainable religious middle ground between what Küng describes as “blind zeal 
for truth,” which has caused unspeakable cruelty throughout history, and “fatigued 
forgetfulness of truth,” which may lead to disorientation and the inability to “believe 
in anything at all.” The tone as well as the content of Smith’s work on religion recalls 
Küng’s third option: “to blunt the edge of the dispute over truth and to arrive at 
common answers in the ecumenical spirit” (228). As Smith’s own work reflects, this 
path is less tidy than absolutism, and requires the relinquishment of some of its 
reassuring coherence; but its advocates see religious conflict as irreligious, and 
consider the softening of one’s hold on religious truth to be a virtuous concession if it 
leads to greater peace and mutual understanding. Patrick Grant writes that in social 
contexts characterized by religious “scapegoating, . . . stereotyping and binary or 
mirror opposition, . . . religious commitments, based as they are on elevated principles, 
can nonetheless be annexed to kinds of behavior that these principles clearly 
denounce” (ix). Religious satirists have perennially targeted the gap between elevated 
principles and degraded acts justified in their terms, a gap that routinely concerns 
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Smith in his humorous treatments of religious divisions. Smith likely would agree 
with Grant’s assertion that interdenominational conflict based on an overattachment to 
the rightness of one’s own group amplifies likeness rather than difference among 
religious groups: according to Grant, “‘patterned opposition’ [between groups] 
produc[es] an often unconscious ‘cultural convergence’ whereby traditional enemies 
come to look more and more alike, despite their proclaimed differences” (6-7). It is a 
likeness without harmony, a mutually condemning likeness that, to one with Smith’s 
ecumenical outlook, serves no one, including God. 
In his childhood memoir Some Fine Times!, Smith denounces an alleged 
excess of  concern for distinctions between Protestants and Catholics in 
Newfoundland. He describes a family move to the community of St. George’s, to 
which his minister father has been posted, and which is Smith’s first experience of a 
mixed Catholic and Protestant community. In St. George’s, the young Smith faces an 
unexpected problem: “I couldn't tell Protestants from Catholics at a glance and 
somehow it seemed important that I should” (105). Thinking there must be some more 
subtle, yet crucially important difference at work, he asks his parents about it. His 
father tells him, “Catholics [don’t] respect the Sabbath day.” The young Smith, 
however, begins to believe that “if respect for any day meant you couldn't enjoy it, we 
Protestants had taken one mother of a wrong turn somewhere along the theological 
road” (105). Smith comes to “understand, even at the age of ten, that religious 
prejudice has to do with internal rather than external considerations, and that these 
were so hard to define that they were virtually worthless” (106). As is made clear in 
From the Ashes of My Dreams and, indirectly, through his multi-angled humorous 
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uses of scripture, working through ultimately ineffable “internal considerations” is, for 
Smith, important to the religious journey, whatever he may say about such 
considerations in this moment of indignation. But his work also generally supports this 
passage’s premise that “internal considerations” ought not to be used as grounds for 
the propagation of strife. Smith places great value on the worldly effects of religious 
beliefs and doctrines: for him, the social ramifications and manifestations of a belief 
are worthy of consideration in the evaluation of the belief itself. Through Smith’s St. 
George’s experience, the propagation of social enmity based on what he perceives as 
theological uncertainties (cf. Kantra 187) comes to seem, as Grant might assert, 
contrary to the “elevated” religious principles that supposedly underpin the various 
parties’ positions. Smith comes to believe that harbouring suspicions and sustaining 
oppositions based on disagreements over abstractions is more than problematic: it is 
“virtually worthless.” 
 In many of his columns, Smith similarly makes light of interdenominational 
animosities and of the religious premises that support them. He begins a column 
entitled “The Little Church Schoolhouse” by parodying justifications for the 
denominational school system. He declares that church schools were developed in part 
as a compensation for a “lack of physical education facilities” (Never 45), and 
describes a compensating, denominational-school “phys ed” activity: “For serious 
competition we fired [rocks] at the crowd from the Salvation Army school a hundred 
yards up the road who, of course, fired them back with equal vigour” (46). He asks, 
“At whom would we have pitched rocks if there had been no Salvationist school? How 
long would students have retained their interest in simply smashing bottles lined off on 
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a fence? Exactly. Can't get blood out of a bottle” (46).8 This description of sectarian 
violence among children resonates with Smith’s denigration in Some Fine Times! of 
animosities based on “internal considerations,” especially given most children’s vague 
understanding of the grounds upon which such divisions have been maintained. In the 
hands of children, the tribalist underpinnings of interdenominational strife are made 
plain. 
Later in the column, Smith addresses a few actual defenses of denominational 
schools, giving them basically the same treatment as his parodic defense. For instance, 
he describes the “religious truth” defense, suggesting that every religious “persuasion  
. . . knew that [their] church pretty well had a monopoly on the real truth about things” 
(46). He notes the paradoxical universality and mutual exclusivity of such claims, and 
further belittles the “religious truth” defense via an ironic attack on Catholics for being 
“so far off the straight and narrow, what with their chopping wood and berry-picking 
on Sundays, that they [don’t] even bear mention” (46). Because of the denominations’ 
confidence in their unique possession of religious truth, Smith argues, “they put us in 
separate schools to keep us apart, and warned us to have nothing to do with each other 
except to pitch rocks in the other's general direction” (47). Smith is less interested in 
exploring the theological subtleties of the various denominations than he is in making 
fun of how such subtleties have been used as a source of animosity. The tendency in 
his religious humour toward the comic belittlement of antagonism based on religious 
distinctions is related to the fact that he does not, for the most part, demonstrate much 
concern with whether one worships the same image of God as he does. 
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 Certain Smith columns playfully explore his theological and moral interest in 
images of God, an interest later explored more seriously and directly in From the 
Ashes of My Dreams. For instance, in his column “Holy Super Santa,” he implies that 
popular images of God have human origins, and assesses them according to this 
premise: they are images, and not God. In the column, Smith describes a childhood 
version of himself musing on similarities and differences between God and Santa 
Claus, in the process playfully addressing the development of images of God while 
expanding a common, rather stern Protestant image of God to include a sense of fun 
and undiscriminating generosity. A predictable move given Smith’s playful persona 
and his trepidation about judgment, this shift invites readers to consider their own 
images of God and the strange existence of Santa Claus, who has become a desirable 
object of belief for children. The question of why people encourage a childhood belief 
in Santa Claus is part of the column’s subtext, a subtext that informs Smith’s alleged 
childhood epiphany, “God and Santa Claus were one and the same!” (Never 79): 
together they seem to present a worthier image of God.  
The column begins by explaining the young Smith’s preference for Santa 
Claus over God: 
 Santa gave you gifts; God gave you Sunday School. God was stern and 
 strict; Santa was a barrel of fun. God punished you if you were bad; 
 Santa talked a lot about being good and bad. But when the chips were 
 down on Christmas Eve, Santa didn't seem to mind one way or the 
 other. 
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      If God was interested in being popular, I often thought, He could 
 learn a whole lot from Santa Claus. (78) 
The column’s child protagonist continues to mull over the available evidence and 
perceives that despite their differences, “they were alike in one intriguing way. Both 
knew everything there was to know about you” (78), a fact he does not relish. In 
addition, the young Smith recognizes in both a form of omnipresence (78-79). He 
wonders if Santa and God could be relatives, then his epiphany strikes. Regarding his 
revelation, Smith remarks, “God wasn't such a bad fellow after all, when you got to 
know Him” (79), re-emphasizing the sternness of the youthful Smith’s inherited image 
of God. The passage lightheartedly implies that the stern father God is an 
impoverished image of God that is improved by this injection of joy and generosity. 
On a roll, the young Smith considers, since men dress up as Santa, and when children 
ask why different men dress up as Santa they are told that Santa is busy, and since it is 
clear that Santa is busy because Santa is God, “why not have someone dressed up as 
God to take up collection in church?” (79). In a lighthearted subversion of a 
conventional image of God, Smith suggests God’s costume would be easy, since 
“Everyone knew God was a tall old man with white hair and white beard dressed in 
long white robes sitting on a golden throne” (80). 
Following such lighthearted play with images of God, Smith closes the column 
with an adult recognition of the Christian spirit of the holiday, paired with a 
subsequent, perhaps paradoxical affirmation of his ostensible childhood insight: 
 Today, I know that the way to see God at Christmas is in a Child. But I 
 can't help feeling that my childhood theory of Santa and God being one 
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 and the same can't be too far off the mark. Indeed, I have to be honest 
 about it. 
      I still like both better that way. (80) 
After confirming that the central figure of Christmas is Christ, Smith returns to his 
youthful epiphany that God and Santa are one being, re-implying his “belief” in Santa 
Claus as an “image of God.” His assertion that he prefers them both as one is left 
unexplained. Readers are left to determine how Santa might be improved by being 
God, and God by being Santa. For instance, if the stern, “father” God is made more 
kind by being Santa, perhaps Santa (as a spirit of joy and generosity) is improved as 
one face of an infinitely just God. Underlying such considerations is the column’s 
implication that both the stern old man God and the jolly old man Santa are images 
people (largely men) have developed over time. Further beneath the surface, a possible 
additional implication may be discerned, born of the fact that Santa, while perhaps a 
desirable object of belief, does not exist in fact. The implications of this are left 
unpursued by Smith in this column, though he does acknowledge the possibility of 
God’s non-existence at one point in From the Ashes of My Dreams (106). Even in that 
passage, however, the allowance is made within a narrative that leads back through 
doubt to an affirmation of belief.  
While Smith advocates tolerance of religious difference, this tolerance of 
people’s faith and respect for its sustaining power does not equate with an uncritical 
acceptance of any given image. Even the playful “Holy Super Santa,” which implies 
that both of its “images of God” are human models, still reflects a perception that the 
truthfulness of different models varies. In fact, Smith’s very insistence on a high 
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degree of religious tolerance and on a corresponding measure of uncertainty is, by its 
nature, intolerant of certain images of God. For instance, a God who would favour one 
group of people over another is unacceptable in Smith’s view. This rejection is 
developed in Smith’s satire of Newfoundland’s history of interdenominational 
tensions, in which the various parties’ mutually exclusive possession of religious truth, 
and of God’s attendant favour,  is ridiculed in principle and in its details. The chapters 
of From the Ashes that either address God directly or mull over theological 
possibilities further develop Smith’s point of view on human conceptions of the 
divine, including the particular notion that God intervenes in worldly affairs. In the 
memoir, Smith discusses the well-intended religious assertions of many of his and his 
wife’s friends. He, and more forcefully Marion, openly reject most of their friends’ 
statements about God’s potential role in Smith’s rehabilitation. While Smith loves and 
respects the advocates of divine intervention who offer him spiritual counsel in From 
the Ashes, and is open to sharing worship and community with them, he rejects this 
aspect of the object of their worship because he disagrees with them in regard to the 
justice of it. 
Throughout the memoir’s chapters that address the nature of God, Smith 
grapples with the possibility of an interventionist God, and finds the idea morally 
unpersuasive. At one point he asks, if God can and does enact miracles,  
 Where are you when little children are starving to death? When 
 women are raped and killed? When men are executed? . . . Someone 
 has told me they believe in guardian angels who watch over and protect 
 us. Where are these angels when the human monsters of this earth 
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 decide to wipe out whole races of people because it suits their perverted 
 and twisted minds? (105) 
Smith subsequently rejects the prospect that God might intervene in the affairs of a 
select, faithful few, and not on behalf of people suffering genocide and torture. In 
addition, neither Smith nor Marion can see the justice of divine intervention in Smith’s 
own situation. He writes, 
 A clergyman friend suggests it’s all a matter of faith. 
      “If you have even the smallest bit of faith, Jesus said you could 
 move mountains,” he says pointedly. 
      This gets Marion very upset. 
      “That’s a cop-out,” she says. “It’s so easy to say that if Ed doesn’t 
 get better it’s because he doesn’t have enough faith. How much is 
 enough? Who knows how much he has? And if you believe that it’s a 
 matter of faith, you probably also believe that this is part of God’s plan, 
 which means God must have planned for Ed not to have enough faith. 
 How do you explain that?” (140) 
After several more passages of a similar tenor, Smith makes his conclusion about the 
prospect of God’s intervention in his accident and rehabilitation explicit in a direct 
address to God: 
 I haven’t blamed you for the injury. I don’t believe you had anything to 
 do with it. . . . I  simply do not believe that my life is so manipulated 
 by you that my choices are limited only to what you allow me to 
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 decide, and that I can avoid the consequences of my actions simply by 
 asking for your help. (312-13) 
Despite his stated openness to different images of God, Smith personally rejects an 
interventionist conception on the grounds that it reduces an infinite God to a partisan 
god, a prospect to which Smith cannot reconcile his own conception of a universally 
loving deity. Smith rejects the notion of a God who would hurt him for some 
mysterious greater purpose, who would base the decision to intervene on the adequacy 
of Smith’s faith (over which, as Marion notes, an interventionist God presumably has 
control), or who, if Smith were to pray ardently enough, might intervene to aid his 
healing while neglecting others who may need help more than he does. While Smith’s 
accident and rehabilitation undoubtedly gave him fresh cause to revisit the question of 
God’s plan and the justice of divine intervention, these passages affirm, and develop 
more extensively, a rejection already humorously articulated before the accident. 
In a column appropriately entitled “Divine Intervention,” Smith ridicules those 
who invite God’s influence in competition, whether it be sports or warfare. The 
column adapts the same basic line of reasoning as Smith’s rejections of divine 
intervention in From the Ashes. The prospect of a God who would intervene on one 
side of a competition denies any equivalent claim to intervention by the opposing side 
in instances where both sides are praying for help in mutual opposition (recalling the 
“religious truth” claims in “The Little Church Schoolhouse”). Again, the reduction of 
God to a partisan is an implicit target, as is the invitation of God’s favour for trivial, 
ambiguous, or even objectionable ends.  
 133
  
The column begins with the assertion, “Pity poor God.” Smith goes on to 
describe facetiously the sorts of conundrums God must be faced with on a regular 
basis, such as which football team to favour. Smith describes a televised football 
game, and notices that, at a crucial moment, many of the players are seen praying: 
 You could almost hear the words. 
      “Dear God, if You'll let that football soar through those goalposts, I 
 promise I will never, repeat never, be bad again. Winning this game 
 means another twenty thousand in bonus money, God, and You know 
 how the new mansion and the three Porsches are bleeding me dry.”  
 (Never 43) 
The triviality of the immediate purpose of God’s hoped-for assistance (a field goal), 
and the frivolous materialism of the player’s own “deeper” hope, emphasize the 
absurdity of inviting God’s help in attaining it. Smith suggests that “God faces this 
kind of foolishness all the time,” then dramatizes a post-match interview with a 
victorious boxer in which the boxer begins by saying, “I just want to thank my Lord 
Jesus Christ” (44). Smith asks, “Thank Him? For what? For pounding another of 
God's creatures into a bloody pulp? For giving him such a vicious beating that he's still 
stretched out on the canvas with three doctors working on him? Thank you, Jesus! 
Amen!” (44). Smith then extends his ridicule to warfare, perhaps the ultimate 
manifestation of worldly partisanship. He notes the explicit and implicit proclamations 
of God’s favour on both sides during the Persian Gulf War, and idly dismisses the 
presumption of divine backing that seemed to pervade both sides, finally suggesting, 
“Being blamed for such actions must be extremely frustrating for the aforesaid Deity” 
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(45). Smith ultimately cannot bring himself to believe in a partisan God who would 
overlook the suffering of millions while selectively intervening in the affairs of others. 
Given Smith’s rejection of a biblical literalism that would affirm God’s violence, he 
rejects certain interpretations of God because they just seem cruel, and he cannot 
accept an image of God that is capable of such cruelty. 
 While Smith rejects certain images of God and embraces others, he is generally 
unwilling to authoritatively assert the veracity of any image of God; in fact, the images 
he rejects tend to be those associated with authoritative assertion in the first place. 
Hence, he consistently rejects fundamentalism of any stripe. In his column “The Hard 
Sell,” Smith uses the publication of his first collection of columns as an opportunity to 
put a disingenuous spin on his own motivations for religious ridicule—he writes that 
he ought to have done it more because he would sell more books. He laments of his 
forthcoming publication, “Nothing was said to get pulpit thumpers good and mad, 
although one dear soul did drop a line to point out that the things I say in this column 
are a stink in the nostrils of the Lord (her words, not mine)” (Never 97). Despite his 
eagerness to make fun of alleged fanatics because he rejects the narrowness of their 
moral and ontological framework, Smith is open and eager regarding his Christianity, 
proclaiming and describing the value of an active religious life. An illuminating 
example of Smith’s ecumenical affirmation of the spiritual power of faith is found in 
From the Ashes of My Dreams, as Smith attends a hospital chapel service at the clinic 
where he and most of the rest of the congregation are rehabilitating after spinal-cord 
injuries: 
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The common denominators among us are pain and grief. . . . But 
somehow in this little gathering pain and grief for the moment are 
strangers. Drawing on our own strengths, and the strengths of those 
around us, we manage to rise above our personal and collective demons 
and are temporarily freed. Here we are understood, and accepted for 
who we are and not what we are. Here we can share worship with each 
other in perfect understanding, whatever our unique and varied 
perceptions of the Creator may be. (172) 
The act of shared worship, and a sense of being “understood” and “accepted,” whether 
by God or each other or both (the excerpt is ambiguous in this regard), are the crucial 
bonds among the congregants in the above passage. The “perfect understanding” 
Smith describes is of their common experience of “pain and grief,” and of their shared 
sense of faith and hope; it is not a common understanding of God. The two axes along 
which Smith’s musings on belief in God tend to run involve morality, on the one hand, 
and the sustaining capacity of faith, on the other. When Smith is concerned with moral 
principles (as in “Divine Intervention”), he cannot shrug at substantial differences in 
belief that pose real obstacles to mutual understanding and humane coexistence; 
hence, God becomes a site of some measure of struggle. But when Smith is primarily 
concerned about God’s sustaining function, he tends not to be very concerned about 
whether he shares a common conception of God with others. When people of diverse 
religious beliefs suffer earthly ills together, and require hope and strength, the act of 
shared worship, despite people’s various conceptions of God, is taken to be of central 
importance. It is tentatively taken for granted that the community can absorb these 
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differences because, at such times, the community’s primary needs are hope, love, and 
a sense of unity. Smith’s different approaches to these two axes of his religious 
thought reveal a paradox in his religious thinking. This paradox is accounted for, 
though not resolved, by his journey-focused understanding of religious life, through 
which answers to “big questions” only ever reveal themselves partially and tentatively, 
and within which one finds no reasonable grounds for sustaining absolute divisions or 
oppositions, regardless of inevitable struggles over specific questions. 
For Smith, the development of a maximum amount of harmonious feeling 
across the bounds of religious difference is both socially and religiously laudable, 
though it may necessitate a measure of the religious uncertainty about which he is 
quite frank. In his broadly ecumenical column “Home for the Holidays,” Smith 
describes familial developments that are facetiously presented as a challenge to the 
limits of his own religious (and racial) tolerance. There is no sincere suggestion in the 
column that the broadening of horizons encouraged by his children’s involvements is 
much of a struggle for him, especially considering that he begins the column by giving 
away its self-congratulatory conclusion: “I discovered that I have not a jot or tittle of 
religious prejudice in my soul” (Not a Word 138). This declaration sets the tone for the 
rest of the column, which is distinctly lighthearted throughout, and which amounts to a 
humorous affirmation of the social benefits of a far-reaching ecumenism. Smith once 
again ironically invokes Armageddon, this time as a potential outcome of his 
children’s interfaith attachments. “Home for the Holidays” presents a pluralistic 
religious, racial, and cultural perspective, relatively unconcerned with the prospect that 
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differences among religious traditions may be difficult to bridge, let alone crucial to 
the fates of souls. 
Presenting his children’s romantic and platonic involvements across a range of 
religious and ethnic divisions as an apparent scandal, Smith prepares the grounds for 
his expression of concern that they may bring on the apocalypse. Smith writes that two 
of his daughters have Catholic boyfriends and that one, “to her Protestant clergyman 
Grandfather's dismay, has already taken up bingo” (138); he adds, “How far is it from 
bingo to a full confessional stance?” (138). Their third daughter is involved with a 
Jewish football player and recently spent a weekend in New York with the family of a 
Korean Hindu young man with whom she attends Harvard University. Smith invokes 
biblical apocalypse and final judgment in a typically teasing but pointed fashion, 
asserting, “Biblical scholars are wrong about where the battle of Armageddon is to be 
fought. Ten chances to one it will be in our living room” (138). “Other Half”9  
responds to their children’s involvements “coolly and dispassionately:” “If our family 
was meant to be the combined United Nations and World Council of Churches of 
Atlantic Canada, so be it. It's more important that the boys are nice. Nice and rich . . . 
would be even better” (138-39). In a province traditionally fraught with 
interdenominational conflict, Smith simply and straightforwardly embraces religious 
differences far beyond those among Newfoundland’s still-dominant Christian 
denominations, extending his always apparent Christian ecumenism to an interfaith 
embrace. 
While, as Smith acknowledges, a broadly conceived ecumenical spirit may 
encourage peaceful interaction among communities (From the Ashes 251), Lakeland 
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argues there are attendant perils in the pursuit of a far-reaching ecumenism, aside from 
many religious believers’ obvious concern that souls may be at stake. As noted in 
Chapter One in regard to a possible direction in which Newfoundland’s growing 
religious pluralism may be heading, a pluralistic mindset tends, in Lakeland’s view, to 
promote “a vision that differences don’t, in the end, really matter all that much” (57). 
Addressing concerns regarding the “liberal metanarrative of pluralism which takes 
over” when the “Christian metanarrative” is abandoned, Lakeland suggests both have 
the potential to effectively erase Otherness.10 He acknowledges that pluralism, unlike 
Christianity, “releases the other to be other” (57). That is, it demonstrates no need to 
alter the Other. Lakeland values a self-conscious relationship to Others, one which 
moves beyond straightforward assumptions of one’s own rightness; but he suggests 
that pluralism may do the opposite of what its advocates expect. The pluralist 
mentality often does not adequately acknowledge that religious difference is deeply 
substantive in its effects on adherent individuals and communities, he argues, and this 
lack of acknowledgment prevents a proper understanding of the religious Other. 
Pursuing his argument, Lakeland argues that religions are “incommensurable,” that 
“each religion is not so much a contributor to the understanding of Being as an 
account of Being, which must inevitably ‘reclassify’ other accounts when it 
encounters them” (68). That is to say, religions have developed as whole systems, and 
the truth value of elements of a given system is, in some measure, dependent upon 
their relationship to the whole. Hence, an approach in which one regards religious 
traditions as collections of spiritual wisdom from which the best parts can be chosen, 
or the deep histories of which can be taken lightly, fails to understand the traditions, 
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alters the meaning of their parts due to a reduction of the importance of their broader 
context, and thereby detracts from the overall, incommensurable “truth” of the 
different religions. 
 Locating Smith relative to such an argument is a bit complicated. On the one 
hand, his doubts about what can be religiously known, and his recurrent expressions of 
concern for social harmony, lead at times to facile rhetorical diminishments of the 
meaningfulness of religious difference. On the other hand, his relationship to his 
Christian tradition is hardly trivial or superficial. By treating the various worldly and 
devotional materials of his religion as sources of fun, targets of ridicule, political 
metaphors, satirical standards, objects of love, and fulcrums of theological 
exploration, Smith seems to take Christianity quite seriously, engaging with it on 
multiple levels and to multiple ends, not all of which are likely to please any given 
reader. For instance, a strongly apostate reader may become impatient or bored with 
Smith’s serious explorations of Christian belief, while a reader with a fundamentalist 
orientation might find his persistent irreverence and his sometimes facile pluralism a 
source of irritation.11 Strikingly, in From the Ashes of My Dreams Smith begins to 
consider possible limitations on the positive potential of (or at least an expression of 
caution regarding) the broad ecumenical spirit he has generally favoured. Addressing 
the cosmopolitan trend he witnessed in Toronto while living in a rehabilitation centre 
in Scarborough, Smith observes,  
 The multicultural and multi-religious groups that make up the Greater 
 Toronto Area seem to have found a way to live together in peace. More 
 power to them. I’m all for peace. Like all peace, this one seems to have 
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 come at a price, that price being that all faiths and cultures are in 
 danger of being reduced to the lowest common denominator. (251) 
There is a mild tension between this passage and the overtly pluralistic humour of 
“Home for the Holidays,” though the two passages are not necessarily contradictory. 
“Home for the Holidays” is primarily concerned with social harmony, and Smith is 
amply pleased by what he sees in this regard. His comments in From the Ashes simply 
acknowledge, perhaps for the first time in his writing, that such harmony, which he 
clearly favours, has a shadow side, that this gain comes with a likely (if not an 
inevitable) attendant loss, a loss it seems Smith can live with.  
 
4.4   Religious Hypocrisy and Foibles: Integrity and Community in Smith’s 
Religious Humour 
Smith’s multifaceted interest in his religious heritage, his explorations of matters of 
belief, and his concern for ethical questions, lead to occasional ridicule of religious 
hypocrisy—a staple among targets of religious satire, and a particular favourite of Ray 
Guy. In other passages, Smith depicts religious shortcomings, such as mild foibles in 
affectionately portrayed religious communities, that cannot properly be attributed to 
hypocrisy. I use the term foibles to describe shortcomings that are not vicious or 
deeply harmful, and that seem to arise out of the daily complexity of life and people’s 
limited insights. By hypocrisy, on the other hand, I indicate willful refusals to 
acknowledge, or rationalizations with vicious consequences of, glaring inconsistencies 
between professed moral standards and behaviour. Implicit in Smith’s satirical 
depictions of hypocrisy is the hypocrite’s lack of proper regard for God as well as for 
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other people, a combination which recalls the objects of his ridicule in columns such 
as “Divine Intervention.” In his humorous depictions of foibles, Smith often draws 
attention to the benefits of shared worship discussed above, and to the presence in the 
religious community of values bonding and supporting flawed if usually well-
intentioned people.  
 Two prominent objects of ridicule in Smith’s satire of hypocrisy are 
televangelists and Newfoundland historical figures. The former are ridiculed in a 
number of columns, and the latter mostly in Fish ‘n’ Ships. Though Smith’s main 
target in his ridicule of televangelists is duplicity, in the process he makes a good deal 
of fun of their preaching style, which is generally depicted as a bombastic mask for 
insincerity. His column “Salvation Full and Free” exploits Jimmy Swaggart’s 
preaching style for satirical purposes; it depicts him as a showman performing for 
money under a guise of religiosity. In addition to the use of religious enthusiasm as a 
mask for greed, the column targets drama and aesthetic excitement as a replacement 
for genuine conviction. 
 Smith begins the column by admitting, “I’ve just been watching Jimmy 
Swaggart” (I Blame 64). He quickly defends himself for doing so: “Well, I'm on 
holiday, you know, and at someone else's house, so there's not a lot to do and the 
television was on and the remote control halfway across the room in another chair and 
it was easier to watch Swaggart than get up and switch to something else” (64). Smith 
goes on to praise Swaggart as a performer: “Swaggart is another Bo Jangles. The man 
can sing. The man can act. The man knows how to work an audience better than an 
auctioneer. The man could bring tears to a glass eye” (65). He describes the “fever-
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pitch of ecstacy and praise” that Swaggart has facilitated among members of his 
congregation, suggesting that “some—the Bo Jangles types—would call it singin' and 
dancin', but it is obviously ecstacy and praise” (65). He concedes that “the appeal was 
all to the heart and nothing to the brain, but that's alright. I'd take a great heart to a 
great brain any day, not having had much choice in the matter for myself” (65). He 
gets swept up again and, alluding to Swaggart’s motel-room sex scandal, asks, 
“Motel? What motel? Hooker? What hooker? Hallelujah” (66). Smith uses self-
deprecation ironically, in a way that is typical of his satire, in defending Swaggart’s 
allegedly vacuous preaching on the grounds that it excites and gratifies him, and 
because it suits his own ostensible incapacity to think critically either about what has 
been said or about its implications for the preacher’s own behaviour. 
The bulk of the column depicts the solicitation from the television audience of 
money to be directed “towards supporting his television ministry so that he could 
continue doing what he was doing then” (67). The ambiguity of this phrase recalls 
Smith’s earlier suggestion that some might call Swaggart’s spiritual leadership 
“singin’ and dancin’,” and implies, in the context of the column as a whole, that “what 
he was doing then” was swindling people. The pecuniary plea is framed as a birthday 
present to Swaggart’s wife Frances, who ostensibly has designed a wonderfully 
expensive-looking necklace that the Swaggarts are willing to sell for only fifty-three 
dollars, and the purchase of which will make Frances happy on her birthday. A less 
expensive cookbook is also available, which, Smith extrapolates, will make Frances 
less, but still adequately, happy (66). He conjectures that if he does not buy even the 
twenty-three dollar cookbook, Frances will “spend her birthday in a blue funk” (66). 
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Smith’s identification of himself as a direct influence on Frances’ well-being targets 
the sentimental rhetoric that would present such a financial appeal in personal, 
emotional terms. Smith’s narrator again gets caught up in the show’s emotional 
momentum, ending the column with a nod to Swaggart’s persuasive powers, followed 
by a predictable Smithean about-face: 
      All I had to do was get my cheque in the mail in a hurry so that 
 Frances would not be disappointed on her birthday. 
      And so I shall, Brother Swaggart, so I shall. 
      When hell freezes over. (67) 
It is implicit in “Salvation Full and Free” that some of the pressure to contribute to 
Frances’ birthday bliss comes from a desire among viewers to please God by pleasing 
these dealers in saved souls. Despite his generally playful approach, Smith is 
sometimes very didactic. Here, his closing quip makes his own opinion abundantly 
clear: salvation by these means is neither full nor free. The column satirizes those 
who, more committed to their own wealth than to God, would sell spiritual shortcuts 
and encourage a hasty embrace of one’s own salvation. Purchasers of Frances’ 
necklace or cook book trade their money for a spiritual solution that is likely to fail 
because it does not account for the challenges of the long spiritual road ahead, a 
likelihood obscured by the drama and excitement of instant conversion. 
Like Smith’s televangelists, the Christian colonial power players whom Smith 
ridicules in Fish ‘n’ Ships are motivated largely by greed. Describing the notorious 
exploitation of Newfoundland fishing communities by the  merchants, Smith writes, 
“Merchants were invariably religious. ‘The poor you shall have with you always’ was 
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their favourite quote from the Bible, and a good thing for merchants it was, too. 
Having the poor with them always would mean that they'd always be rich” (59). The 
same biblical passage is used to similar ends in CODCO’s “Upper Class Scene,” from 
their play Das Capital. In the CODCO sketch, several wealthy St. John’s residents 
discuss their wish to “get [their] hands on a poor person and pluck him up out of the 
dirt, . . . and just give him a good scrub up or something . . . And just see, with a little 
breeding and a little encouragement, see if [they] could make a rich person out of him” 
(181). However, they decide that it will not work, that the poor person would 
undoubtedly squander the new-found wealth, and that, “as J.C. himself said, the poor 
you always have with you” (181), at which point the group chuckle at their cleverness. 
In both Smith’s book and CODCO’s sketch, the biblical quotation is used by the 
wealthy as a means of disengaging themselves from the problem of drastic inequality. 
For Smith’s purposes, it matters little if such a use of the phrase has real historical 
currency; it is a rhetorical tool for satirizing alleged hypocrisy among people who not 
only maintain their faith while exploiting the poor, but often find ways to rationalize 
their positions within the tradition itself. 
In the same passage, Smith goes on to describe the accomplishments of 
Captain Henry Osbourne (an early governor of Newfoundland), as well as British 
military exploits. In these instances, financial greed is a symptom of a broader hunger 
for power. After listing several other features of Osbourne’s tenure, Smith ironically 
notes, “Being a good Christian man, Osbourne also built jails and a courthouse” (60). 
In consideration of the drastic economic inequalities that characterize Newfoundland 
history—largely due to the machinations of colonial agents and merchants—“jails and 
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a courthouse” are framed as a convenient, symptom-based response to crime: a 
response which would largely target the crimes of the poor (often rooted in the effects 
of poverty), rather than those of the criminally avaricious “Christian” representatives 
of the crown. Describing the British colonial history in which Osbourne participated, 
Smith asserts, “The English believed as strongly in war as they did in God, and firmly 
believed that if they weren't involved in one they weren't pleasing the other. At least, 
this is what some scholars believe. I, of course, am not one of them” (71). Smith 
alleges a hypocrisy so deep and abiding that it became a kind of colonialist orthodoxy, 
no longer recognized as hypocrisy because of the depth to which religious ideals had 
become adapted to fit imperialist desire. This critique emphasizes the perils of 
religious control by an elite and of the over-identification of religion with power, in 
accordance with Smith’s general emphasis on the importance of community and 
dialogue, and his low valuation of power and might as Godly attributes. 
 While Smith, like Guy, is eager to satirize religious hypocrisy, especially 
among figures with substantial power over the public, Smith also gently highlights 
more benign quirks and flaws, in frequent depictions of the religious lives of ordinary 
people. Smith explores such foibles in his farcical fictional column “Circa 1951,” and 
in a more pedestrian fashion in his memoir of childhood Some Fine Times!. The 
column and the memoir, taken together, present a view of religious community life as 
being characterized by inevitable failure, limitation, and error, but also, when the 
communities are functioning as they ought, by a shared sense of forgiveness and love 
among their members. 
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 “Circa 1951” juxtaposes a passage satirizing religious hypocrisy with a slightly 
absurd though affectionate depiction of the fictional community of Caplin Spawn Gut 
(a name that recalls Ray Guy’s favourite fictional locale, Bung Hole Tickle). In 
Smith’s column, the annual report of Caplin Spawn Gut Church is being delivered to 
the congregation. The report describes church community events such as fundraising 
suppers, one of these funding an overseas missionary, “Riverent Bellacardy in far-off 
Africa” (Never 123). The speaker reports, 
 We learned through our church paper that he had been disrobed—right, 
 Riverent, sorry—defrocked for carnal knowledge of a young girl who 
 was also a heathen. Consequently, we put a stop-payment on our 
 cheque for thirteen dollars and seventy-two cents, and we are now 
 looking for a new missionary to adopt. 
      The treasurer of the League reports they have a balance on hand of 
 thirteen dollars and seventy-two cents. (123) 
The pointed reference to the young girl’s heathen condition implies suspicion that it 
had some mysterious, probably causal relationship to the apparent rape, or that it 
somehow made the priest less culpable. In light of Smith’s concern over abuses of 
children, and humanity’s often shameful legacy of cruelty more generally, in several 
serious passages of From the Ashes of My Dreams, his depiction of “Riverent 
Bellacardy” can be read as a satirical attack on a broader Christianizing, ostensibly 
civilizing mission that often has had barbaric effects and shrouded base intent. 
 Although there is an element of light ridicule throughout “Circa 1951” that is 
strengthened by the satirical reference to Reverend Bellacardy, the remainder of the 
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column’s humour is relatively gentle. Its passages referring to the year’s conversions, 
for instance, are exuberant in a way that is rather cute:  
 On a spiritual side, it was a year of ups and downs. The bad news is 
 that only five people got saved all year. The good news is that three of 
 them got saved fourteen times, and Joshua Morgan got saved twice in 
 one night. . . . So not counting Billy Price, who was drunk the night he 
 got saved and didn't know what he was doing, that makes sixteen 
 conversions for the year. (123). 
Joshua getting saved twice in one night is taken to be an especial achievement, to 
which the speaker refers repeatedly. The speaker notes that “Church attendance stayed 
about the same, except for the night Joshua got saved twice” (124), and proclaims at 
the column’s end,  
 We don't want to forget our wonderful pastor, the Riverent Glentiddy, 
 who gave us such a wonderful sermon the night Joshua got saved twice 
 and knocked over the church stove while the spirit was on him. And 
 last but not least, thanks to all the brave people who fought the fire.  
      We will now call for volunteers for the new church building 
 committee. (124) 
Despite the satirical undercurrent of the missionary passage, “Circa 1951” generally is 
an example of Smith at his most exuberantly comedic. While the cast of characters is a 
bit ridiculous, their depiction is, on balance, affectionate. Joshua’s multiple 
conversions are played for laughs, but the community’s warm-hearted embrace of 
Joshua, though comically innocent, is not depicted sneeringly. Similarly, though 
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Joshua’s exuberance inadvertently results in the church burning down, the 
community’s commitment to rebuilding the church is humorously but gently stated, 
and he is not blamed. Thus, while the passage about “Riverent Bellacardy” is 
religiously satirical, and while the column may be seen to contain a latent comment on 
public conversion as a kind of entertainment (especially in light of “Salvation Full and 
Free”), it also emphasizes the benefits to the community of the church, which acts as a 
binding agent, through which members (even struggling members like Joshua) are 
held in a shared, loving embrace. 
 Churches were socially conservative forces in the outports. The shadow side of 
this conservatism is depicted in Smith’s columns ridiculing the development and 
perpetuation of interdenominational animosities, and in critiques such as Harold 
Horwood’s excoriations in Tomorrow Will Be Sunday of the churches’ persecuting or 
ostracizing attitude toward several arguably innocuous forms of social deviance. But 
the churches also acted to conserve the bonds of community through the provision of 
faith, joy, opportunities for socializing, and even the ambiguous gift of social 
regulation. This overall effect is comically depicted in “Circa 1951” and in several 
sections of Smith’s first memoir, Some Fine Times!, about growing up as a minister’s 
son in outport Newfoundland. 
 Some Fine Times! is filled with lighthearted falling-from-innocence narratives 
such as the St. George’s excerpt discussed above, in which Smith recounts the 
beginning of his journey toward ecumenism. These narratives recall columns such as 
“Holy Super Santa” in their tendency to question particular religious conventions 
without fundamentally questioning the value of religion or belief. More realistic than 
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“Circa 1951,” a passage from Some Fine Times! that describes Smith’s bad boyhood 
behaviour during his father’s pastoral prayers and sermons is akin to the column in its 
affectionately humorous depictions of the religious foibles of one of Smith’s own 
childhood church communities, in its subversion of certain aspects of church 
propriety, and in its overall affirmation of the value of the church to the community.   
The young Smith’s central discovery in the passage is that, despite his own 
longstanding, finally failed attempts to remain in “the attitude of prayer” when the 
pastoral or “long” prayer was being spoken, he was not bound to suffer eternal 
punishment for his failure, unless most of the congregation were similarly fated. 
Peeking about for the first time, he sees that  
 only the near-sainted had their heads bowed and their eyes closed in the 
 proper attitude.  There were those with their eyes closed and their heads 
 up; those with their heads down and their eyes open; and those who had 
 neither head down nor eyes closed. The latter group, without doubt, 
 would be in hell even before me. (Some 37) 
The young Smith’s perennial efforts to make his sister laugh during the sermon 
receive a similar treatment. When he is finally caught making faces by his mother, she 
unexpectedly bursts into laughter as well. While being punished for his misdeed, he is 
preoccupied with a single thought: “Gee, I must be pretty good at making faces!” (39). 
Smith also describes the range of activities among the rest of the congregation during 
the sermons, and writes that some particularly bored-looking congregants typically 
were “the first to compliment my father on his marvelous sermon” (39). Smith is not 
apparently bothered by these small-scale follies and apparent dishonesties. They are 
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presented sometimes for laughs and sometimes without comment, as if to suggest that 
it is simply the way of people not to be generally capable of consistently abiding by 
strict codes of conduct, to be bored at least some of the time by long speeches of any 
nature, and to be prone to a measure of small-scale dishonesty, whether for self-
protection or diplomacy. 
The congregation’s distraction during the pastoral prayer and sermon has 
implications for Smith’s interest in community. Whereas the community are not active 
participants during the long prayer and the sermon, Smith’s father’s common practice 
of having a sing-song of hymns after the service, which Smith describes as “the best 
part of the whole thing,” elicits the eager participation of the whole congregation. 
Neither the long prayer nor the sermon are condemned, but the potential boredom of 
the congregants is presented as understandable, and “the best part” is participatory. At 
those times when active participation is less welcome, intensity of engagement goes 
down. The passage recalls the long-winded-preacher jokes from Chapter One, within 
which congregant characters vent their boredom or frustration with the preacher’s 
tendency and privilege to talk at great length. Two recurrent elements of Smith’s 
approach to religious matters are evident in this passage. One is his interest in 
community as a fulcrum for religious life (and vice versa), characterized by a sense of 
the flexibility and forgiveness community living requires, as well as the tensions it 
inevitably creates. The other is his concordant interest in the journey of faith, through 
which everyone moves differently and without perfection. 
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4.5   Conclusion 
Smith's negotiations between areas of moral and religious confidence and his 
acknowledgment and embrace of a measure of uncertainty manage to hold together in 
a comprehensible if not entirely coherent whole. In an illuminating discussion of the 
sometimes tense epistemological negotiations that face satirists who acknowledge a 
postmodern epistemological environment, M.D. Fletcher argues that postmodern 
satirists—a label which usefully if only partially describes Smith—are caught between 
postmodernism's emphases on the play of uncertainties and the often oppressive 
effects of binary discourses, and satire's emphasis on a form of play that judges, that 
implies certainties, and that often assumes that binary judgments may have liberatory 
potential. Fletcher argues that, from within this bind, postmodern satirists have 
claimed the right to ridicule based on “political limitations . . . imposed by particular 
arrangements and actions,” but not “political limitations inherent in the problematic 
nature of human knowledge” (xi). This differentiation is evident in Smith’s distinct 
treatments of religious hypocrisy, framed as abusive and “imposed,” and religious 
foibles, generally depicted as benign and “inherent.” Smith discourages “arrangements 
and actions” that cause hurt or strife through either callous hypocrisy or refusals to 
admit that human knowledge is problematic and limited, and he encourages a 
worshipful openness and epistemological humility that he assumes will facilitate 
harmony and minimize unnecessary conflict. Smith reconciles his Christian faith and 
his postmodernist doubt through the mystery of God, through which a potentially 
nihilistic perception that knowledge is ultimately inaccessible is framed within a 
context that instead invites awe and worship. At the same time, the context of mystery 
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troubles any over-confident notions about God’s nature, so that we humans must be 
very careful regarding both our assertions about God, and what actions we might 
presume to undertake in God’s name. In this way, Smith’s apparently paradoxical 
embrace of skepticism and also of belief make a certain practical peace with one 
another.   
Smith maintains an overarching concern for social harmony, and accepts a 
diversity of beliefs in a world he concedes, explicitly in From the Ashes and implicitly 
through his abiding sense of play, is resistant to understanding. In order to 
accommodate his advocacy of humane interaction in a diversifying social 
environment, he relinquishes a dominant strain of Christian belief: the belief that 
salvation through Christ is the only true path to salvation. Smith leaves this prospect 
aside in his assessments of Christianity and even in his expression of concern for the 
potential cost of a far-reaching ecumenism. At the same time, his notions of the 
humane are drawn deeply from his particular Christian affiliation and from a Christian 
faith he maintains despite his relinquishment of exclusive religious salvation. Neil 
Postman describes a tension regarding belief in gods that Smith’s work often 
negotiates on some level. Rhetorically framing the term god as a given person’s (or 
group’s) most pivotal, stable principle(s), and arguing that atheists as well as religious 
people have “gods” in this sense, Postman argues that “all gods are imperfect, even 
dangerous.” He emphasizes the benefits of flexibility of mind and a sense of humour 
in considering gods, and he accepts the potential for multiple loyalties, but he is 
appalled by the prospect of meaninglessness. He argues that an excess of information 
inadequately filtered, prioritized, or even excluded, can lead to a kind of moral-
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intellectual listlessness that has corrosive effects on the fabric of a society. Hence, 
despite the dangerous character of gods, Postman asserts that “it is undoubtedly better 
to have one profound truth, one god, than to have none” (qtd. in Sweet 165). He 
asserts that individuals and societies cannot thrive without some measure of clarity, 
some sense that their world is comprehensible and their values stable, and he argues 
that comprehensibility and stability have psycho-social benefits independent of the 
accuracy or justice of particular beliefs. Postman cites Christian fundamentalist belief 
as one uncompromising example of such comprehensibility and stability, writing that 
the lives of fundamentalists are invested with “meaning, clarity,” and a sense of 
“moral authority” (79) that have more to do with the fact of belief than with its 
particularities. But Postman does not condone any kind of fundamentalist orientation; 
rather, while he values a measure of confidence and coherence, his belief that gods are 
“imperfect” and even “dangerous” leads him to argue that “a belief too strongly held, 
one that excludes the possibility of a tolerance for other gods, may result in a 
psychopathic fanaticism” (qtd. in Sweet 165). Which is to say, while such ardent 
belief may serve the adherents of a particular religious or ideological sect, 
fundamentalism is ultimately too dangerous to those outside the circle of belief to 
warrant support. Smith consciously and determinedly lacks a strong sense of the 
“moral authority” that Postman ascribes to fundamentalists. For Smith, unswerving 
moral or religious confidence is inhumane and best avoided. At the same time, sharing 
with Postman an appreciation of the benefits of belief, Smith strives to maintain and 
even nourish a sense of meaningfulness and a rich moral life through an epistemology 
that combines certain Christian social and spiritual principles with a generally 
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described but undefined blend of secular-humanist tolerance and postmodernist 
skepticism. Rather than having no god, Smith is, in Postman’s terms, polytheistic; and 
his secular gods not only act to temper his attachment to his Christian god, but come to 
shape the god itself. 
Smith’s comic negotiations between a religious orientation and a socially 
critical mindset are explicitly exploratory and experiential, and are not always tidy or 
satisfying. But they are probably inevitable for a liberal Christian, according to an 
argument proposed by social critic Anthony Giddens in Runaway World. Giddens 
suggests there are really only two ways that traditional religious observance can 
sustain itself in a globalizing, “detraditionalising” world. One way is fundamentalism, 
which he describes as “beleaguered tradition,” or “tradition defended in the traditional 
way” (through “ritual belief”) in a cosmopolitan world that demands reasons. Giddens 
characterizes fundamentalism by its refusal to engage in dialogue with such a world 
(49). Smith rejects this path, and chooses Giddens’ other option, in which religious 
adherents, increasingly “in contact with others who think differently from them,” “are 
required to justify their beliefs . . . both to themselves and others” (45). It is probably 
not surprising that Smith, who is a member of a Canadian denomination that has been 
struggling to balance traditional beliefs and an increasing cosmopolitanism, and who 
is prone to almost constant comic subversions of authoritative truth claims, is 
unwilling to forego dialogue and the challenges—even the lack of clarity or solidity of 
belief—that attend the pluralism he embraces. 
In considering Smith’s extensive explorations of religious matters and uses of 
scripture, it is instructive to recall that he declined the ministry in favour of a career as 
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a teacher and, later, a humorist, and that his most sober published reflections on 
religious matters arose from a life-altering accident. That is to say, while Smith is an 
active, sometimes didactic, institutionally affiliated Christian, he is not a cleric or a 
professional theologian. He is a layperson, very ordinary by his own description, who 
is privileged to have a regular forum for speaking his mind; and his explorations of 
religious material and life are experientially grounded and usually funny. For Smith, 
religious questions interweave with educational, social, and familial questions as the 
subjects of his playful musings. It is not surprising that Smith, as a humorist, explores 
his beliefs with a sense of fun and a measure of playful uncertainty. While his affinity 
for morally and religiously loaded subjects undoubtedly arises, at least in part, from 
his particular relationship to Christian religion, his brand of humorous play with the 
Christian materials that preoccupy many Newfoundland writers is consistent with his 
more general tendency toward rhetorical play characterized by frequent backsliding 
and self-contradiction. He employs these tools to generate laughs and to engage 
readers as something like equals in a process of exploring, and making meaning out 
of, the common materials of their lives, culture, and beliefs. For Smith, humour is at 
least partly a means of acknowledging and managing disagreement while avoiding 
conflict, as it often is among circulators of religious jokes such as those discussed in 
Chapter Two. Like the joke tellers, Smith relies on the fact that humour, on a formal 
level, acknowledges epistemological limitations and defies the always simplified, 
coherent assertions that characterize speech in “the serious realm” (Mulkay 214). 
All of this is to say that, while it is informative to examine Smith's explorations 
of Christian beliefs, values, and materials for patterns and themes, one ought not to 
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seek a final coherence, or even a final incoherence, in the work of such a dedicated 
humorist, given that humour is largely rooted in surprise and the maintenance of a 
state of pleasurable unsettlement. Instead, the process of Smith’s ongoing religious 
negotiations takes centre stage, as he persistently engages readers as critical 
participants in a rhetorical exchange. By implication, this relationship with a broad 
readership questions whether strict orthodoxy or the control of interpretation by an 
elite can genuinely lead toward moral or spiritual truth. 
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Notes 
1 The Downhomer is a magazine (now on-line as well as in print) that is 
oriented largely toward Newfoundlanders living outside of Newfoundland. 
2 Liberal Catholic theologian Hans Küng links detraditionalization to the 
spread of a far-reaching ecumenism. Küng writes, “If it were up to me, I would prefer 
calling this emerging epoch of ours “ecumenical” [rather than postmodern] in the 
sense of a new global understanding of the various denominations, religions, and 
regions” (3-4). 
3 Passages written by Smith’s daughter Jennifer, and others written by Smith 
according to his wife, Marion’s, memories of the early days after the accident, provide 
perspectives and responses other than his own. The sections based on Marion’s 
recollections largely describe times when Smith was in a drug-induced haze. 
4 In the Author’s Note, Smith writes, “This book is intended to be futuristically 
productive rather than historically unkind.” 
5 Recalling Smith’s musings in From the Ashes, Hans Küng writes of the limits 
of applying reason to the question of God’s existence: “Now I cannot and do not wish 
to prove that religion is actually aimed at a reality. . . . But for their part the atheistic 
opponents of religion have no proof that religion is simply a venture into nothingness. 
Like God, this nothingness is nowhere to be found” (230-31). 
6 Küng writes, “Even in Christian faith, according to Paul, we recognize the 
truth itself, which is God, only as in a mirror, in puzzling outlines, fragmentarily, in 
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certain aspects, always dependent upon our quite specific standpoint and place in 
time” (255). 
7 cf. Walter Klaassen, Armageddon and the Peaceable Kingdom. Klaassen 
argues that Old Testament biblical prophecy cannot be understood as simultaneously 
predictive and true, since many of its predictions quite clearly did not come to pass. 
Rather, he argues that the prophets spoke of a kind of spiritual necessity, in terms that 
were comprehensible to their audiences and relevant to the politics as well as the 
linguistic conventions of the time. Hence, reading the Bible’s apocalyptic visions as if 
they were predictions, rather than expressions of spiritual necessity, is to distort and 
diminish them. 
8 Grant describes sectarian behaviour in the Northern Irish context as 
“representative violence” based on “group morality,” through which “any member of 
another community can be scapegoated and held responsible for transgressions 
attributed to that group in general” (188).  
9 Not until the 2002 publication of From the Ashes of My Dreams does Smith 
refer to any of his family members by name, although he seems to have based many of 
his columns on his family’s experiences. 
10 “Otherness” is a commonly invoked, usually fairly straightforward object of 
politicized academic analysis, involving, on a basic level, individuals or groups of 
people set off from one’s own self or group by differences substantial enough to create 
blockages to mutual understanding, intergroup conflict, or oppression in instances of 
substantive power imbalances. 
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11 Smith’s affiliation with the United Church of Canada undoubtedly informs 
his high level of interest in social harmony and religious tolerance, and his relaxed 
willingness to acknowledge and even embrace religious doubt. 
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5.   When the Saints Go Marching Out: Emergent Liberal Ethics and the Erosion 
of Catholic Authority in Ed Kavanagh’s The Confessions of Nipper Mooney 
 
5.1   Introduction 
Over the years, St. John’s-based artist Ed Kavanagh has worked as a writer, editor, 
theatre director, actor, and musician; has won over a dozen awards in the annual 
Newfoundland and Labrador Arts and Letters Competition; and has served as 
president of the Writers' Alliance of Newfoundland and Labrador. Throughout this 
varied career, Kavanagh’s work for and about children has remained a staple, one 
reflected in his first adult novel, The Confessions of Nipper Mooney. To a large extent, 
the novel focuses on the educational and social rites of passage of children and youth 
in Newfoundland’s Roman Catholic school system in the 1960s. In addition to writing 
The Confessions and his popular Amanda Greenleaf series of children’s books, 
Kavanagh has edited a collection of children's plays and regularly writes, performs 
and records songs for children. Maintaining an avid interest in education, Kavanagh 
himself has earned an Honours Bachelor of Arts degree in English and a Bachelor of 
Education degree from Memorial University of Newfoundland, a Bachelor of Arts 
degree in Music from Carleton University, and an Master of Arts degree in Creative 
Writing from the University of New Brunswick. In addition, he has taught creative 
writing for the Extensions divisions of Memorial University of Newfoundland and the 
University of New Brunswick, and has been active in the collection and editing of 
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adult literacy materials. The latter involvement suggests a concern for those on the 
margins of the educational mainstream, a concern evident in The Confessions, which 
pays particular attention to stigmatized, marginalized, and alienated students.  
One of the striking features of The Confessions of Nipper Mooney, which won 
the 2002 Writers' Alliance of Newfoundland and Labrador Book Award for Best Adult 
Fiction,1 is that in some respects it reads very much like a children's book. Even the 
fanciful name of its protagonist recalls that of Kavanagh’s guardian of the waterfall, 
Amanda Greenleaf. The novel is, in part, a kind of worldly fable: it is peppered with 
traces of the fantastic and is populated by characters who, while sometimes richly 
portrayed, are mostly type-based; and its tone is often moralistic. At the very 
beginning of the novel, Nicholas “Nipper” Mooney “loses time” (is possibly taken by 
the fairies) for a whole day, on the same day his father dies from cancer. Beginning 
with this striking juxtaposition, The Confessions maintains an undercurrent of wonder 
and mystery that quietly recalls Kavanagh’s Greenleaf stories. This tone serves as a 
kind of buoy as the novel’s central child characters become increasingly immersed in a 
world characterized by institutionalized cruelty and vexing personal struggles. 
Throughout The Confessions, Roman Catholic institutions are agents of religious 
training, but also of worldly education and socialization, largely shaping the day-to-
day lives and relations of the communities in which the novel’s characters live. And 
throughout, the possession of such comprehensive authority leads to abusive conduct, 
to the damaging stigmatization and suppression of healthy diversity, and to a culture 
of self-justifying power. The novel favours a pluralistic, liberal outlook,2 dramatized 
among protagonists who have been failed, and often rejected, by the overriding 
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authoritarian orientation of the novel’s Catholic Church and schools. As the authority 
of the church wanes among The Confessions’ younger generation, relativistic, context-
dependent ethics come to be favoured over absolutist ones, individual moral 
discernment is depicted as preferable to centralized moral authority, and mystery is 
recruited, as it is in Smith’s work, as a tool for the reconciliation of religion and 
relativism.  
 The Confessions follows its title character closely: though it is often easy to 
forget about his presence, he is in every scene, often observing and reflecting on 
interactions in which he is not directly involved. The third-person limited omniscient 
narrator follows Nipper through his childhood and youth in the small farming 
community of Kildura and in nearby St. John’s, beginning in the first grade and 
ending shortly after his graduation from high school. During his primary school years 
at St. Brigid’s Academy, a school in Kildura run by nuns, Nipper forges an abiding 
friendship with Brigid Flynn, an unusually bold, independent local girl. He also 
develops a fascination for the slightly older Paddy Dunne, son of the local garbage 
collector, whose strange-seeming life and candid, critical questions help develop 
Nipper’s sympathy for those who live on the social margins. In addition, Nipper 
befriends Brigid’s great-uncle Brendan O’Brien, a local eccentric whose sense of 
humour and mystical outlook are enchanting and illuminating to Nipper. Later, while 
attending All Angels Academy in St. John’s under the instruction, administration, and 
discipline of the Christian Brothers, Nipper has to come to terms with unanticipated 
cruelty among his schoolmates but also among several of the Brothers. Their 
scapegoating disciplinary tactics draw the ire of Paddy, who becomes a model of 
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moral courage to the milder, less alienated Nipper. At the same time, Nipper finds he 
must face the religious ramifications of his increasingly sexual relationship with 
Brigid, the sinfulness of which seems unconvincing to him in comparison to the 
cruelty to which he is increasingly witness. As the children move further into the 
complexities of the “real world,” the mystical Brendan fades gradually into the 
background, re-emerging at the novel’s end as a symbolically central figure.  
Departing from the interdenominational landscape that Guy and Smith 
routinely depict in their pluralistically oriented columns, Kavanagh’s novel depicts 
religious and social intolerance within a single denomination, and recalls some of the 
tensions portrayed between clerics and strays in Newfoundland joke books. In the joke 
books, the legitimacy, excesses, and social value of both figures are acknowledged, 
and the jokes tend implicitly to affirm the status quo. The Confessions, on the other 
hand, sustains an obvious critical focus on alleged power abuses within a church 
depicted as violently authoritarian and seemingly incapable of self-correction. 
Straying, in the world of The Confessions, is sensible and perhaps even noble, because 
the evils of the church and its agents have been so pronounced.  
The novel’s different uses of humour accordingly work to support the 
perspectives of the story’s strays. This chapter discusses several episodes of 
lighthearted, humorous dialogue in the novel; these episodes work to foster a sense of 
sympathy for Nipper and others, who grapple in their day-to-day lives with aspects of 
Roman Catholic belief and practice. Other humorous scenes discussed in the chapter 
are very mild examples of Horatian satire, in which the minor vices of sympathetic 
characters are exposed; in these episodes, humour’s potential as a form of in-group 
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legitimation and norm reinforcement is evident, and the stigmatization of religious as 
well as social difference is gently problematized. Other scenes depict joking 
exchanges that are not presented in a way that is funny for readers. In these scenes, as 
in the episodes of light satire, the reader’s attention is drawn to social uses of humour; 
but in these non-humorous depictions of joking, the reader is also clearly invited to 
judge the jokers in identifiable ways. Some of these scenes favourably depict friendly 
joking exchanges among mutually supportive protagonists as they playfully engage 
with the incongruities that permeate their lives and beliefs. Other non-humorous 
episodes portray aggressive joking among antagonists (mostly Christian Brothers and 
students at All Angels Academy), aimed at characters over whom these antagonists 
have power. These scenes disapprovingly depict the use of aggressive humour for 
social control, a more extreme version of the kind of socially regulative joking in 
which Nipper’s more sympathetic family and friends are also shown to participate. 
The novel’s depictions of aggressive joking legitimize the protagonists’ sense of 
alienation and their rejection of the authoritarian relations that are associated in the 
novel with the Roman Catholic Church. These depictions also suggest an authorial 
relationship to aggressive humour that differs drastically from that of writers such as 
Ray Guy, given that aggressive humour in The Confessions of Nipper Mooney is 
consistently depicted as a form of undue abuse. 
 
5.2   Brendan O’Brien: Difference as Defect in the Church and the Village 
Brendan O'Brien inhabits the margins of the village of Kildura, literally and 
figuratively: he is considered to be an eccentric, and is an object of passive fascination 
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and speculation whom few in the community know more than superficially; and he 
spends the bulk of his free time in the woods beyond the Old Road on the edge of the 
village, a landscape with which few in Kildura are very familiar and about which few 
are more than passingly curious. To those who stay within the normal boundaries of 
the village, the Old Road is on the edge of their local reality. But the foreign space 
beyond it is a central part of the worlds of Brendan, Paddy Dunne, and Nipper’s father 
before his death; and it becomes a locus of discovery and growth for Nipper. It is 
largely on the Old Road and beyond that Nipper gets to know Brendan, who becomes 
his friend and, in a limited way, a kind of father figure. Brendan's familiarity with 
generally unfamiliar geographic as well as religious spaces, his frank, friendly 
attention, and his often self-effacing humour make him an expansive influence on 
Nipper. Brendan helps to reveal to Nipper the limited nature of the worldview he has 
inherited, and he gives Nipper greater confidence in his own, individual capacity for 
moral discernment. Brendan’s social marginality is exacerbated, and the romanticism 
of his portrayal complicated, by his longstanding exclusion from the life of the local 
church, ever since he angered local priest Monsignor Murphy with persistent questions 
whose details are never revealed. Brendan’s expulsion presages the status-quo-
protecting insensitivity of some of the nuns at St. Brigid’s Academy and the 
scapegoating tactics of some of the Brothers at All Angels. But the novel’s relatively 
rounded depiction of Murphy, and the gradual revelation that Brendan’s view of him 
is unbalanced, links the destructive capacity of the church’s agents in the novel to their 
institutionally derived power, which facilitates cruel effects even when the church 
agents in question are not, on balance, cruel. Along with growing misgivings about the 
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church’s moral doctrine that are supported by Brendan’s encouragement of proscribed 
activities, the consistent link between cruel effects and institutional power is a cause of 
Nipper’s increasing alienation from the Catholic Church. Both undergird Nipper’s 
development of a liberal-pluralist vision of moral and social life that questions 
patronizing or hostile attitudes toward several of his friends and acquaintances, 
attitudes premised on the notion that their individual differences are defects.  
There are two main playful exchanges in The Confessions that focus on 
Brendan as a “local character,” as one who inhabits the edge of the community (cf. 
Tye, “Local;” “Aspects”).3 These exchanges draw attention to the general 
identification, by many in the novel, of conformity as a virtue and of deviance as a 
defect. Many characters routinely deny contrary evidence in order to support these 
identifications, while the novel’s protagonists come increasingly to reject them, and 
even to turn them on their heads. The exchanges that address Brendan as a local 
character present a paradox in local talk about his religious status: he is spoken of as a 
saint, but also as an apostate or stray. A remarkable characteristic of this paradox is 
that both versions of Brendan, however contradictory, are framed as defective. The 
novel consistently implies that certain arrangements of power—specifically, strong, 
centralized moral authority as manifested by the Catholic Church—tend more than 
others to facilitate the normal-is-good fallacy, and to stigmatize those, like Brendan, 
whose peaceable, non-conformist existence embodies a challenge to the recognized 
bounds of acceptable behaviour. 
One of the incidents that emphasize Brendan’s strangeness involves Nipper, 
his mother Sharon, and his aunt Mona as they prepare for the evening rosary. Through 
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their conversation, they articulate a range of local perspectives on Brendan, whom 
Sharon and Mona find baffling and amusing. After initial speculation on how he 
turned out so strangely, during which their familiarity with various local theories 
suggests that conjecture on possible causes of Brendan’s unconventional behavior is a 
favourite topic, Sharon and Mona describe several apparently bewildering aspects of 
Brendan’s behaviour. He is chronically overdressed (too formally and too warmly), he 
reads too much, and he is too polite: “‘There’s nothing wrong with being polite,’ 
Mona said. ‘But there’s no need to go to hell with it’” (94). At the same time that 
Sharon and Mona stigmatize Brendan, they betray their fascination with him. This 
comes to the fore after Nipper mentions one of Brendan’s favourite books, Irish Saints 
and Martyrs, prompting a discussion of another popular interpretation of Brendan: 
Brendan as saint. Mona suggests, “‘He’s like a saint himself,’” though she adds, “‘But 
sure half the saints were a bit touched’” (94-95). Like Brendan, whose decency Sharon 
and Mona never deny but who is best kept at a reasonable distance (as they caution 
Nipper to little effect), the saints exist outside the realm of socially acceptable 
behaviour. Though they are esteemed as pinnacles of Catholic piety, they are just not 
normal. Through its playful characterization of clerical and lay responses to Brendan, 
who draws deeply on the Catholic mystical tradition as nourishment for his own 
passionate spirituality, The Confessions critically depicts a conformist Catholicism 
that, by bristling against exceptionality and spiritual challenge, reveals its discomfort 
with important elements of its own spiritual tradition. 
As Sharon and Mona’s discussion of Brendan takes place in the context of 
their preparations for the rosary, transitions between the social and the spiritual are 
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shown to be fluid: gossip is smoothly integrated into preparations for religious ritual, 
and the two women’s saintly descriptions of Brendan demonstrate that Catholic 
religious themes are integral to their everyday speech and world-view. But their casual 
social dismissals of several local people bear a tense relationship to the worshipful 
attitude they embrace during the rosary. And Sharon and Mona, despite their clear 
fascination with Brendan, turn away from the potential challenge raised by Brendan’s 
differences, back to a reassuring emphasis on the value of likeness as their religious 
interpretation is informed by socially conformist standards. Saints are deviants, 
revered in the abstract, but untenable, even ridiculous, in real life.  
 A second conversation that illuminates popular local responses to Brendan 
accentuates the common evaluation of his behaviour against a standard of social 
conformity to which vaguely conceived religious meaning is attributed. In their 
ridicule of Brendan, several children in this exchange eagerly mimic their adult 
influences (an imitative aggression later more disturbingly manifested by several of 
the boys at All Angels Academy). The quip-heavy humour of the episode begins as the 
children discuss how to properly categorize Nipper, now that his father is dead: 
  “Well, maybe Nipper’s a half-orphan,” Gerard said. 
      “There’s no such of a thing,” Brigid said. 
      “Why not?” Gerard said  “My dad’s got a friend who’s half-French. 
 And you can be half-dead, or half-drunk.” 
      “Or half-cracked,” Ronnie said. “Like old Brendan is.” 
      “Brendan is not half-cracked,” Brigid said, stepping toward him. 
      “That’s right,” Ronnie said. “He’s all-cracked.” (111-12) 
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The voices of Kilduran parents echo among Nipper’s and Brigid’s friends as they 
shout out a series of rhetorical questions that emphasize the ways in which Brendan is 
not normal. For instance, Ronnie asks, “‘How come he’s not married? . . . And he 
never goes to church’” (112). But Brigid refuses to accept her friends’ point of view 
that her great-uncle’s differences constitute defects. She rebuts Ronnie’s accusation 
regarding Brendan’s non-attendance at church by pointing out that Ronnie’s father 
spends every Sunday mass outside on the steps, smoking with another local man 
(112). Brigid's response points out that, to some degree at least, it is the social ritual of 
church attendance that is valued, rather than religious orientation itself. It is normal to 
go to church, and that makes it good. 
Because Brendan does not seriously threaten the social structure, his defects 
are described in amused rather than appalled terms. Still, his strangeness is viewed 
with some apprehension: it disturbs social norms and must somehow be accounted for 
in a way that minimizes its destabilizing capacity.4 A similar anxiety is reflected 
elsewhere in the novel via several nuns’ and Brothers’ adverse responses to various 
forms of non-vicious deviance that trouble an equation of the status quo with the good. 
In The Confessions, this equation, paired with the moral and institutional authority of 
the church, routinely leads to the damaging stigmatization, punishment, or exclusion 
of benign or even potentially beneficial diversity. 
While it is apparent that even as a child Brendan was not normal, the extent of 
his current marginal status is linked to his expulsion from the church by Monsignor 
Murphy. Yet, despite evidence that he was hurt and saddened by the loss, Brendan has 
made no attempt to reintegrate himself into the local church community (128), 
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seemingly because it would require submission to Monsignor Murphy. Readers are not 
informed of the content of the exchanges that led to the final blow-up during which 
Murphy told Brendan to “get the hell out of his [Murphy’s] church” (128); and 
Brendan’s account of the episode is vague and brief (128). In the absence of 
substantive details, readers are left with a power relation involving what Foucault 
describes as “the general politics of truth.” This consists, among other things, of “the 
types of discourse which [a society] accepts and makes function as true and the status 
of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” (“Truth and Power” 72-73). 
In past discussions between Brendan and the Monsignor, Murphy had the religious 
“truth” on his side in so far as it consisted of Catholic doctrine as mediated by Murphy 
himself. Brendan’s religious beliefs do not appear to be overly radical, given that the 
bulk of his belief and practice—excepting his espousal of a traditional north Atlantic 
belief in fairies, which his family has oddly integrated into a Christian cosmology—
can be accounted for within the spacious Catholic tradition; but due to the power 
imbalance between Murphy and Brendan, once the strain between their truths became 
too marked for Murphy to bear, Brendan had to lose.  
Brendan’s view of the Monsignor emphasizes Murphy’s stubbornness and 
rashness at the expense of his capacity for compassion and humour. This capacity is 
evident in Murphy’s patient responses to Nipper in the confessional, as well as in a 
comical conversation between Sharon and Mona, in which Mona describes a past 
compulsion to laugh at the Monsignor’s terrible singing during Mass. Though nervous 
about the prospect of confessing her sin to Murphy, she decides she must. After she 
confesses, Murphy asks her how much money she put in the collection plate the 
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previous Sunday. Baffled, she says, “‘Twenty-five cents, Monsignor. Just like I 
always do.’” Murphy responds, “‘Well, what did you expect for twenty-five cents? . . . 
Bing Crosby?’”, and prescribes a mild penance (83). The gap between Brendan’s one-
sided depiction of Murphy and the novel’s more sympathetic overall depiction of the 
Monsignor suggests Brendan’s expulsion ought to be seen in institutional terms: the 
concentration of authority that favours one stubborn but generally well-intentioned 
character over another with whom he is in disagreement impedes not only an equitable 
solution to their dispute but the healing of a personal wound.  
Despite his wounded attachment to a disapproving picture of Monsignor 
Murphy and his resultant self-seriousness in this matter, Brendan is generally capable 
of laughing at himself and his marginal position in the Kilduran community. After 
Brendan defends the value of divinely-originated variety, citing examples from nature, 
Nipper asks, “‘Is that why you’re different—because of all the variety in the world?’”  
Brendan agrees that this is likely, but then refers to the rumour that he was dropped on 
his head as a baby, refusing to rule it out as an alternate explanation (134). Brendan 
also jokes about some harsh consequences if he is wrong about certain religious 
matters:   
 “So I don’t go to church anymore. I make my peace with God in my 
 own way. I don’t think He holds it against me.” Brendan chuckled. 
 “Although I admit it’s a bit touchy, second guessing God. Just think of 
 the hard time He gave those Philistines. They probably got the surprise 
 of their life when the thunderbolts starting falling on them. The same 
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 thing might happen to me. I might be handed a one-way ticket to hell 
 the minute I passes on. Who knows?” (130-31) 
Mulkay argues that it is in the nature of humour to undermine the apparent coherence 
of serious speech, and to revel in the multiplicity of perspectives and truths that 
actually characterizes social reality, despite the fact that serious speech persistently 
(and perhaps necessarily) denies this non-coherence (219-20). For Mulkay, through its 
very form humour “reminds us that the world in which we live is not exhausted by any 
one set of meanings; and certainly not by those which happen to be dominant in our 
own society” (222-23). Mulkay argues that humour contains this reminder even when 
it is recruited to support dominant understandings and attack marginal perspectives (as 
is critically depicted in a passage discussed later in the chapter)—since even then it 
operates by subverting coherence. Brendan’s humour about spiritual matters is partly 
self-effacing: it advocates epistemological skepticism and acknowledges that the 
possession of a wrong-headed or incomplete perspective is a possibility for anyone in 
any instance. But Brendan applies to the frequently grave tone of scripture the same 
humorous skepticism he applies to himself. Recalling Smith’s ironic suggestions in 
“Winners and Losers” and “Home for the Holidays” that his and his family’s 
innocuous foibles are likely to incur the wrath of God, Brendan questions God’s well-
documented predilection for punishment. And implicitly, in keeping with The 
Confessions’ emphases on social relations and institutional power, Brendan’s humour 
calls into question the perceptive capacities of earthly authorities with the power to 
direct moral speech, judgment, and punishment. In the process he decentres moral 
authority for a young, impressionable boy already developing doubts about the church. 
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Brendan’s willingness to doubt the veracity of his own religious differences 
participates in his broader suspicion that all people are subject to error. But Brendan’s 
continued embrace of a peaceable, marginal life—a life of distinct, benign 
difference—frames not only difference but the possibility of error in a new way for 
Nipper. Partly through Brendan’s influence, Nipper begins to believe that deviation 
from norms may not be intrinsically bad, and may even have value; further, Nipper 
comes to suspect that the potential for moral error and the reality of moral uncertainty 
are not, despite his training, things to be feared. As Nipper negotiates between the 
religious precepts with which he has been raised and an increasingly complex social 
reality, he faces several interpretive difficulties. Among Nipper’s elders, Brendan is 
the only one who suggests, through his words and his laughter, that it is all right to be 
baffled or stumped, and even that it is legitimate to make choices that seem to others 
to be strange or wrong, as long as they are not oppressive. Complementing the effect 
of Brendan’s humour on Nipper’s moral development are Brendan’s open-hearted 
questions about Nipper’s point of view on religious matters. Rarely invited to explore 
his own perspective on religious life, Nipper is usually encouraged only to confess 
failures to correspond to a received standard. But Brendan’s simple questions, such as, 
“‘Do you like church?’” (128), allow Nipper to consider, without anxiety, his own 
relationship to his religion and the moral value of his actions. One can read in 
Nipper’s subsequent musings the beginnings of a liberally oriented moral conscience 
and early, tentative steps away from a belief in the sufficiency of doctrine and the 
validity of Catholic moral authority. 
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5.3   Paddy Dunne: Authoritarian Relations and the Path of Dissidence 
Paddy Dunne lives in a run-down shack on the edge of Kildura until it burns down in a 
fire that kills his younger sister Rosarie, after which he and his father move to nearby 
St. John’s. Like Nipper's father, Paddy's mother is dead from cancer. Paddy's father 
collects garbage and does odd jobs in the community, but his family are still poor. 
Even as a young boy, Paddy looks after Rosarie and helps to support his family by 
fishing and by spending hours crouching by the roadside selling worms out of soup 
cans to passers-by (53-54). Paddy is unusually serious and reflective for a boy his age, 
reticent to speak but frank and incisive when he does. Despite his clear intelligence 
(and his surprising gift for calligraphy), he remains largely illiterate throughout his 
off-and-on educational career. His experiences of hardship and prejudice lead to an 
unusual willingness to question the word of authority. This willingness, combined 
with his unruly appearance and mode of expression, make him a target for authority 
figures who find his disputations threatening. Adverse responses to Paddy’s blunt, 
grating dissent eventually lead to his premature departure from the Catholic school 
system, but not before he has influenced others closer to the mainstream, such as 
Nipper. Having developed an admiration for Paddy and an understanding of his 
character, Nipper is affected by Paddy’s social insights and sympathy for scapegoats. 
By the end of the novel, the Catholic Church appears to have lost Nipper, partly 
because he has been “radicalized” by Paddy’s insights and by the “crackdown” 
responses that his expressions of discontent elicit from agents of the church (Safire 
197).5 These agents, who could have opted to weaken the disapproval-spreading effect 
of Paddy’s “censure” through rhetorical “compromises” (Safire 197), instead abet the 
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erosion of their own power through the very hardline tactics they use to try to 
strengthen it (cf. Safire 197). 
Early in The Confessions, having been put back to Nipper and Brigid’s grade 
one class because of poor reading skills, Paddy questions Sister Francesca de Palma, a 
nun visiting from Peru, about the religious rhetoric associated with the overseas 
Missions, and is scolded and given detention by Sister Mary Ignatius, a nun who 
teaches at the school. Paddy demonstrates a striking intuition, which sparks the 
curiosity of other students, but which goes largely unacknowledged by the nuns. The 
nuns’ invocations of mystery as an account of endemic poverty are depicted as an 
obstruction to accurate perception, as the complexity of circumstances underpinning 
the poverty of those benefiting from the Missions’ aid is obscured by a view of them 
primarily as recipients of Christian charity. The nuns’ approach affirms the authority 
and necessity of the church, as meaning is directed away from geographical and 
political circumstances, toward the divinely-sanctioned healing power of the Church 
Missions. 
 Sister Mary Ignatius arranges for the students to ask Sister Francesca de Palma 
a series of agreed-upon questions. She makes it clear they are expected not to 
improvise, and are to appear to their guest to be models of decorum. But Paddy is 
unsatisfied when Sister Francesca responds to a question by telling the students, 
“‘Every penny helps. And Our Lord knows what great hardships you good children go 
through in order to donate to the Missions. He smiles on you for it’” (68). Without 
invitation Paddy asks the class’s first spontaneous question: “‘Then why don’t God 
smile on them people down there and give ‘em some food and houses and stuff in the 
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first place?’” As he continues, a shocked Sister Mary Ignatius attempts to quiet him, 
while Sister Francesca attempts more congenially to respond to his queries. When he 
implicitly questions the Missions’ marriage of material assistance and evangelism, by 
observing that “‘all of them poor people in them hot countries got nothin’ not because 
of what they done or anything, but just because of where they lives’” (69-70), he is 
warned by Sister Mary Ignatius not to question the will of God. Paddy nonetheless 
elaborates on both his hunch that starving Peruvians are probably not in especial need 
of religious guidance, and his sense of the seeming injustice of God’s apparent will for 
them, via a story about his Uncle Frank:   
 “Sure my Uncle Frank got a old huntin’ shack up on the Witless Bay 
 Line that’s ten times better than their houses. And he don’t go to 
 church, he drinks like a fish, he got about seven youngsters even 
 though he was never married—” 
      “Enough!” Sister Mary Ignatius said through clenched teeth. She 
 glanced apologetically at Sister Francesca. (70) 
Lacking a coherent critique, Paddy pesters the nuns with questions and doubts, a 
means of expression which Sister Mary Ignatius interprets as insolence. 
In contrast, Sister Francesca de Palma is content to respond to Paddy’s 
questions. Ultimately, though, she so thoroughly identifies with mystery as a means of 
accounting for inequity that she fails to really “hear” Paddy’s intuitive, experience-
informed doubt of her theological premises. Feminist moral philosopher Rebecca 
Kukla argues that those with power and privilege in any society typically have trouble 
understanding the speech of its marginal groups because they do not have to pay 
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enough consistent attention to gain such understanding. Not only do they not often 
listen, they often cannot “hear” marginal speech even when they do listen (325). Sister 
Mary Ignatius cannot hear Paddy because she is preoccupied with interpreting his 
manner: she does not listen. Sister Francesca listens, but she cannot hear him because 
the content of his religiously skeptical speech is too far removed from the religious 
account she has internalized. She ultimately echoes Sister Mary Ignatius’ admonition 
not to question the will of God (a caution which inadvertently encourages Paddy to 
resign himself to his own suffering as an aspect of divine design), and embarks on a 
lengthy exposition on the Joyful, Sorrowful, and Glorious Mysteries. Paddy quickly 
loses interest, and Nipper also drifts off, unimpressed by Sister Francesca’s response 
to Paddy’s inquiries (71). The novel’s contrasting favourable depictions of Brendan, 
who is in love with mystery, and Paddy, who is a chronic demystifier, amount to a 
narrative navigation of different potential uses and effects of the invocation of 
mystery. It is depicted approvingly as a facilitator of wonder and of an epistemological 
reserve that echoes Smith’s use of mystery to caution believers against a potentially 
oppressive religious overconfidence. But mystery is also potentially abused, the 
Missions episode suggests, as a matter of (often unrecognized) convenience, as a 
means of getting around certain troubling political questions that might unsettle the 
existing order.  
 In the introduction to Canadian Churches & Social Justice, John R. Williams 
describes a trend in Canadian Christian mission work that was gaining momentum at 
the historical moment in which the fictional Paddy questions the nuns at St. Brigid’s. 
According to Williams, the approach to mission work in the Catholic Church and 
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other prominent Canadian churches substantially changed beginning in the 1960s. He 
writes that whereas the churches’ engagement with overseas as well as domestic 
poverty had traditionally been focused on symptom relief, from the 1960s onward—
largely led by Christians in colonized parts of the world—they have concentrated 
increasingly on the social and structural factors underpinning poverty. Williams notes 
that the churches no longer tend to regard poverty primarily as either the result of the 
shortcomings of the poor themselves or the mysterious will of God for certain 
blameless individuals or groups (13). In the light of history, the Missions episode's 
dramatization of dissident insight and the responses to which it is subjected might be 
seen to suggest that dissenting voices may express important, emergent insights 
despite the resistance they routinely encounter. Such “crackdown” responses as Sister 
Mary Ignatius’, while largely successful in the short term as a means of disciplining 
students, in the longer run come to “radicalize” several students and alienate many 
others, at a time during which the Catholic Church’s authority, and the general 
effectiveness of the kinds of authoritarian relations upon which it has relied, are 
waning. 
Whereas most of the remarkable episodes involving the nuns at St. Brigid’s 
have to do with religion in some direct way, the frequent abuses carried out by the 
Christian Brothers at All Angels Academy tend not to be related directly to religious 
matters, though they arise from the abuse of religious prestige.6 Paddy engages in 
three major confrontations while a student at All Angels, involving attempts to protect 
scapegoats from abuse (the third of these is himself). In the first episode, the culprits 
are students whose behaviour mimics the often ruthless scapegoating tactics of the 
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Christian Brothers, and the scapegoat is Darrell Wiggins, a young man with an 
intellectual disability, for whose marginal position Paddy demonstrates a feeling of 
solidarity (224-27). Paddy’s words reveal his sense of identification with Darrell—
based, it seems, on Paddy’s capacity to relate to the experience of being singled out. 
Before his second major All Angels confrontation—this time with Brother Crane, a 
predatory former boxer who is the boys’ teacher—Paddy furthers his identification 
with Darrell, who has received unusually terrible strappings partly related to his own 
panicky movements during his punishments, by helping him with strategies for 
receiving strappings with a minimum of suffering (231-32). Paddy is the first in the 
school to assume that with some assistance Darrell might have the capacity to help 
himself. Darrell surprises everybody by his stoical response to his next strapping, and 
in the process confounds Brother Crane, who has relied on Darrell’s fear and panic as 
a disciplinary tool. Recalling psychologist Erving Goffman’s description of the 
“ambivalence” that “the stigmatized individual” inevitably feels “about his own self” 
(106), one can see Paddy’s assistance to Darrell as an effort not only to stave off 
further abuse, but to help Darrell overcome a measure of such ambivalence, given that 
Darrell is routinely encouraged to feel poorly about himself.7 Paddy’s acts in defense 
of other marginal students are also likely to have an ambivalence-mending effect on 
Paddy himself. As Brendan jokingly suggests that his own difference may be a 
personal defect rather than a sign of divinely created worldly variety, Paddy 
indignantly defends his own and other students’ differences as legitimate variety, 
rejecting the prospect that they might be defects. Both Brendan’s humour and Paddy’s 
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anger differentiate stigma from defect, and favour a pluralistic outlook in which there 
are many goods. 
 At All Angels Academy, the rule of the Brothers constitutes a harsh law that is 
especially harrowing because it so often seems capricious. The Brothers are protected 
by their religious prestige from critical assessment by parents, (e.g., 286) and despite 
their misgivings, the bulk of the students see no alternative to this rule. In the episode 
that sparks Paddy's first confrontation with Brother Crane, the Brothers cruelly revel 
in their own authority. The episode begins when Brother Spencer, another teacher, 
parades into Crane’s classroom with Bill Tobin, a “strong and unflappable” farm boy 
from another class, whose “head was completely swathed in bandages” with no slit for 
the mouth (238-39). Spencer and Crane make threatening mummy jokes, and Spencer 
grips Bill by the shoulders, periodically “work[ing] his fingers into a double shoulder-
pinch” that causes Bill to “shift in pain” (238). Spencer tells the class, “‘This is a boy 
who doesn’t know . . . how-to-shut-up!’” (239). After Spencer leaves the class and 
some time passes, Paddy breaks his silence, saying, “‘That’s not right, you know’” 
(240). Paddy has lived his whole life in a kind of “frontier zone” relative to the norms 
and expectations of the culture whose margins he inhabits socially, economically, and 
religiously; hence, he sharply perceives the “hypocritical and exploitive” character of 
“the law” (Grant 10), and he is more than averagely willing to call perpetrators to 
account because he is ready, if it comes to it, to leave school and go to work on the 
docks (which he eventually does). 
 In the exchange that follows, Crane tries to use humour to humiliate Paddy, 
who refuses to be a passive object of ridicule. In keeping with the novel’s anti-
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authoritarian tone, when Crane asks, “‘[S]ince when have you become an expert in 
these matters?’” (240), Paddy rejects the premise that one has to be an “expert” to 
possess accurate moral intuition. He tells Crane, “‘That doesn’t mean I don’t know 
when something’s not right. Doin’ him up like that and bringin’ him around like he 
was one of them freaks in a circus’” (241). Crane responds to the long-haired, rough-
looking Paddy, “‘You’re a fine one to be talking about freaks,’” and likens him to a 
“‘bloody streel’” and a “‘hopped-up hippie’” (241).8 Throughout their exchange, 
Paddy refuses to be shamed by Crane’s attempts at aggressive humour. Morreal 
suggests that those who aspire to superiority frequently encourage those around them 
to share laughter at “outsiders” (115). This strategy is not different in kind from the 
satire discussed in earlier chapters, though the targets, the “outsiders,” in the works in 
this study tend to be authority figures, rather than the relatively powerless as in 
Kavanagh’s depiction of Crane’s and Spencer’s scapegoating humour. It is in the 
nature of satire to create imbalanced portraits and to set certain figures off as objects 
of ridicule, not to be sympathized with by the author or those who laugh along. In his 
efforts to secure and increase his authority in the classroom, Crane often relies on such 
aggressive imbalance. If he, as author and authority, can incite laughter—even 
nervous laughter—from the students, then his power is solidified and his case is made. 
But in Paddy’s exchange with Crane, the students are struck by Paddy’s resistance, 
which undermines Crane’s efforts at humiliating him, and also the humiliating humour 
of the previous episode. 
 Paddy’s next question, regarding whether Jesus was a hippie because of his 
long hair, leads Crane to abandon humour and to launch at him with more direct 
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ferocity. Crane defaults to straightforward aggression in his efforts to re-establish his 
authority, and insists on an exclusive right to religious interpretation: “‘Mr. Dunne, 
you don’t pretend to compare yourself with Our Lord, the Saviour of the world—and 
of your miserable soul, do you?’” (241). Brother Crane’s enraged response is an 
inadvertent invitation to Paddy’s classmates to make just such a comparison, while 
Crane himself is degraded relative to the righteous young dissident. Crane “pounces” 
on Paddy, slamming him against the wall so that his head “cracked against the 
concrete” (241). Crane’s assault on Paddy, and his assertion of a version of Christ that 
would justify it, recalls feminist theologian Kay Ashe’s discussion in The 
Feminization of the Church? of the effects on earthly power of the attribution of 
authoritarian characteristics to God. Ashe argues that when God is understood through 
terms such as “Supreme Ruler” and “Almighty,” and when humans are imagined as 
“slaves” who must bow in “humble submission” (39), then,  
 [f]or those who would be as gods, those who long for or who enjoy 
 quasi-absolute political, economic or military power, God's sovereign 
 power can serve as a kind of legitimation of their own. . . . By claiming 
 willing acquiescence to a higher power, God, and by imagining 
 themselves agents of God's will, they demand uncritical acceptance of 
 their decrees. (39) 
Having slammed Paddy’s head off the wall, Crane makes his most direct demand for 
“uncritical acceptance.” He tells Paddy, “‘Now, you listen . . . Nobody here is 
interested in your opinion—least of all me’” (241), in the process instructing the class, 
who he knows are highly interested in Paddy’s opinion, not to question his position. 
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Complementing Ashe’s description of the political usefulness of authoritarian God 
language, Vanier argues that history is marked by the perennial demonization of 
dissidents, often on ostensibly religious grounds, by people who have a “vested 
interest in the maintenance” of the status quo. He suggests such an interest is often 
driven simply by a “need to control others” (74). The self-justification and the 
demonization of difference and dissent that characterize the behaviour of several of 
the Brothers at All Angels reflect the shadow side—or, depending upon one’s point of 
view, a perversion—of the Catholic Church’s understanding of itself as God’s 
instrument on earth. The Brothers apply an apparent sense of divine entitlement to 
their management of non-religious contact in the schools, invoking an historically 
prominent, sternly authoritarian image of God to bolster their own authority, and 
increasingly alienating the novel’s freedom-loving protagonists at a time during which 
such models of authority are increasingly beleaguered by an emergent liberalism that 
is clearly favoured in the novel. 
Holding Paddy against the wall, Crane asks, “‘Do I make myself perfectly 
clear?’”; but as the bell rings and more time passes, Paddy forces a stalemate by 
refusing to answer (241). Though Paddy sabotages an episode of scapegoating, his 
actions ultimately make him a scapegoat—though Crane, who recognizes Paddy’s 
strength, avoids antagonizing him (e.g., 217, 222-23), until it becomes clear that his 
presence will be more than passively disruptive. Crane eventually weeds Paddy out, to 
his own surprise and at his own expense, in an encounter during which he taunts and 
insults Paddy away from most of the other boys. Paddy punches him in the face, 
knocking him out, then walks out of the school forever (257-61). Though there is little 
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Paddy can directly achieve through his dissension and rebellion, Nipper and others at 
All Angels are impressed by Paddy’s indignant courage. In The Confessions, the 
destabilizing effect of dissidence, as well as its frequent suppression by those in power 
and its unpredictable path of influence, is dramatized via the past marginalization of 
old Brendan, the present marginalization of Paddy, and the influence of both of them 
on the relatively “normal” Nipper, who sees that their marginalized perspectives 
contain insights and who respects their mettle. 
Though Nipper is influenced more obviously by Paddy’s example than by a 
personal relationship with him, their slowly developing friendship comes to intensify 
the dissident Paddy’s moral influence on Nipper. Before their time together at All 
Angels, their slowly growing camaraderie is interrupted for several years after Paddy 
and his father move from Kildura to St. John's. And Paddy’s aloofness is an obstacle 
to intimacy, as is Nipper’s shyness around Paddy. Still, Nipper and Paddy slowly 
develop a personal bond. Relatively early in the novel, as the two encounter one 
another on the Old Road, Paddy “glanced at the ground, then looked at Nipper 
furtively. ‘I was . . . I was sorry to hear about your old man—I mean, about your 
father’” (120).  Nipper says, “‘Yeah,’” then Paddy steps closer, hesitates, and says, 
“‘My Mom died of cancer, too’” (120-21).  Through the exchange that follows, the 
boys acknowledge, through their discomfort and their kind though constrained words, 
the enormity of what they are grappling with. Later, when they are both in grade eight, 
Paddy demonstrates his trust in Nipper by recruiting his help in rewriting a paper, and 
also lets Nipper help him with his reading (235-37). Though the rewrite comes to 
nothing academically (Brother Crane refuses to even look at his rewrite because the 
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paper he uses is too long) (244), Nipper’s assistance to Paddy constitutes a forward 
step in their slowly developing bond of trust. Through this trusting relationship, 
Nipper gains a fuller understanding of Paddy, whose moral courage is made more 
poignant by his weaknesses and personal struggles. And Paddy gains an apparently 
new kind of friend—someone whom he can trust with his weakness, who he knows 
will treat it gently. 
Nipper and Paddy’s slowly developing intimacy requires that each overcomes 
his anxiety about the other’s foreignness, that each conquer his fear and defensiveness 
in order to be able to grow through mutual understanding and trust. It is a lovely and 
worthy idea, but one that relies on the essentially benign character of the diversity they 
embody. The only strategy the novel ever depicts for coping with people who embody 
malignant manifestations of diversity—manifestations that inhibit others’ freedom to 
expression their diversity—is to avoid or constrain them. In The Confessions, even 
physically violent attempts to free oneself from unjust regulation are understandable 
and even laudable, while any violence in defense of a status quo presented as 
chronically violent is depicted as abusive. 
 
5.4   Nipper Mooney: The Liberal Conscience and the Waning Authority of the 
Church 
Although several other characters in The Confessions of Nipper Mooney are more 
immediately striking than Nipper, Nipper’s moral development remains the heart of 
the novel. In contrast to the relatively unchanging Paddy and Brendan, the unassuming 
Nipper is immersed in an obvious process of moral development, and is clearly 
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susceptible to influence. Though Nipper is not stigmatized by difference as Paddy and 
Brendan are, his sensitive nature leads him to sympathize with those whose 
differences are preyed upon. Nipper’s attention to marginal characters, and to their 
treatment at the hands of religious authority figures and those who mimic them, 
profoundly affects his moral development. In addition, Nipper begins to question the 
church’s sexual regulations, according to which his loving encounters with Brigid are 
sinful. Nipper gradually begins to consider the whisperings of his own conscience to 
be an essential tool for evaluating received moral wisdom, the morality and wisdom of 
which seem to vary widely. As his friends are marginalized by a church which, while 
still powerful, is waning in moral authority, Nipper opts to follow them into 
disenchantment, conceding the loss of a coherent, centralized morality because such a 
concession appears to encourage greater equity and liberty. 
The struggle with sin that preoccupies Nipper throughout the novel is 
developed partly through a series of comical scenes directly involving his confessions. 
Nipper, who is claustrophobic, finds that being in the confessional is like being “down 
in a mine,” and that the confessional booth reminds him of “a coffin turned on its end” 
(49-50). With Brigid’s help, Nipper begins to plan ways to avoid irritating the priest 
while minimizing time spent in the oppressive space of the confessional. Brigid and 
Nipper’s rules culminate in an ultimate guideline, “Never, ever, ever give a sin you 
don’t understand,” the importance of which Nipper learns “the hard way” (58), in a 
humorous exchange with a surprisingly patient Monsignor Murphy. The priest 
inquires into the nature of the “bad thoughts” that Nipper has just confessed, until it 
becomes clear that Nipper has no idea what he is talking about: “Nipper wasn’t even 
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sure what he had confessed. He had overheard the expression ‘bad thoughts’ out on 
the school playground” (59). The children's preparation for confession at the hands of 
Sister Mary Ignatius has encouraged an understanding of confession as a process of 
wrath-avoidance: at one point she pokes Nipper hard in the chest with her pointer as a 
means of emphasizing the sanctity of confession (58-59). Nipper’s comical confession 
fiascos reflect a fear of God that is a sublimation of his fear of God’s earthly agents. 
Such a strictly punitive framework may miss much of the point of confession, 
as Monsignor Murphy gently demonstrates in Nipper’s and his Aunt Mona’s 
confession episodes, in which Murphy displays an understanding of confession 
according to which “the priest . . . is to sit not as judge but as pastor,” and according to 
which he is not called to “deal with his fellow sinner as a man or woman or child on 
trial, but as one who comes to a sacramental encounter with God in his mercy” 
(Gaskell 148). But despite Murphy’s compassionate example, Nipper’s early 
understanding of the relationship between sin and confession leads to an approach to 
moral and spiritual life premised on appeasement. In the years following his first 
confession episodes, Nipper encounters many minor temptations, and yields to quite a 
few of them. To compensate for these sins, Nipper develops his spiritual strategies 
more elaborately. He comes up with another plan: “With so much occasion for sin, 
Nipper thought it a good idea to make his soul as clean and white as possible and store 
up this whiteness like a squirrel storing nuts. That way he would have some protection 
against those times when he would be bad” (179). Having gained a sense that one can 
gain or lose spiritual points, or “whiteness,” and that storing up “whiteness” may have 
some “protective” usefulness against sin,9 Nipper hopes that by praying very ardently 
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he can accumulate a kind of sin credit. The comical tone of many of Nipper’s 
confession and conscience-wracking episodes makes light of strategic approaches to 
sin, and subverts the expiative seriousness that, according to Nipper’s instruction, 
ought to characterize confession.  
Nipper’s fearful association of sin with punishment fosters a sense of urgency, 
and thereby discourages measured reflection on the moral quality of his actions. This 
fearful association is reinforced by his observations of the nuns and Brothers who are 
the majority of his schoolteachers. In one instance, Brother Bannister, the principal at 
All Angels Academy, straps Nipper after he is beaten up by two other students for 
trying to prevent them from stealing his banana (185). Witnessing Nipper’s tears upon 
his return from Bannister’s office, his teacher Brother Devine is obviously troubled by 
the undeserved punishment. Devine says nothing about it in front of the class, and 
does not challenge Bannister. Instead, he “crouched down by [Nipper’s] desk,” and 
says, “‘I’m sorry you got strapped, Nipper. Brother Bannister, he . . . he shouldn’t 
have done that.’” Then “Brother Devine squeezed Nipper’s shoulder and went back to 
his desk” (187). The example of compassion Nipper observes here is fearful and 
furtive, in apparent violation of a higher authority that seems to be brutal and arbitrary. 
Such instances encourage fear of punishment and an anxious sense of never being 
safe.                                                                                                                                                           
Eventually the minor tendency to drift from his religious instruction that 
characterizes Nipper’s childhood gives way to a more substantial, sustained departure 
as his relationship with Brigid turns physical. In facing his own nervous sense, and 
Brigid’s confidence, that there is nothing wrong with their encounters, Nipper must 
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address the question of his own supposed sin more directly. Catholic feminist 
theologian Denyse Lardner Carmody argues that the churches, in order to deal morally 
and humanely with the “sexual misadventures” of youth, “have to take to heart their 
own doctrinal conviction that sexual sins are less serious than sins of pride and 
destructive domination” (120). Despite its relative lack of doctrinal gravity, sexual sin 
has seemed particularly serious to Nipper. This perception is reinforced by its 
description in the catechism, which tells him that “sins of impurity and immodesty are 
especially dangerous because our nature is strongly inclined toward them, they are 
easily committed and soon develop into habits which are very hard to break.” Nipper 
“grimaces” at the truth of this description (254), though he perceives no real harm in 
his relationship with Brigid (253, 269-70). Throughout the novel, a relativistic 
morality in which the moral quality of acts is dependent upon a variety of contextual 
factors is favoured over an absolutist morality based on the intrinsic qualities of acts: 
the affection and trust that Nipper and Brigid share affects the moral quality of sexual 
encounters which, from the vantage point of their religious training, are 
straightforwardly sinful.  
Recalling Guy’s and Smith’s work in different ways, Kavanagh’s novel 
presents religious language as something humans contrive as a means of approaching 
the ineffable and lending motivating weight to moral talk. During Nipper’s 
explorations of the catechism, he turns to a section called “Problems and Exercises,” 
and reads, “Godfrey, a lad inclined to be lazy, is bothered with many temptations to 
sin. May he justly blame all of them on the devil? Explain your answer. Advise him 
how to overcome his temptations” (254-55). Nipper closes the book, puts it away, and 
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thinks, “‘Sorry, Godfrey, . . . I think you’re on your own’” (255). Ultimately, Nipper 
shrugs off such abstractions, and discovers that his conscience is quiet about his 
relationship with Brigid but is troubled by his minimal participation in local gang 
fights and by the physical and psychological violence he has witnessed at school. 
After examining his religious instruction and his conscience vis-à-vis his encounters 
with Brigid, Nipper tells her, “‘I don’t have anything to confess’” (270). In the novel’s 
portrayal of the liberal moral conscience in development, Nipper’s own reason and 
moral intuition are recruited in his efforts to discern which acts and tendencies are 
benign manifestations of human diversity and therefore deserving of toleration, and 
which are malignant and needful of control. In proper liberal fashion, moral authority 
is shifted away from central institutions and toward the individual (Held 74-75), where 
moral responsibility lies. 
 While Nipper grows, relatively unharassed, into an acquaintance with moral 
complexity and a sense of the insufficiency of doctrine, those in the novel who openly 
question received religious opinion are berated and punished. Throughout the novel, 
the domineering church agents responsible for these punishments consistently govern 
the institutions in which they operate. Gentler, more sympathetic clerics typically try 
to create safe, supportive spaces in the margins of power, but defer to their more 
authoritarian superiors when conflicts arise. Authoritarian politics are typical of strong 
institutions in any sphere, and may actually have positive social functions—clarity of 
vision and a sense of shared purpose that is not subject to constant second-guessing, 
for instance,10 as well as effective regulation of vicious deviations. But institutions 
also tend to protect themselves at all costs, rigorously excluding perceived threats to 
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existing authority.11 Nipper observes these power dynamics at work, largely at the 
expense of people whose worth he recognizes and appreciates; he senses the interplay 
between these dynamics and the kind of moral instruction he has received; and by 
growing increasingly resistant to both, he is increasingly alienated from the influence 
of the Catholic Church that has been their source. In The Confessions, church agents’ 
efforts to protect the existing order of power come to impede rather than strengthen 
their own, and the church’s, authority. The church’s influence over the novel’s 
younger generation lessens as the novel progresses: whereas Brendan seems to have 
been very much on his own in his alienation from the church, Nipper finds he has 
company as well as a predecessor. And old Brendan discovers new bonds with young 
people, such as Nipper, who increasingly relate to his questions and misgivings as the 
church’s authority erodes. 
  
5.5   Brigid Flynn: An Alternative Model of Power 
Though The Confessions is focused mostly on male relationships, and Paddy and 
Brendan’s supporting roles are given more exposition than Brigid Flynn’s, no one in 
the novel demonstrates greater strength of character than the independent young 
Brigid. She is influenced by Brendan's self-governing spirit but is not so stigmatized; 
she shares Paddy's sense of moral indignation but is not so alienated; and she shares 
Nipper's sensitivity but is not so impressionable. Brigid’s characterization draws on 
stereotypical depictions of women as natural temptresses, and equally prevalent 
representations of women as natural nurturers, in the process making much of Brigid's 
fruitfully complex affiliation with her saintly Irish namesake. The spiritual fertility and 
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nurturing quality of Brigid's saintly foremother is described very early in the novel, as 
Nipper recalls his school lessons: “She was . . . the all-provider, the nurturer, 
symbolized by her cow that always gave milk” (14). But the girl named after St. 
Brigid is strong, assertive, independent, and sexual, recalling St. Brigid’s emblem, fire 
(14). It is through such fiery traits that she provides for, and nurtures, her young lover. 
Through her confidence and self-assertion in her interactions with Nipper, and through 
her bold defenses of others stigmatized by difference, Brigid provides a model of 
power that supports and defends diversity and individual liberty, a model that contrasts 
with the authoritarian  model embodied by the novel’s Catholic Church. 
 Brigid’s confident embrace of her amorous relationship with Nipper 
demonstrates her strength and moral autonomy. The sexual aspect of Brigid and 
Nipper’s bond grows out of a lengthy friendship, and the tone of their interaction is 
consistently tender, attentive, and generous. Brigid’s secure sense of the goodness of 
their encounters is reaffirmed for Nipper when Brendan, suspecting what the two 
youths have been doing, describes it as “church” (252). This is among the novel’s 
many symbolic overturnings of conventional moral associations, as sexual encounters 
with a trusted partner are likened to a form of worship. Ashe argues that the dominant 
historical Christian response to human sexuality, which has led to elaborate sexual 
prohibitions over the centuries, has been phobic and damaging. And like many 
feminist theologians, she argues this phobia and its attendant prohibitions have hit 
women's experience of their bodies particularly hard. Ashe argues that the healing of 
the spirit she believes must take place in the wake of Christianity’s repressive history 
must be accompanied by a healing of people’s relationships with their own bodies, so 
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that people can develop “a sense of ease and pleasure in our own embodiedness” and a 
sense of the body as “a sacred means of connecting us to God, nature, loved ones and 
the human community” (26-27). Blessing a doctrinally proscribed encounter that 
seems to allow or even encourage Brigid and Nipper to thrive, Brendan affirms the 
spiritual worth of sexual activity that defies Catholic dogma. Though Nipper seems to 
need this blessing, the autonomous Brigid seems already to be certain that these 
encounters are worthy and to be cherished, despite doctrine to the contrary. 
In her relationship to Nipper, Brigid makes no attempt to shape him despite her 
considerable force of personality. Instead, she accepts him entirely as he is, 
empowering him to be, in terms of traditional stereotypes, feminine. Before their first 
amorous encounter, after joking that his nickname makes him sound like a mosquito, 
Brigid surprises Nipper by mischievously biting him on the neck, making him blush. 
Brigid is unfazed, her “eyes crinkl[ing] with laughter.” She brushes off the question of 
why she did it: “‘I just felt like it;’” and then she compliments Nipper on his pretty 
eyes, his lashes “like spiders’ legs.” Seeking her approval, he asks, “‘Is that good?’” 
As she bikes away, she looks back over her shoulder and tells him, “‘That’s good’” 
(195-96). Throughout the episode, Brigid is characterized by assertiveness and self-
confidence, while Nipper is receptive and uncertain, even delicate, needing her 
reassurance that all is okay—a reversal of common stereotypes that quietly resonates 
with the story’s general favouring of benign, stigmatized diversity. According to The 
Confessions’ liberally oriented depictions, accepting people’s different predilections 
(excepting instances where such acceptance enables oppressive behaviour) generally 
allows them to thrive, and also tends to enrich others around them by unsettling 
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narrow notions of the proper and the good: the very effect feared by those most 
invested in the status quo.  
Though Brigid's role as the lead character’s love interest is typical for a female 
character in a male-centred narrative, Brigid is also ruggedly independent and a 
vigorous champion of justice in her immediate surroundings. Her affinity for St. 
Brigid’s emblem, fire, is evident in her quick, indignant defenses of the dignity of her 
friends and family, and in her inheritance of her great-uncle Brendan’s independent 
spirit. Early in the novel, her defense of a “simple” local boy against schoolmates’ 
taunts (27-28) parallels Paddy Dunne’s later acts of solidarity at All Angels Academy. 
Later, she defends her great uncle Brendan from the slights of her friends (111-13). 
And at the novel’s end, of all the young characters whose development the story 
follows, only Brigid goes on to attend university, which suggests her assertive spirit is 
likely to continue to bloom in professional life. Brigid’s creative fusion of traditionally 
female- and male-associated traits not only manifests the benign diversity that the 
novel celebrates, but, by marrying strength and willfulness to compassion and 
openness, embodies a kind of power that can actively support diversity in others. 
 
5.6   The Foursome: The Saints Go Marching Out 
Through The Confessions’ modest doses of fantasy, and the association of its central 
characters with sacred themes and figures, its protagonists are invested with nuance 
and nobility, and their journeys are imbued with a measure of magic. By contrast, the 
autocratically oriented, mostly church-affiliated characters against whom they struggle 
are depicted as psychologically quite flat, and often as abusive, with no such special 
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qualities. Among the symbolic links between the protagonists and the sacred is the 
naming of Brendan, Paddy (Patrick), and Brigid after prominent Irish saints. 
Excepting Brigid’s fairly developed association with St. Brigid, likenesses between 
the characters and their namesakes are broad and basic. Simple links between Brendan 
and Paddy and their saintly forebears are easily discerned. Brendan’s in particular are 
underscored by Nipper’s mention of Brendan’s book Irish Saints and Martyrs (94), by 
Sharon and Mona’s discussion of Brendan’s “saintly” qualities, and by his talk about, 
and prayers to, Irish saints (131-36). The gentle Brendan, like his namesake, is a 
voyager of a kind (St. Augustine’s 101), whose knowledge of little-known physical 
and spiritual terrain is extensive;12 and it is not hard to see a trace of Paddy in the icon 
of St. Patrick, trampling snakes or driving them before him (St. Augustine’s 433). 
Such identifications with Catholic saints symbolically exalt the novel’s protagonists, 
who are neglected, rejected, and even despised by church agents. An association with 
the sacred is elsewhere invited via Sharon’s joking reference to Nipper, Brendan and 
Paddy as “the Holy Trinity of the Old Road” (119). The recurrent associations of the 
protagonists with elements of the Catholic tradition, whose institutions and dogma 
they come increasingly to reject, include quiet gospel echoes. The early community of 
disciples is echoed by the novel's development of a marginal group characterized by 
moral vision, compassion, and identification with pariahs. The martyrdom of Jesus is 
echoed by the portrayal of Paddy as a righteous scapegoat railing against corrupted 
authorities at his own expense. And the resurrection is echoed by the implication, at 
the novel’s end, that Brendan, having gone missing from the nursing home where he 
has been sent by his family, has not died but has gone to live with the fairies. These 
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mostly implicit echoes, tailored to fit a group of protagonists mostly unconcerned with 
the central Christian question of salvation, symbolically unsettle the legitimacy of a 
church that is largely depicted as jaded, inertial, and self-serving, whose arbiters 
frequently exhibit an outlook that is not only self-justifying (as Nipper’s, Brendan’s, 
Paddy’s and Brigid’s perspectives also seem to be), but oppressive. 
The novel’s final scene, after Brendan has disappeared and Brigid has left 
Newfoundland to attend university, solidifies the foursome's web of interrelation, and 
grounds a mostly worldly story in the wonder and mystery that characterizes its 
beginning. In this final scene, unlikely events cohere in a way that invites a mystical 
interpretation. While out on a long walk to the shore in May, Nipper steps into the 
clearing of “Brendan's Lookout” (a new coinage), and accidentally discovers 
Brendan's silver St. Brigid's medal glinting off a rock, in a turn of events that seems 
fated. Brendan has told Nipper he wants Brigid to have the medal, but does not 
actually give it to either Nipper or Brigid before he disappears. And Nipper’s 
discovery of the medal relies on the sun emerging from the clouds and reflecting off it 
at just the right moment. Now Nipper, whose fondness for Brigid was well-known to 
Brendan, is responsible for giving her the mysteriously discovered medal. As Nipper 
walks to the cliff's edge where, accompanied by Brendan, he first saw the ocean years 
earlier, “a dragonfly [perhaps a fairy, or maybe Brendan] zigzagged past his head, then 
darted into the woods” (321). Just at that moment, Paddy happens to come down the 
path, fishing rod in hand. Nipper and Paddy briefly discuss the pendant, then Paddy 
asks Nipper what he thinks happened to Brendan. Nipper says he thinks Brendan was 
“‘stolen by the fairies’” (which was Brendan's assessment of Nipper's experience of 
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“losing time” on the day of his father’s death). But Paddy corrects him: “‘No, he went 
willingly’” (322). Nipper and the generally suspicious Paddy accept the intervention 
of the fairies as the story that best embodies the mystery of Brendan’s (and the 
novel’s) end. The final words of the novel ground it in a mystical perspective:   
Nipper watched Paddy leave. He looked out over the ocean and listened to the 
breathing waves, the piercing cries of the gulls. A salt wind stirred the juniper 
and spruce. Nipper held up the cross by its chain and watched as it caught the 
light, the bright silver reflecting the sun back to heaven. (322) 
Brendan's belief in fairies could easily have been taken as mere foolishness, but 
instead, Nipper and Paddy affirm and legitimate it—not necessarily via a literal 
acceptance of the existence of fairies, but at least via an affirmation of the presence of 
the mysterious within earthly things and within human relations. This affirmation 
constitutes a stepping back from the territorial knowing of the Cranes and Mary 
Ignatiuses of the world, toward an increase of wonder and of love—of faith, of a 
kind—and toward a corresponding, if paradoxical-seeming, decrease of transcendent 
belief. In Kavanagh’s novel as in Smith’s work, an effort to reconcile faith and 
skepticism through mystery seems evident—in part, it seems, in order to reconcile a 
religious orientation with a socially grounded, liberal ethics. 
 
5.7   Conclusion 
Despite the rich breadth of ideas and perspectives associated with the Catholic faith in 
The Confessions of Nipper Mooney, the influence of its institutions and agents in the 
novel’s social world slowly wanes because the church and its schools are locked into a 
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mode of relations that is becoming an anachronism. Dissidents and even fairly 
mainstream characters in the novel are targeted for punishment or exclusion in order to 
maintain an authoritarian order. And those church representatives who demonstrate 
alternative possibilities for engaging with people’s differences are relegated to the 
institutional margins. The fate of the faith is left largely uncertain as dissidents and 
outcasts develop their own bonds, and as the local church and church schools struggle 
between a largely subjected compassion and a more prominent tendency toward the 
aggressive maintenance of order. The Confessions’ Catholic Church is depicted as 
largely paralyzed, unable either to change or to revive, in the midst of a process of 
erosion in the face of an emergent liberal pluralism.  
If, as several episodes in The Confessions imply, conformity is always likely to 
be equated with goodness, liberal pluralism may be seen to allow a relatively wide 
range of people to live and struggle in groups alongside other, similarly “good” people 
(i.e., those with whom they conform) without unduly oppressing “bad” (but non-
oppressive) people or groups. According to such a model, the only acts that need to be 
constrained are those that get in the way of other people or groups freely doing what 
they want (to the extent that those things do not prevent others from doing what they 
want, and so on). Such a standard seems to underpin the novel’s positive depiction of 
mutual acceptance among a community of benign outsiders and its dismissive 
portrayals of some nuns, Brothers, and schoolmates whose actions violate this liberal 
principle (and for whom no potentially positive role is suggested). Essentially, The 
Confessions implies the same standard that Guy’s Triffie implies when Pastor Pottle’s 
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hand is nailed to the table: reasonable limits need to be placed on tolerance, for its 
better overall enactment as a principle. 
The Confessions’ positive portrayal of the development of bonds of trust 
among a diverse group of mostly stigmatized individuals, as well as its occasional 
sympathetic depictions of church agents such as Monsignor Murphy, appears to push 
beyond liberal tolerance, favouring the active pursuit of harmony and understanding 
across the bounds of difference. Yet the novel’s development of a loose-knit alliance 
of alienated people who show no more sense of moral responsibility to church agents 
than church agents have generally shown to them suggests a less idealistic option: a 
kind of pluralism in which a balancing of factional interests is the best that can 
reasonably be hoped for. Nipper’s and Brigid’s sympathy with the novel’s socially 
marginal characters might be seen to imply that, through the facilitation of mainstream 
sympathizers who can advocate on their behalf in a way that will be heard, marginal 
groups might take up the dialogue with power. Yet even this unsatisfying option is left 
largely undeveloped in the novel, whose factions—one romanticized, and one 
demonized—are left without discernible prospects for fruitful exchange. The 
Confessions seems, on the one hand, to hold out a measure of hope for the instillation 
of some sense of harmony across the bounds of disagreement and difference, while, on 
the other, conceding to the political pluralism of factions as a contingent response to 
unaccountable authority.  
These two tendencies maintain an uneasy relationship with each other 
throughout the novel (it is not clear, for instance, how the latter might aid the former), 
and recall Guy’s and Smith’s religious humour in different ways. The novel’s 
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mystical, inclusive current reflects an idealistic embrace of “value pluralism” that 
recalls Smith’s work. Talisse, as we saw earlier, maintains that value pluralism 
acknowledges that disagreements over the “Big Questions” are not always a product 
of error, but are to some degree “inevitable, irresolvable, non-contingent, and, in a 
word, permanent” (2-3). In Smith’s humour, such an acknowledgment can lead to a 
measure of harmony among groups. The Confessions’ emphasis on the importance of a 
sense of mystery, and its cautions about what can be known with confidence, may be 
seen as a Smithean corrective to certain potential effects of the factional pluralism 
whose development the novel traces. A factional pluralism has the potential, for 
instance, to amplify rather than to mitigate the conformity against which the novel 
clearly cautions. Factions within a pluralistic society can exist in a condition of 
mutually aloof tolerance, while continuing to enforce a self-protective conformity 
within their own bounds. And the struggle for influence, within the group and in the 
broader society, may reinforce a corresponding pressure to seem “normal.” An 
acknowledgement of the mysterious, such as that shared between Nipper and Paddy at 
the novel’s end, may be seen to encourage listening to those whose perspectives might 
correct or complement one’s own. This seems to be the hope of the liberal ecumenists 
cited in Chapter Three, and of Ed Smith’s ecumenical humour. The Confessions’ 
hopeful marriage between pluralism and mystery is prominent in Smith’s religious 
humour, which presents a more consistent case for their combination. Smith’s work 
routinely advocates for the harmonious, epistemologically self-conscious coexistence 
of communities, as opposed to the constant jostling for influence that, according to 
Held, characterizes political pluralism. 
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Though The Confessions’ marriage of pluralism and mystery recalls Smith’s 
ecumenical humour in its optimistic tone, it echoes Guy’s cantankerous, apostate 
religious satire in its structure. The novel’s depiction of the splintering of a 
problematic, often oppressive, but stable-seeming unity into a plurality of factions—
some of which have not approached self-consciousness—is at odds with Smith’s 
idealistic vision. This unruly factionalism, which characterizes Guy’s satirical outlook, 
is at the heart of political pluralism as Held describes it. Political pluralists argue that 
factionalism is not only a natural outcome of democratic “free association,” but “a 
structural source of stability and the central expression of democracy,” through which 
tyranny is avoided by the mutual competition of many groups formed on the basis of 
common interests (187-88). Such pluralism does not rely on the insightfulness of its 
factions. Hence, it can, after a fashion, be seen to acknowledge the presence of the 
mysterious in human affairs. That is to say, in such a world, “rightness” is nowhere to 
be found, or at least nowhere to be proven, and in fact is unnecessary as long as 
political structures foster competitive pluralism rather than authoritarian relations. 
Guy’s apostate skepticism, which abandons any grand, unifying understandings, may 
in fact reflect the logical extreme of Kavanagh’s and Smith’s relativistic uses of 
mystery. His apostate question is: Given that one ought not to build ethics upon what 
cannot be known, and given that nothing transcendent can be known, what is left upon 
which to build ethics? Kavanagh’s novel and Smith’s religious humour seem to stop 
short of such apostasy, yet are left facing Guy’s question all the same in their 
imaginative attempts to reconcile a measure of Christian religious interest with liberal, 
pluralistic values. The irony of this process in works that exemplify a sustained 
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interest in religious experience is that while one (authoritarian) set of worldly values 
that previously had achieved religious ascendancy is criticized as perverse, another 
(liberal) set is granted religious legitimacy because it is more amenable to the times. 
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Notes 
1 The Confessions was also shortlisted for the Winterset Award for "excellence 
in Newfoundland writing," and was nominated for the International IMPAC Dublin 
Literary Award. 
2 According to David Held’s Models of Democracy, liberalism involves “the 
attempt to uphold the values of freedom of choice, reason and toleration in the face of 
tyranny, the absolutist system and religious intolerance.” Held explains, “At the centre 
of [the liberal] project was the goal of freeing the polity from religious control and 
freeing civil society . . . from political interference. Gradually, liberalism became 
associated with the doctrine that individuals should be free to pursue their own 
preferences in religious, economic and political affairs—in fact, in most matters that 
affected daily life” (74). Pluralism, for its part, modifies the liberal focus on the 
individual actor by putting “particular weight on the processes creating, and resulting 
from, individuals combining their efforts in groups in the competition for power,” a 
process which, according to pluralists, facilitates the simultaneous (and, hopefully, 
relatively balanced) existence of “many power centres” (200).  
3 For a detailed study of the social roles and functions of “local characters,” see 
Diane Tye, “Local Character Anecdotes: A Nova Scotia Case Study,” and “Aspects of 
the Local Character Phenomenon in a Nova Scotian Community.” 
4 Tye’s work on “local characters” contains illuminating discussions of the 
social use of deviants for the maintenance of social standards and boundaries. 
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5 Conservative political commentator and wordsmith William Safire’s book 
The First Dissident: The Book of Job in Today’s Politics is a discussion of the political 
value of dissent. The book draws upon Job’s relationship to God as an anchor for 
discussion, but is a political and literary study, not a religious essay. In it, Safire 
argues that it is politically unwise for those in power to attempt to eradicate dissent 
because this leads to a more intense, widespread inclination toward rebellion. 
Conversely, allowing and even fostering a measure of dissent has the dual effects of 
being good for civil society (because political leaders may learn to be better governors 
by listening to dissenting voices) and good for the self-preservation of the current 
leadership (because a political climate that invites dissent provides for those who are 
frustrated with the status quo a sense that their voices are being heard). 
 6 cf. Michael Harris’s journalistic essay Unholy Orders: Tragedy at Mount 
Cashel, written in the wake of the Mount Cashel Orphanage sexual abuse scandal. 
Given the public notoriety of sexual abuse scandals in Newfoundland, it is striking 
that Kavanagh opts not to depict sexual abuse. This choice seems useful to The 
Confessions’ more general depiction of problems arising from the abuse of religious 
prestige—as if to say, it is not necessary for abuses to be sexual to be serious. 
7 Darrell is dubbed the “class mascot,” and is spoken to “like he was a six-
year-old or a puppy” (205). His schoolmates’ strategy of ironic bullying relies on his 
partial comprehension; this bullying creates in him a sense of shame that depends on a 
measure of understanding, but it also confuses him because it is not straightforward. 
This kind of emotional abuse is modeled by Brother Crane himself, who routinely 
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humiliates Darrell, often through the use of sarcasm and other predatory exploitations 
of Darrell’s limited comprehension. 
8 In the Dictionary of Newfoundland English, a “streel” is defined as an 
“untidy, dirty person,” or a “dirty, slovenly person, esp a woman.”  
9 Brigid is strikingly dark compared to other Kildurans, and that this darkness 
affects how she is perceived by others. Brigid’s darkness fits the novel’s general 
tendency toward symbolic reversals. For instance, “whiteness”—or purity—loses 
much of its meaning as Nipper’s world gets more complex, while the dark-skinned 
Brigid—who is also guiltlessly sexual and therefore “bad”—is among the novel’s 
virtuous protagonists.  
10 Neil Postman writes that “any decline in the force of institutions makes 
people vulnerable to information chaos. To say that life is destabilized by weakened 
institutions is merely to say that information loses its use and therefore becomes a 
source of confusion rather than coherence” (73). 
11 For a thorough critical discussion of the self-preserving character of 
institutions, see Chomsky, Understanding Power. For a discussion of a similar tenor 
applied to Newfoundland in particular, see Pottle, Fun on the Rock. 
12 At one point during their discussion of Brendan, Sharon and Mona liken 
Brendan to St. Francis because of his unusual gentleness toward animals (95). 
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6.   The Huntress and the Holy Mother: Symbolic Integration in Berni 
Stapleton’s The Pope and Princess Di 
 
6.1   Introduction 
A prolific writer and performer, Berni Stapleton is a fixture on the Newfoundland 
theatre scene whose original works for the stage demonstrate a combined commitment 
to artistry, humour, and the exploration of social issues. Stapleton’s plays include the 
renowned A Tidy Package, her post-cod moratorium two-hander written and 
performed with longtime cohort Amy House, which toured Canada several times. Also 
notable are Stapleton’s one-woman satirical fantasy Woman in a Monkey Cage, 
published in the collection Voices from the Landwash, and the personally inspired The 
Pope and Princess Di, first produced at the St. John’s Arts and Culture Centre for 
Artistic Fraud of Newfoundland (2004). Along with playwrighting and performing, 
Stapleton has authored educational video works, poetry, and non-fiction. Her multi-
media publication on post-moratorium Newfoundland with Chris Brookes and Jamie 
Lewis, They Let Down Baskets, won the Newfoundland and Labrador Writers’ 
Alliance Non-Fiction Book Award (1999), and her topical works for organizations 
such as the Provincial Working Group Against Child Sexual Abuse and the Federal 
Department of Justice (the latter on mending the divide between youth offenders and 
the general public) are used as educational materials in public schools. Drawing on 
Stapleton’s own experience of breast cancer, The Pope and Princess Di continues her 
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abiding integration of public and political concerns into works with a personal heart 
and humorous guts.  
The Pope and Princess Di sustains a political emphasis characteristic of most 
Newfoundland literary and dramatic humour about Christian religion, while extending 
Smith’s attention to questions of belief by giving symbols and their interpretation 
centre stage in her framing of religious power. Blending social realism, satirical 
fantasy, and affectionate caricature, the play is complex and intricate, but is also 
polemical, emotionally accessible, and broadly humorous. It challenges prevalent 
religious and cultural standards while sustaining a wary appreciation of tradition and a 
far-reaching skepticism about the ultimate adequacy of any epistemological 
framework. As the protagonists experience a painful process of transformation, 
symbols—even those most revered—are framed as properly subservient to an 
experiential standard of wellness that does not require justification through a given set 
of ideas or beliefs. Religious and cultural symbols are elaborated and subsequently 
shattered, only to be reintegrated as useful complements in a new symbolic weave 
messily adequate to the protagonists’ emerging needs.  
The play centres on Bernadette and Diana, two women recently diagnosed with 
breast cancer. Both women have been subjected to damaging patriarchal pressures 
supported by the perception-shaping power of symbols. During regularly scheduled 
visits to the oncology ward, the two women provide each other with new insights 
necessary for their emotional and spiritual healing, even as their bodies get sicker. 
They are helped along their journey by Bernadette’s idol, a singing and dancing Pope; 
Diana’s idol, an Amazonian Princess Di; a harried, chemical-addicted nurse referred to 
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only as Nurse until almost the end of the play; and Bernadette's dead Granny, who 
captains the fantastical ship upon which all of the play's action takes place. Over time, 
Bernadette’s relationship with the Pope, and Diana’s relationship with Princess Di, are 
elaborated and complicated, and the women, and their very different idols, begin to 
influence one another in unexpected ways, assisted by Granny’s hectoring wisdom and 
Nurse’s self-denying service.  
Subject to an historical, patriarchal manipulation of the Christian principle of 
self-sacrifice that emphasizes its desirability in women especially, Bernadette’s 
understanding of her own needs has been largely stunted. The play’s Pope symbolizes 
a patriarchal emphasis on women’s self-sacrifice, until a shift in his character occurs 
late in the play. The Pope begins his life as a convenient fabrication fulfilling 
Bernadette’s youthful need for a sense of personal importance, which she develops 
using the materials of her Catholic religion. She cultivates an affinity for her namesake 
Saint Bernadette, and a fantasy of personal relationship with the Pope catalyzed by the 
real-life Pope’s visit to bless the fleet in her village. Bernadette’s fantasy Pope, 
informed by her fascination with the sacrifices of the holy martyrs, acquires an 
enduring place in her psychological make-up, and begins to direct and evaluate her 
behaviour as a kind of warped conscience. Bernadette comes to envision fulfillment 
arising through a religiously framed self-abnegation, and manifests this in her 
domestic life as well as in her self-mortifying response to her illness. 
For her part, Diana as a young woman becomes fascinated by the story of 
Princess Diana’s fairy-tale marriage to Prince Charles, and develops a kind of pop-
culture devotion to Princess Diana, imagining her own life through a princess-fantasy 
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lens. When her marriage to a breast-fixated man falls apart, Diana tries (somewhat 
unsuccessfully) to free herself from her princess fantasy and from patriarchal beauty 
standards, all the while sustaining a fascination for Princess Diana in secret. Once the 
play is in motion, after Diana is stricken with cancer, Princess Di turns up transformed 
as an Amazon figure with one breast removed, representing will power and self-
assertion, and also (along with Granny) a legitimate future without both breasts—
though her insistence on toughness and independence also hampers Diana’s capacity 
to develop relationships.   
The gradual transformations that the women’s idols undergo suggest the 
plasticity of symbols, as fantasy objects initially conceived in accordance with their 
proponents’ own wishes are gradually transformed into idols that oppress their 
adherents by stunting their growth, and which must be further transformed if healing is 
to occur. Princess Di and the Pope each eventually develop a relationship with the 
other’s adherent, as well as with one another. Bernadette and Diana are healed through 
the access they provide to one another’s perceptual frameworks, as symbolized by 
Princess Di and the Pope; and these frameworks, as a result of the protagonists’ new 
relatedness, accordingly change their shape. The action of the play culminates in a 
sort-of-happy ending in which Bernadette and Diana sail away into death with Granny 
at the wheel, the Pope and Princess Di depart together to “help” others, and Nurse 
leaves her current job to work in a Florida plastic surgery clinic. Throughout, The 
Pope and Princess Di playfully employs a variety of Christian and Classical Greco-
Roman figures and archetypes, culminating in a couple of crucial integrative images: 
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the shattering and re-gluing of Bernadette’s commemorative teacup of the Pope, and 
Diana’s heart leaving her body and hanging in the sky like a moon. 
 
6.2   Hardened Symbols: Bernadette, Diana, and their Idols  
Bathed in light and speaking over the humming of a chorus who have just been 
singing “Ave Maria,” Bernadette says, “In the beginning, there was me. My name is 
Bernadette. I'm named after Saint Bernadette of Lourdes. And I've met the Pope” (10). 
Among other things, Bernadette’s character introduction suggests an innocence and 
exuberance that clearly contrasts with Diana’s parallel introduction, “In the beginning 
there was a little embryo of malignancy” (15). Diana is critical, bordering on cynical, 
and uses barbed wit to protect herself from familiar hurts. The contrast between the 
two characters’ attitudes is the foundation for their often difficult journey toward 
friendship, and for the fruitful paradox of their strengthened senses of self and their 
burgeoning interdependence. This journey requires the disruption of their narrow 
idolatries to the Pope and Princess Di. Initially symbols of sainthood and of romantic 
salvation respectively, the two figures have hardened into idols that unduly constrain 
their adherents. As idols, the Pope and Princess Di operate, however inadequately, as 
absolute principles for their adherents (“Idol”); they become so identified with the 
principles they imperfectly “point to,” that they are mistaken for them (Gross 169), 
and hence gain the power to distort them. Bernadette’s and Diana’s growth emerges 
from the breaking of their idols and their refashioning as softer symbols, and from the 
emergent openness of each woman to the psycho-symbolic world in which the other 
has been trapped. 
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There are obvious parallels between Bernadette’s and Diana’s relationships 
with their respective idols. Both begin with sustained fascination for the people who 
are transformed into their idols, and both have had brief encounters with these 
people—encounters that are culminations of long anticipation and that become 
important elements of their personal mythologies. In addition, both have come away 
from these encounters with items that become relics, acting as loci of reflection and 
adoration: Bernadette’s is a commemorative teacup of the Pope; Diana’s is a scrap of 
lace that was torn off the train of Princess Di's wedding gown. In addition to their 
roles as idols, The Pope and Princess Di also function as archetypes in that they 
represent ultimately unattainable states of being that are perceived as ideal, toward 
which each woman strives through the use of her relic as well as through an attendant 
ritual (Moon). Bernadette’s ritual is “tea with the Pope,” which she describes as being 
“like having a hold of God by the ear” (42). Bernadette’s tea ritual, presented as safe 
and reassuring, is quietly parodic of the Eucharist as a kind of archetypal striving 
through ingestion. This parodic quality is emphasized by Bernadette’s assertion at one 
point that the Pope “is this cup” (27)—a point reinforced when the Pope, in first 
giving her the teacup,1 enacts a comically self-aggrandizing parody of Jesus, saying, 
“Take this in remembrance of me” (14). However comforting the ritual, the self-
sacrificial ideal that accompanies it has become self-absorbing and self-destructive for 
Bernadette. Diana’s archetypal counterpart to Bernadette’s tea ritual is drinking 
martinis: she describes “having a martini [as] like having the world by the balls” (42). 
It is archetypal in its striving toward an ideal of willpower (in this case, willpower 
over the always surprisingly bad taste of martinis) as a means of overcoming the 
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disappointments that largely characterize her life. The will, which is the one means 
Diana can accept for bearing the weight of her disappointments (62), is embodied in 
the archetypal figure of the Amazon. Princess Di’s description of the martini as “a 
triumph of elegance over pleasure” (62), however, hints at the ambiguity of Diana’s 
ritual. Princess Di’s words can be read as reflective of Diana’s longstanding sacrifice 
of her own pleasure for the sake of a sense of her beauty as it can be objectified by 
others. Diana’s sacrifice of her pleasure on the altar of other people’s expectations 
bears some obvious effective resemblance to Bernadette’s propensity for self-sacrifice, 
despite the characters’ apparent opposition. It is the shadow side of Diana’s 
attachment to her will, to her capacity to endure trials and disappointments. 
 Following her introduction of herself, Bernadette points out that she is from 
Lourdes, Newfoundland (a name that may refer to the island village of Lourdes off the 
west coast of Newfoundland, and also to the grotto in the eastern Newfoundland 
village of Flatrock that is modeled after the grotto dedicated to Saint Bernadette at 
Lourdes, France), and gives a comical account of the life of her namesake (10). 
Bernadette suggests that as a girl, Saint Bernadette “was really sweet and shy and cute 
and starved for attention” (10). “So,” according to Bernadette, “the Holy Virgin Mary 
Mother of God” appears to Saint Bernadette, and the saint subsequently discovers a 
holy spring. Then she “lived out the rest of her life being extremely popular and very 
well known and a very successful Saint” (10). Bernadette’s interpretation of her 
namesake’s life reflects her own early, approval-seeking motives for aspiring toward 
sainthood, motives that shape the Pope’s devotion-hungry character. Like a 
stereotypical celebrity (he first emerges as a clericalized Elvis, singing, dancing, and 
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fretting over his blue suede shoes), he is petulant and prideful, his ego easily wounded. 
He threatens to eternally condemn Granny for refusing to indulge Bernadette, (12) and 
even threatens to cancel Purgatory altogether, citing the previous Catholic retraction of 
limbo for children: “Remember limbo? All the little dead babies? Null and Void!” 
(12). As she ages, Bernadette comes more fully to embrace the sacrificial aspect of her 
saintly aspiration, relinquishing much of her hope for recognition by her peers. And 
the Pope continues to encourage martyr fantasies even once Bernadette has begun to 
struggle against them. He encourages Bernadette when she says such things as, “Saints 
do have to suffer for a while of course. They have to be tortured, mutilated, sometimes 
boiled in oil” (13). Bernadette’s eventual, gradual discovery of the strength of her will, 
and her nascent appreciation of herself, are facilitated, to the Pope’s surprise and 
chagrin, by a model of toughness and pride embodied by the ghost of Princess Di. 
Bernadette has viewed holiness as inextricably linked to suffering. She 
describes to the Pope her revelation on the way into the operating room: 
 When they were wheeling me into the operating room to do the 
 mutilation, it struck me. I had finally achieved my dream of Sainthood. 
 The pain would elevate me to a greater spiritual level. The scars will 
 distinguish me as a martyr. I even begged them to let me stay awake, to 
 have it done without anaesthetic. I wanted to suffer as much as 
 possible, so I could offer it up. (30) 
Bernadette’s fixation on sacrifice satirically reflects a pan-historical, cross-cultural 
idealization of “women who disable themselves for the sake of marriage, religion, and 
social approval” (Anderson). Broadly speaking, “men who sacrifice others and women 
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who sacrifice themselves” have perennially been objects of celebration and admiration 
(Anderson). Kaye Ashe argues that women, “already prone to an unhealthy self-
abnegation, have an obligation to themselves to weigh others’ needs against their 
own,” and that women's self-effacement is a sin against the self but also against the 
community, hindering “the creation of a humane culture in every area of life” (37). 
Ashe’s perspective is reflected in Bernadette’s improved relationships with her family 
once she stops being such a “saint” and learns to admit her own need. 
Throughout her process of self re-valuation, Bernadette has to grapple with the 
Pope’s continued, intimate influence. When Princess Di asks, “Are you trying to 
seduce me?”, the Pope articulates his own understanding of his appeal and his power, 
responding, “Yes. Yes I am. Women love me. I'm the perfect man. Strong. Seductive. 
Yet I make no real demands of the flesh. Only of the spirit. Women love that” (34). 
While the Pope seems unaware that women like Diana consider him a retrograde 
threat to their liberation, he recognizes that he is the perfect man for women persuaded 
that their best attribute is their capacity for self-sacrifice. He lavishly praises 
Bernadette for her aptitude in this regard, and addresses her with diminutive 
endearments, continually affirming her self-sacrificial mode. He responds 
enthusiastically when she says, in response to her ongoing refusal of painkillers, “The 
Chemo hurts sometimes. It can burn. I offer it up. Like a gift. To God” (14).  At one 
point he suggests that Diana’s amputated breast “can sit at the right hand of the Lord” 
(46), a theme he further explores, in a travesty of Christ taking the sins of others onto 
himself, when he speaks of the sacrificed breast purifying other, sinful breasts (25). In 
the Pope's “allegory,” Bernadette's breasts are analogous to Christ, and mastectomy is 
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the cross. The Pope also discourages Bernadette from developing a candid relationship 
with her newly altered body, by discouraging her from looking at herself (13). When 
Bernadette eventually looks, with her husband, at her post-mastectomy chest—after 
which they have great sex (72)—her view of surgery as a sacred mortification is 
disrupted.  
When the Pope realizes he is losing his hold on Bernadette, his first response is 
a narcissistic projection of his ideal, most powerful self. Applying Freud’s work on 
narcissism to relations within and among nation states, in a manner that resonates with 
Bernadette’s Pope, Jacqueline Rose notes that “a belligerent state not only breaks the 
law in relation to the enemy; it also violates the principles that should hold between 
itself and its citizens” (18). According to Rose, when states (by which term Rose 
consistently seems to indicate governments) are recognized, by the citizenry but also 
by themselves, as being capable of the nastiness they attribute to others and purport to 
abhor, they become defensively narcissistic: they become “frantic and demanding 
because of the extent of the internal damage they are battling to repair” (17). Along 
these lines, the Pope can be seen as a wounded narcissist violating the faith of his 
adherent when he responds to Bernadette’s nascent sense of self-worth and suspicion 
of his moral governance by threatening, in a fit of absurdly hubristic pique, to cancel 
Easter as proof of his own power (Stapleton 55). Viewed as Bernadette’s own 
projected struggle, The Pope’s nasty lashings-out are a final, failed internal battle as 
her old self-image struggles against an emergent one. 
As the play progresses, Bernadette begins to make irreverent but fairly 
innocuous jokes, deriving a seemingly inordinate amount of pleasure from them. 
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During a conversation in which she and Diana list things (mostly body parts) they 
would rather give up than their breasts, Bernadette blurts out, “I'd rather give up [my 
husband] George!” (50), unable to suppress her enjoyment of a sense of freedom she 
only feels when with Diana. Morreal argues, “Any prohibition can cause a person to 
build up an increased desire to do what has been forbidden, and this frustrated desire 
may manifest itself in pent-up nervous energy” that can be released in laughter when 
the forbidden desire is mentioned in speech (21). Bernadette's breakthrough is that she 
allows herself to think in ways she has largely forbidden herself until this point. After 
she says this, she pauses, then says, “I'm only joking! My Lord. The things I say to 
you” (50). Morreal argues, “When we look at our own culture with a sense of humor, 
we see our customs, which we often take for granted as the natural way to do things, 
as just one possible way of doing things” (102-103). Bernadette’s own comment 
comes as a surprise to her, and gives her an opportunity to consider the removal of her 
breasts in terms other than sacrifice.  
Bernadette gradually claims a measure of autonomy, and discovers the healing 
power of the expression and relief, rather than the suppression or sublimation, of 
grievances. She learns to argue with Diana, decides she is sick of tea (77), complains 
about being stuck with all the housework despite her sickness (77), accepts painkillers 
for pain she no longer frames in sacral terms, and on her way into drug-induced relief, 
quietly says, “Fuck the Pope,” inadvertently smashing her Pope teacup in the process 
(79). When her immune system crashes, Princess Di, having witnessed a change in her 
character, declares her to be a “[m]artyr. And Amazon” (80). 
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Earlier in the play, in response to Bernadette’s initial enthusiasm for the Pope, 
Diana tells her, “I'm an atheist. I hate the Pope. . . . Misogynistic old fart. Traipsing 
around the world, sticking his nose in everybody's business. Trying to keep us all 
barefoot and pregnant and prostrate on the altar of his paternalistic bullshit” (28). This 
rant accurately reflects Diana’s public persona and its clear contrast to Bernadette’s. 
However, Diana is unable to free herself sufficiently from her fear of rejection to 
consistently discard the patriarchal expectations she associates with the Pope. Diana 
also cannot, despite her own assertion, simply dispense with faith. Diana's expressions 
of belief assert an affected cool—“I believe in 40 proof imported Finlandia Vodka. 
And in science, facts, stats, and odds” (28)—but Diana secretly still worships Princess 
Di, though she is increasingly embarrassed by the particular hope this implies. The 
Amazonian ghost of Princess Di who appears part-way through the play acts as a 
corrective to Diana's fantasies of posh romantic fulfillment. But her hard-nosed 
strategies limit Diana’s potential to connect emotionally with others, which she needs 
to do, especially once she is stricken with cancer. Diana also has to discover in herself 
a new kind of vulnerability, through which the toughness she has cultivated is 
transformed by a deepened sense of trust. This vulnerability is that of open-
heartedness, exemplified by Diana’s moral support for Nurse and more profoundly for 
Bernadette, and by her surprising, sympathetic words to the wounded Pope. 
Diana's marriage entrenched in her an anxiety about what constitutes her 
“assets,” an anxiety that has come to work with her residual hope for romantic rescue 
to compromise her capacity for autonomy, even as they intensify her conscious need 
for it. Diana describes her ex-husband:  
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 The love of my life did not love me. He loved my breasts. He always 
 told me how beautiful my breasts were. . . . I wanted long conversations 
 about life and feelings and philosophies. What I got was “You have 
 amazing breasts.” “Thanks,” I’d say. “I grew them myself.” He saved 
 his important conversations for other people. People with less 
 impressive breasts.  (32) 
Diana emerges from her broken marriage having tacitly submitted to a body-based 
appraisal of her value, while having consciously determined to revolt against it 
through the development of a tough, independent persona and a devotion to her career. 
Despite her aspiration to freedom from patriarchal fetishism, Diana perceives that her 
success as an upscale real estate agent, and in the marriage market, relies largely on 
her appearance: specifically, her breasts. This perception instills in her a high degree 
of anxiety at the prospect of a mastectomy.  
Once she learns to trust that Bernadette will not use her vulnerability against 
her, Diana breaks with her typical reserve and tells her about the princess fantasy that 
still underpins much of her current anxiety. As a young woman, Diana saved up for a 
trip to England to attend Princess Di's wedding. Diana tells Bernadette, “She was so 
demure and sweet and fucking young. And weren't we all so fucking sweet and young 
just from looking at her? And hopeful . . . . I saved up for a year. . . . And I made it 
happen. I was there” (68). When Princess Diana passes by, her train tears a bit on the 
metal barrier, leaving Diana with her relic. Then there is a moment of direct 
identification, at least for Diana: “And then she turned, she looked at me. . . . I was 
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standing there, feeling like it was me going to walk in that church. She was me. I was 
her. In that moment” (69).  
Diana also tells Bernadette about the crumbling of her fantasy:  
 I designed my own wedding gown. I based it on hers. And when I was 
 going through my divorce, I'd think, well, this can't be happening to 
 me! I'm the Princess. It's all supposed to be Prince Charming and happy 
 for fucking ever after, right? . . . I promised myself I'd never give 
 another soul my heart again, as long as I lived. (70)  
When Princess Di shows up in Amazonian form, she provides a symbolic replacement 
for the living Princess Di, in accordance with Diana’s resolution. Carol Christ argues, 
“Symbol systems cannot simply be rejected, they must be replaced . . . [because] 
where there is not any replacement, the mind will revert to familiar structures at times 
of crisis, bafflement, or defeat” (275). Embracing the notion that the divine is 
ultimately mysterious, feminist philosophers such as Christ assert that symbols for the 
divine are fluid in nature, and can and sometimes should be replaced. They regard a 
conception of the Goddess as a crucial devotional symbol for women, partly because, 
as Christ argues, “in a Goddess-centered context, . . . [a] woman is encouraged to 
know her will, to believe that her will is valid, and to believe that her will can be 
achieved in the world” (284). For Carol Christ, an embrace of the will is a crucial 
corrective in women’s spirituality to the self-effacement she sees as endemic for 
women in patriarchal systems. Catholic feminist Denyse Lardner Carmody argues that 
the Goddess has symbolic value even for women with more mainstream religious 
beliefs, because of its “linking [of] women to a female sacral power,” which helps 
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women to perceive “that what makes God God is as much in her as in men (27). Diana 
needs to learn to trust her own will, and to see something of her new, powerful ideal 
self reflected in the object of her devotion. 
Bernadette intuits Diana’s need for belief when she asks, “[I]f you don't 
believe in God, then why are you always cursing and swearing on him? Why do these 
words give you so much satisfaction if they're meaningless?” (76). Neil Postman 
argues that blasphemy and irreverence are “among the highest tributes that can be paid 
to the power of a symbol. The blasphemer takes the symbol as seriously as the 
idolater” (165). Diana's seriousness about the Pope is the inverse of Bernadette's, and 
equally acknowledges his power: he is as dangerous in Diana’s view as he is salvific 
in Bernadette's initial view. As Bernadette intuits, Diana believes in the God against 
whom she rails; she just hates him. And her other object of belief is an embarrassment 
to her. Upon returning from the dead as a figure who interacts directly with Diana as 
the Pope does with Bernadette, Princess Di ridicules Diana for so ardently denying her 
discipleship: “Why do you deny me? You say you're not religious. Yet you're no 
better. Did not Peter deny Jesus three times? You've denied me now twice and if 
there's a third time I'm coming down there and punching you right where the Botox 
keeps you numb” (30). Diana’s denial is premised not on this new Princess Di, but on 
the old Cinderella version, whom she still partly worships, as is evinced by the 
Princess Diana books she carries around. The new, resurrected Princess Di is the 
“woman [Princess Diana] would have become,” (60) a tough huntress who symbolizes 
an absolute ideal of female independence. Already a testament to the fluidity of 
symbols through her decidedly non-Cinderella divorce from Prince Charles, Princess 
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Di returns from the dead in a new, crucially one-breasted form in order to help Diana 
shape a new self-image as she journeys through breast cancer. 
Yet, while the new Princess Di seems to be a definite improvement upon the 
earlier version, she is still ultimately an inadequate aid on the road to Diana’s healing, 
because this new Princess Di’s personality is too caustic to truly reflect the full range 
of principles which her Amazonian rebirth symbolically suggests. These principles 
rightly include not only the strength, autonomy, and ferocity that the new Princess Di 
clearly manifests, but community with other women as well. Rather than showing 
Diana a way out of her current fixations, Princess Di merely turns Diana’s princess 
fantasies and physical insecurities—and any demonstrations of weakness for that 
matter—into sources of shame and objects of ridicule. While Princess Di’s ridicule of 
Diana may usefully point out errors in Diana’s current priorities, since she speaks in a 
language Diana easily understands, this language also helps to keep Diana locked into 
an alternately self-defensive and self-loathing pattern from which she ultimately needs 
to escape.  
The process of cancer treatment and the anticipation of a mastectomy 
undermine Diana's confidence in herself as an object of male attraction and as an 
appealing catalyst for attraction to upscale property: “What kind of a Real Estate agent 
will I be? Nobody wants to buy a house from a one-breasted wonder” (17); “Who will 
love me now? Fuck. Now I’ll have to rely on my winning charm and sparkling 
personality. Fuck” (49). As long as Diana can maintain an image very close to a 
rigidly normalized high-class aesthetic, she continues to feel relatively self-assured 
about her desirability or at least her professional prospects. But the process of careful 
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correspondence to an aesthetic ideal to which Diana subjects herself creates its own 
anxieties, especially once her image begins to suffer unforeseen alterations due to her 
cancer treatments and surgery. Diana’s gradual liberation from a fetishistically framed 
self-image is poignantly dramatized in two “seduction” scenes. In the first, which 
takes place before Diana’s mastectomy, she attempts to seduce a bartender she has 
dubbed (Prince?) Charles. She asks the bartender, “Are you a leg man? Or a breast 
man?” Her anxiety about the predicted anti-seductive effects of a mastectomy creeps 
into her words: “Either way, I’ve got it all. Legs and breasts. Two of each. It takes 
two” (24).  She runs her Martini glass over her breast, invites the bartender to come 
home with her, and dances as the lights fade, unbuttoning a few buttons on her dress, 
subjecting herself to the physical appraisal of her male watcher.2 In the second 
sequence, after she has lost her breast, the attempt at seduction is aborted. Previously, 
she has heard about George's acceptance of Bernadette’s new body and the reportedly 
great sex they have after they both look at her new, breastless chest. Diana has been 
envious of Bernadette’s marriage, and has tried to interpret George's anxiety about 
Bernadette’s cancer and treatment as a symptom of rejection. Yet Diana comes to 
appreciate George’s acceptance of Bernadette, with all her weirdness and now with 
her changed body. Diana’s words before her second dance are a marked contrast to 
those preceding her first: “Fuck Charles. I’m going to hold out for someone like 
George” (74).  Her dance is different too: it is an exploration of her own sensuality; 
and as she begins to unbutton her shirt, she looks down at herself, replacing the 
evaluating male gaze with her own loving gaze.3  
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Diana's decision to wait for someone like George constitutes a rejection of 
fetishistic assessments of her virtues, but does not suggest simple independence. As a 
heterosexual female, her continued longing for a male partner is understandable; yet, 
she is now willing to risk being alone rather than settling for exploitative relationships. 
As she dances, by herself, she affirms her continued sensuality through her own eyes; 
she is ready to forego willing subjection to a fetishistic gaze. She relinquishes an 
aspiration that has led to unhealthy obsessions, deciding she will have an accepting 
man—a man like George—or no man (74). Bernadette's protection of George from the 
physical details of her ordeal, which Diana has interpreted as due to the prospect that 
he will be disappointed or disgusted, turns out largely to be the result of concern that 
he will worry about her too much. His is a passive virtue, far from the heroism of a  
fantasy prince, but Diana decides it is better than salvation through a male partner. 
This route has already failed her; nonetheless, early in the play she still automatically 
recommends it when Nurse laments the demands of her job. Diana suggests, “Marry a 
doctor.” Nurse responds flatly, “Tried that” (16-17). 
Another sign of Diana’s emergent sense of self-worth is presented when she 
tells Bernadette, “I’m opening my own agency. No more Condos. From now on, I’m 
handling fixer-uppers. Homes that need to start over” (81). Princess Di has ridiculed 
Diana for her haughty professional pretension—a thinly-veiled striving toward a sense 
of self-worth still dependent upon appearances—calling her “Little Miss Perfect.  
Little Miss I only sell Condos. I only handle the big estates. Little Miss Snot! . . . 
Little Miss Lakefront Property” (30). Diana’s decision to deal in older, 
flawed/experienced/broken properties acknowledges an acceptance of the critique 
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underlying Princess Di’s harsh rebukes. Diana’s career reinvention also resonates with 
the play’s themes of brokenness and renewal, as she directs her professional attention 
along the lines of her personal decision to give her heart to Bernadette (a survivor of a 
double mastectomy), and to herself. This healing heart-giving is facilitated by Diana’s 
developing camaraderie with Nurse, as well as her surprising development of 
empathetic feelings for the Pope. Diana, who has been wounded and who is therefore 
fearful of letting herself be vulnerable or of giving of her deeper self, finds succour in 
her own capacity to help a newly humbled Pope. She swallows her distaste, and 
manages some kind words: 
 POPE: I’m shattered. 
 DIANA: She’ll get another one [another teacup]. 
 POPE: It was a one of a kind cup. 
 DIANA: It was a fine cup. (80) 
As a humbled, needy person, someone who, like Diana, has maintained a carefully 
honed image based on adoration by others and whose self-image has ultimately failed 
him, the Pope is able to be of assistance on Diana’s journey toward a healing empathy. 
Sacrifice (seen now, at its best, as a product of empathy) and its attendant principle, 
self-transcendence (Carr 102), are necessary for Diana's healing, since it requires 
escape from a narcissism that bears a partial resemblance to the Pope’s, into a kind of 
relationship of which she has had little apparent experience. Diana’s new sacrifice is 
to stop protecting herself so ardently from the hurt she risks by emotionally connecting 
with, and supporting, others, especially when these others are in some sense “the 
enemy.” While The Pope and Princess Di is critical of exploitative or dehumanizing 
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relationships, its depicted path of escape from these relationships proposes nothing 
like straightforward self-reliance. The inevitable partialness of any liberation is 
intrinsic to the play’s presentation of autonomy within interdependence. 
 
6.3   Granny and Nurse: Complex Experiences, Simplistic Salvations 
In an essay about her experience of breast cancer, Audre Lorde emphasizes the 
importance of sharing personal experiences, writing, “If I am to put this all down in a 
way that is useful, I should start at the beginning” (149). In a sense, this is Granny's 
role in the play: she is able to draw on more and earlier experiences than either 
Bernadette or Diana, providing perspectives that otherwise might be lost to them. And 
her experience-based stories cast doubt upon the simplistic salvations to which both 
Bernadette and Diana have aspired. Drawing on the multiple interpretations of “wake” 
that fuel the play, Granny has been “awakened” in order to help Diana and Bernadette 
grapple with the messy “flotsam and jetsam” that lies in their wake, by which they 
come to a new awakening partially through her influence. Complementing Granny’s 
role in grounding the play’s symbolic movements in the complicated world of 
experience is Nurse, who is the most disconcerting character in The Pope and Princess 
Di. Nurse is beleaguered, overworked, and addicted to Demerol, and imagines that a 
job in a Florida plastic surgery clinic will provide her salvation. Nurse negotiates her 
way through others’ painful experiences with little time to consider her own well-
being, and receives little institutional or patient recognition for the emotional toll her 
work takes on her. Whereas Bernadette is fixated on an ideal of self-sacrifice, Nurse is 
sacrifice flatly embodied, and is far from happy about it. And whereas Diana seeks 
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meaning by seeking ways to be in demand, Nurse is constantly in demand and wishes 
for nothing but respite. She comes to associate “truth” with pain and suffering, 
desperately longs for a life of superficiality, and imagines it realized in a cosmetic 
heaven in which she invests all her hopes for well-being. Like Bernadette and Diana 
early in the play, she devotes herself to a patriarchally shaped symbol of salvation that 
seems destined to fail her. According to the play’s depictions of Granny and Nurse, 
ideals and symbols ought to be sources of help but not sources of authority: they may 
reflect truth in limited ways, but they are not truth, and hence do not merit devotion. 
 Introduced as the captain of the ship aboard which Diana's and Bernadette's 
“journey” takes place, Granny steers the vessel armed not with a coherent set of 
principles or a clear mythology but with the piecemeal wisdom of her experience. 
Granny offers often unwelcome, eccentric-seeming advice as well as anecdotes 
containing wisdom in the midst of their comic foolishness. Granny is, roughly 
speaking, a crone in the sense attributed to the term by feminists who emphasize the 
experiential wisdom that accompanies age rather than the physical withering 
emphasized in common definitions of “crone.”4 Granny tries repeatedly to discourage 
Bernadette from overly mystifying her experience. For instance, when the young 
Bernadette tells Granny that the Pope will arrange it so she will “have to say a million 
Hail Mary's just to get into Purgatory!”, Granny responds, “You, my dear, are 
Purgatory!” (11). Bernadette is frequently irritated by Granny, as is Diana, who asks a 
few times whether it is possible to get rid of “the dead Granny” (9). Many of Granny's 
insights are not easy to hear; she is necessary, but this does not make her popular.  
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Granny’s descriptions of past and present attitudes toward spiritual matters 
help to frame the play’s seeds of doubt regarding individuals’ capacity to adequately 
understand their own needs, and thereby regarding the veracity of worldviews tailored 
to suit one’s particular purposes. One of Granny’s contributions, coming from her long 
and often difficult journey through a hardscrabble outport life, is to doubt the benefits 
of personalized religion. Granny recalls, “Now in my day, there was no such thing as 
spirituality. That's a new thing that came out in the eighties. In my day you went to 
church and you got down on your knees and you thanked God and all creation for 
what little you had” (44). With tongue slightly in cheek, Granny affirms thanksgiving 
prayer, but later in the same speech, describes the failure of her pleading prayer to 
have only sons so as to avoid passing breast cancer along to daughters. Granny’s 
seasoned reports of her life and disappointments suggest there are no panaceas, no 
escape routes from suffering.  
At the same time, the vexing world of experience that Granny describes also 
provides surprising moments of pleasure and dignity. This second contribution to the 
play’s undermining of worldviews based on tidy premises and clear, authoritative 
reference points comes to the fore when she relates another past experience. She 
describes hiding her head—newly bald from chemotherapy—under a bandanna 
because she missed the long hair which had been a central aspect of her own 
conception of her beauty. Coming home in the rain one day, and thinking herself alone 
upon her arrival, she is seen by her daughters while changing her bandanna. Granny 
describes the episode:  
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 I wanted to croak right then and there. All of them looking at me as 
 bald as a baby. Or, in my case, like an old bald eagle. Till my oldest 
 jumped up and grabbed a hold of me and says mom! I never knew how 
 beautiful you are! I couldn't see your face for all the hair! Next thing I 
 know, they're jumping up and down and screaming cause I'm so 
 freaking gorgeous without all my hair. Go on, I told them. You great 
 Obegons! Don't be so stunned. But I got a bit vain after that. I started 
 sneaking on a dab of rouge and putting on perfume when no one was 
 looking. Now that was living it up. (74). 
As a means of liberating Diana and Bernadette from fixations that stifle their capacity 
to adapt to a new chapter of their experience, Captain Granny troubles over-
attachments to particular symbols, whether inherited or tailored to suit one’s own 
apparent needs. Granny's stories of her complicated experience serve to suggest that 
the world will inevitably—and often favourably—out-complicate all available 
accounts.  
 Whereas Granny positively emphasizes the complexities of experience, Nurse 
is mired in them, and understandably longs to escape into a simple, sunny world of 
superficiality. At the end of the play she seems overattached to an understandable but 
limited symbol of her desire. Nurse’s attachment to her cosmetic heaven is akin to 
Bernadette’s initial devotion to the Pope or Diana’s worship of Princess Di: all three 
women attempt to transform the materials of their patriarchally mediated suffering into 
the fabric of their salvation.  
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 Nurse’s basic good nature is abused by the hospital management, and the 
stresses of her job go largely unacknowledged by demanding patients and staff. Her 
coping strategies include sarcasm, Demerol, and fantasy. Another of Nurse's meagre 
defense strategies is the smoke break, a habit for which she and the other nurses are 
criticized in a demonstration of cold disregard for their obvious need to unwind. The 
nurses receive a memo from the hospital administration, “saying it doesn't look so hot, 
to see the nurses, standing outside the hospital smoking.” Indignant, Nurse sends a 
memo back, saying, “Well, give me a raise, and I'll go smoke in my Porsche like all 
the doctors do” (16). A distillation of an historical lack of respect for the crucial 
nature, and the difficulties, of “traditional” women's occupations, Nurse’s plight is 
indicative of a profound failure of community and compassion. At one point, it occurs 
to Nurse that she could take the Demerol that Bernadette routinely refuses: “Just this 
once. Just to take the edge off. I'm only human” (45). Later in the play, it becomes 
apparent that she has become addicted. The unrelenting demands on Nurse's time and 
energy, and the emotionally taxing context in which they take place, lead to a fantasy 
of a heaven of surgeries that are purely cosmetic, ostensibly freed from the context of 
suffering. 
Until Diana begins to notice Nurse’s suffering, it goes entirely unrecognized as 
she slips slowly through the cracks while putting her own well-being on the line. An 
episode in which this process is revealed also urges Diana out of her self-protective 
shell, as she is forced to address her concern for Bernadette, and to recognize the 
desperation of her new acquaintance. Nurse tells Diana, “I'm going to go in and give 
[Bernadette] a steroid shot. Take the pressure off the joints, you know.” Diana 
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responds, “Stop! You just went in and did that. I watched you. You did that already. 
Jesus. How many fucking needles did you give her today!”, and shakes Nurse, as if to 
snap her out of her daze. Nurse responds, “I was having phantom pains. I just wanted a 
little peace and quiet. Let me go” (65). This poignant conclusion to an important 
episode reaffirms Nurse's sense of sympathy with her patients as well as her drug-
addled state, both of which are reasonable interpretations of her “phantom pains.” 
Once Nurse realizes how badly off she has become, she quits her job, sobers 
up, and is off to Florida. When she makes her decision, she expresses her desire to 
finally be known by her name (Florence, as in Florence Nightingale), rather than 
simply as Nurse. This seems to be a sign of progress toward autonomy, as does the 
recognition of her need for relief from the weight of her current circumstances. But in 
the course of relinquishing her suffering, she also relinquishes depth and growth: she 
states flatly, “The truth is not my business anymore” (83). What has passed for “truth” 
has radically failed Nurse. As the play ends, Diana’s and Bernadette’s worlds are 
expanded, a process that has required them to become vulnerable to unsettling truths, 
to an open engagement with meaning and the potential for different attributions of 
meaning to the same experiences. But Nurse, whose vulnerability has been exploited, 
whose openness has been abused, and who has been left exhausted and emotionally 
raw, refuses meaning altogether, settling for a narrow heaven that reverses the pattern 
of her current occupation, creating breasts instead of removing them. “Florence”’s 
dawning recognition of her own need for relief is accompanied by signs that her self-
image is damaged and in need of repair. Her plan for repairing it, though, glosses over 
the image-based anxiety that underlies cosmetic surgery, and suggests that her 
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awareness, like Bernadette’s and Diana’s, is not sufficient to her needs: she predicts 
that when she dies, “I'll have had so much collagen and Prozac, I’ll be the damndest 
finest looking corpse ever laid out for a wake” (83). Nurse’s ardent desire to escape 
from “truth,” from meaning, from any obligation to seriousness, is understandable, and 
provides a striking foil to Bernadette’s and Diana’s initial, rather severe orientations: 
when, on her way to Florida, Nurse is asked by Princess Di whether she is a martyr or 
an Amazon, Nurse responds plainly, “Neither” (81). Yet Nurse’s deliberately 
meaningless salvation is equally narrow; and, given the treatment that simple 
salvations generally receive in the play, it is implicit that Nurse’s plastic heaven will at 
some point become her prison.  
 
6.4   The Heart Beneath the Breast: A Symbolic Reconfiguration 
Granny repeatedly expresses frustration with her own doctor’s refusal to follow her 
intuition about a growth in her second breast. Recalling the Amazon courage that runs 
through the play, Granny says, “If your frigging doctor won't listen to you, chop your 
own frigging tit off and shove it down his throat” (17).  Elsewhere, she rails, “Two 
tits! Two tits for the price of one! But would he listen to me? . . . Told me the lump 
was nothing to worry about” (13). The implication of these expressions is that the 
oversight killed her. Granny also believes the same hesitation resulted in the premature 
death of Bernadette’s mother (13). As the cultural complex of symbolism surrounding 
breasts is ironically elaborated, Granny's impatience becomes poignant. She does not 
identify with breasts as cultural currency. To Granny, they are valued but ultimately 
survivable parts of the self. Such a perception, expressed by the play’s crone, enriches 
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the play’s explorations of relationships toward breasts ranging from loathing to 
integration to fetishistic attachment. The twin poles of loathing and fetishism are 
linked in the play to the notion of the breasts as a source of sexual temptation, linked 
in turn to a more general historical tendency for men to locate the source of male 
sexual sin in women. The connection between the breast and the heart in the play is 
obvious and invites attention: mediated through Granny and Princess Di, a shift in 
emphasis from the breast to the heart takes place, and the heart, the play’s site of 
courage and of empathy, becomes the new framework for perceiving the breast.  
 The fetishistic end of the breast-perception spectrum is reflected in the play’s 
word lists and word play surrounding the breast as a cultural symbol. Breasts are 
integral to how many women are perceived, and to how they perceive themselves. Yet, 
having been fetishized, breasts are also set off from the self, evaluated, presented, 
hidden, altered—objects in their own right with the power to shape perceptions of 
women as subjects. Estella Lauter and Carol Schreier Rupprecht write of the Boston 
Women’s Health Collective’s decision to name a self-help book Our Bodies, 
Ourselves that they were not expressing an essentialist relationship but were rather 
“reclaiming their bodies on their own terms,” bodies which “had been described in 
research informed only by male fantasy for so long that even [women’s] own sense of 
their bodies had been affected” (227). This is evinced by Diana’s perception that her 
breasts are her primary sexual lure, and by Bernadette's belief that it would be ideal for 
saints not to have breasts, in keeping with the Pope’s interpretation of the story of St. 
Agatha, “the patron Saint of breast cancer” (25). At one point early in the play, the 
Pope offers Bernadette “a teaching Parable:” 
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 This is a story about poor Saint Agatha. Lovely girl. Came from a good 
 Sicilian family. What a little sweetheart. Happy as a lark. But my dears! 
 Wait til I tell you this! She was being courted by a lecherous Judge who 
 wanted to have his wicked way with her. Nudge nudge, wink wink. 
 When she told him 'no', he chopped off her breasts. Martyred her. (13). 
In the Pope’s telling of the tale, Saint Agatha is essentially blamed for her own 
martyrdom because she has, in the Pope’s version, tempting breasts. The spiritual 
privilege of sainthood is transformed into a punishment for built-in sin, as is evident in 
the moral the Pope derives from the story: “It’s better not to have any breasts at all in 
the first place” (13). The judge is implicitly free from culpability because, as a man, he 
cannot (or should not have to) control his impulses. 
In The Pope and Princess Di, word lists associated with breasts constitute an 
exposure and exorcism of fetishistic patriarchal fantasies, including the association of 
breasts with sexual temptation, so that what can emerge is a sense of breasts as parts 
of the body that can be related to, grieved, but also put to rest. The meaningfulness of 
the lists is gradually transferred from their specific features, lost in a sea of plurality 
and contradiction, to their sheer length and detail, which imply a cultural obsession. 
One such list, provided by Granny, is composed of various colloquial names for 
breasts: “Tits. Titties. Tough titty said the kitty, made the milk taste shitty. Bite my 
titty. Bosoms. Bazoombas. Honkers, hooters, hootchies. Knockers. Jugs. Udders. 
Melons. Puppies. Over your shoulder boulder holders” (39). Linda Hutcheon argues 
that irony can be “a useful mode by which to acknowledge the force of [a] culture and 
yet to contest it, in perhaps covert but not ineffective ways” (Splitting 99). This list, 
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recalling the list of words for “vagina” in the introductory section of Eve Ensler's The 
Vagina Monologues, (5-6) illuminates a cultural preoccupation with breasts and breast 
imagery.  
Another list, courtesy of Princess Di, is a testament to the commercial, 
cosmetic, and therapeutic attention paid to breasts, suggesting an underbelly of fantasy 
while telling the audience almost nothing of breasts themselves: 
 Welcome to our Brassiere Museum. Bustier. Corset. Full support. Light 
 support. Sports. Strapless. Criss-cross. Push-up. Cotton. Silk. Lace. 
 Padded. With water balloons. With blow-up air-inserts. Nursing bras. 
 Starter bras. Gel bras. Cross your heart bras. Training bras. Wonder 
 bras. Merry Widows. All used to encase and hold a little mound of 
 flesh. The hidden garment. The last barrier to the great frontier. (51) 
Through its excess, this list rhetorically subverts fetishistic attention to “a little mound 
of flesh.” Princess Di elaborates on the fantasy underlying her list, as the chorus hums 
the Star Trek theme: “To boldly go where no one has gone before! To the breasts! Our 
heaving breasts, our quivering breasts, our pillowy bosoms of comfort. The bra 
unhooks and bliss is unleashed on the world like a madness. The door opens to love, to 
sex, to mother's milk, to the center of the universe” (52).  Stapleton’s wordplay echoes 
Betsy Warland’s “theorogram” “The Breasts Refuse,”5 in which Warland describes 
patriarchal diction as a function of power, and asserts her own right and power to 
rename. But whereas Warland's word play is explicitly analytical, grounded in the 
creative use of etymology, in Stapleton’s play the word play stops short of overt, 
analytical overturnings. Instead, it relies on intuitive connections made by the 
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audience, and gains its power to trouble via a fetishistic-seeming aggregation of 
varieties of brassieres, an absurd superfluity of nicknames and general expressions of 
enthusiasm for “a little mound of flesh,” the relationship between this obsessive 
attention and the sin and danger associated with breasts elsewhere in the play, and the 
play’s symbolic reconfigurations that facilitate an atmosphere of questioning.  
 The breast is linked in the play to the heart, which is framed as the site of both 
empathy and courage. Bringing to light an identification of the heart as a site of 
empathy, Bernadette responds to a favourite saying of Granny's—“You're giving me a 
Royal Pain where my left tit used to be” (11, 13)—by making the link explicit: 
“Granny . . . often had a Royal pain right where her left tit used to be. Which meant, a 
pain in her heart. Ever since they cut her breast off, her heart was too close to the 
surface, and hurt more easily” (13). According to Bernadette’s interpretation, 
Granny’s breast has a quite different, more genuinely intimate role to play than that 
which we see in any of the word lists. Here, the breast protects and insulates the heart. 
It is integral, and its absence hurts, but its loss can be survived, and may even have its 
uses. The heart connection is deepened by the emergence of Princess Di as a warrior 
who, according to the stage directions, floats onstage “dressed as a Greek Amazon” 
with “[h]er right breast . . . strapped flat by sparkling thick cords” (29), carrying a 
bow, the use of which is eased by the removal of the breast. In this regard, the loss of 
the breast comes to represent the transformation and strengthening of spirit that 
Bernadette and Diana experience through their ordeals, reflecting the dedication of the 
Amazons to “warfare and the hunt” (Reinhard). As the play goes on, the audience’s 
attention is gradually shifted from the breast to the heart; and these women’s journey 
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through breast cancer, through the loss of a body part that is also the object of a 
massively conflicted patriarchal obsession, becomes a journey of healing and growth 
through which Bernadette’s and Diana’s hearts are exposed (Diana's to empathy, 
Bernadette's to her own will, and each to the other) and ultimately shared. 
 In the opening scene of the play, Diana hears a heart monitor somewhere and 
notes, “There are two of us, but I only hear one heartbeat” (5). Diana interprets this in 
the most obvious way: one of them is dead (7). This turns out to be true, as it becomes 
apparent at the play’s end that Bernadette, now deceased, has come back with Granny 
to see Diana across the threshold of her own death. But the meaningfulness of the one 
heartbeat extends beyond its use as a plot point. Through the course of the play, the 
discreet locations of different characters' hearts in their own bodies increasingly give 
way to rich sharings dramatized by literal, physical dislocations.6 Several times, 
Princess Di mentions that her heart has fallen out. This literal fact—the impact of the 
crash tore her heart out of place—reflects Diana's feeling that her own heart is falling 
out. In the end, it does come out when the self-protecting Diana offers it to Bernadette. 
Diana muses, “If a bird shits on it, I'll frigging kill somebody,” then wonders, “Now 
that I've given her my heart, what will I have left for myself” (80). Other hearts must 
come into play to support Diana now that she has given her own heart away: Princess 
Di's lost heart, perhaps, which she may have given to Diana in the first place, and 
Bernadette's, repeatedly described as a strong heart, which joins Diana’s in the sky at 
the play’s end.  
Earlier in the play, Bernadette speculates on a couple of benefits that might 
come of having a removable heart: 
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 It might be nice to have a heart that you can pop out of place when it's 
 convenient. When you don't want to feel too much. Or when you want 
 to show someone that you love them deeply. You can let them hold 
 your heart. The Virgin Mary's heart is always floating around outside of 
 her body, in all the pictures you see of her. Proof of all the love she 
 feels. (56) 
When Diana responds with habitual skepticism—“The Virgin Mary never looks very 
happy, if you ask me”—Bernadette displays the wisdom underpinning her sacrificial 
orientation, despite its lack of measure, remarking, “Love and happy are not the same 
thing” (57). The culminating image of Diana’s heart is striking. The play develops a 
polytheistic “cosmology” of sorts, inhabited by multiple spirits creatively interacting, 
leading to surprising new symbolic integrations. Though Diana combats patriarchal 
pressures via the emulation of an Amazonian archetype, she offers her heart like the 
Virgin Mary. This heart now oversees Bernadette’s no-longer sacrificial sufferings as 
a moon, infusing the Virgin Mary’s love with the self-assertion of the Huntress.7  
 
6.5   Humbled Idols: Symbolic Integration as a Product of Relationship 
In The Pope and Princess Di’s opening scene, which sets the tone for the play’s use of 
the fantastic, the audience is introduced to Bernadette, Diana, and Granny on a ship. 
Throughout the scene, Bernadette is working on a crossword puzzle, struggling with 
clues for the words “Vessel” and “Wake,” both of which are linked to the “flotsam and 
jetsam” that lie in the characters' wake (in the play, flotsam and jetsam are still-
perceivable residue of the past). Defined as “to become active or alert after being 
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dormant,” “wake” foreshadows Bernadette's developing sense of self worth, Diana's 
newfound sense of creative purpose, and their awakening to interdependence. A wake 
is also defined as a “watch over the body of a dead person through the night, before 
burial” (5), presaging the revelation that Granny is dead, and further that Diana and/or 
Bernadette may also be. The double entendre in Bernadette's utterance, “You are 
supposed to Wake the dead,” acknowledges the wake tradition while suggesting 
another form of waking the dead: inviting their wisdom back into the world of the 
living. And all these meanings of “wake” are reflected materially in Diana’s relic, a 
scrap of lace from Princess Di’s extraordinarily long wedding train, a kind of wake in 
its own right. “Vessel,” for its part, is defined as a “hollow container for holding 
something” and as a “tube or canal that transports a body of liquid” (4). It is the boat 
that carries Bernadette and Diana, and it foreshadows their different brands of 
emptiness, their self-valuation based on the burdens they can carry or what they can be 
filled with: it is the protagonists themselves, the ones creating the wake. “Vessel” is 
materially represented by Bernadette’s relic, the commemorative teacup of the Pope. 
Granny notes, “When two wakes converge all kinds of things get regurgitated” (20). 
Bernadette and Diana are in the same boat now, sharing one vessel and one, new wake 
they are creating together, the flotsam and jetsam rising up out of the turmoil, 
demanding to be acknowledged and accounted for. Of the “cosmology and structure” 
of Adele Wiseman’s novel Crackpot (1974), William Closson James writes that 
“everything can be redeemed, gathered up, and incorporated” (57). In The Pope and 
Princess Di, as in Crackpot, this redemption and incorporation is neither facile nor 
final, but emerges through the often painful core of human experience, and is in a state 
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of constant incorporation, as well as constant shattering. It is a deeply plural universe, 
within which attempts to impose conformity are both futile and destructive; but it is 
also a universe whose inhabitants cannot remain in a state of static coexistence with 
those who are different from themselves. It is, rather, a universe of hybrids. 
 In The Pope and Princess Di, the developing relationship between the title 
characters is used to reflect the growth and relationships of the protagonists, who 
themselves develop new relationships with their habituated symbols and with foreign 
or resisted symbols. As the play progresses, the Pope and Princess Di engage in a 
series of agonistic, bragging exchanges in which they outline their supposed virtues. 
The Pope argues he is “the power of prayer” and “the physical manifestation of the 
power of . . . belief”; associates himself with “the relief there is, in looking outward, to 
God” and the “force of faith”; and asserts about the nature of life and the cancer-
stricken state of the protagonists, “It’s purpose, . . . It’s faith, . . . , It’s how you play 
the cards, . . . It’s knowing when to fold ‘em, and knowing when to hold ‘em, . . . It’s 
divine intervention, . . . It’s life after death, . . . it’s me!” Princess Di calls herself “the 
power of life” and “the fecking ghost of Christmas Past”; aligns herself with “the 
power there is in looking inward, to the self” and with “force of will”; and argues 
about life and the protagonists’ cancer, “It’s random, . . . It’s genetic, . . . It’s how the 
hand is dealt, . . . It’s keeping an ace up your sleeve, . . . It’s self-motivation, . . . It’s 
life now! . . . It’s me!” (35, 43-44, 61). Satire theorist George A. Test writes that 
participants in a satirical agon “may both be condemned by their own words,” (129) as 
the Pope and Princess Di are, in that their pretensions become increasingly ridiculous 
and they both ultimately resort to egotistical defenses. But the effect of their bragging 
 240
  
exchanges is not wholly satiric: the two characters also make substantive claims to 
symbolic merit, reflecting in simple terms the struggles lived out by Bernadette and 
Diana. 
While the two women are amply complex, “human” characters, the two spirits 
are tied directly to particular principles, so when their principles collide the spirit 
characters themselves collide in quite a direct and uncomplicated way. And once they 
harmonize, they straightforwardly align themselves with each other. In a comically 
simplistic way, the eventual, eager alliance of the two spirits reflects the successes of 
the relationship between the two human protagonists, despite false starts and half-
achieved understandings: 
 POPE: I think she loves that cup more than she loves me. I could just 
 go cancel something. Something like Easter. And I can do it pardner. 
 Just, poof! Issue a Papal Bull and voila! No more Easter. I'm all riled 
 up. 
  PRINCESS DI: I feel the same way about Elton John. Totally  
  infuriating. That beastly song wasn’t even written for me!8  
  POPE: I hardly think that compares. 
  PRINCESS DI: Chew on an olive, old man. (55) 
As their animosity wanes, the Pope and Princess Di find a way to cooperate, and 
ultimately to help their adherents. Late in the play, the Pope moves beyond narcissistic 
displays of power and acknowledges he is losing his hold on Bernadette, who is drawn 
increasingly to Princess Di. He laments, “I miss the days of infallibility. She 
[Bernadette] heard you.” Strikingly, considering their relationship to this point, 
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Princess Di's response is productive rather than petty. Recognizing that she cannot 
save Diana on her own, that she needs the Pope’s help, she says, “So now you get 
through to the other one [Diana]. Are you up to it?” (62). In Transforming Grace: 
Christian Tradition and Women's Experience, Anne E. Carr argues, “An adequate 
feminist [religious] interpretation . . . is suspicious as it unmasks the illusory or 
ideological aspects of symbols that denigrate the humanity of women, and it is 
restorative as it attempts to retrieve the genuinely transcendent meaning of symbols as 
affirming the authentic selfhood and self-transcendence of women” (102). According 
to the play’s cosmology, the “illusory or ideological” aspects of the Pope's symbolism 
include his encouragement of sacrifice as deference to an unconsultative authority 
within a gendered power context, while Princess Di embodies an unrealistic solution 
to socially mediated suffering, based on an excessive reliance on the strength of the 
individual will. But faith and will, sacrifice and autonomy, empathy and courage, are 
nonetheless presented as “genuinely transcendent” in their capacity to lead to a 
healthful combination of “authentic selfhood and self-transcendence,” a pairing that 
captures the essential dynamic within and between Bernadette and Diana: 
  POPE: Think of the courage of the martyred ones. 
  PRINCESS DI: Think like an Amazon. 
  POPE: Face the music like a Saint among Saints. 
  PRINCESS DI: Be an Amazon, a fierce warrior woman. They lopped 
  off their own breasts. 
  POPE: Offer up your breasts. 
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 PRINCESS DI: The right one, so it would not hinder the use of the 
 bow. Like so. 
 She demonstrates proper bow technique. After a moment the POPE 
 holds the bow with her. (65-66) 
In the end, the principles that Princess Di and the Pope promote collectively help to 
save the human protagonists, as the spirits begin to work together. 
By the play's end, the Pope is redeemed by becoming vulnerable. The thinness 
of his self-assurance, its very nearly desperate character, has in some sense been 
obvious all along; but only once he is rejected and “powerless” can the power of his 
principles—sacrifice, selflessness, faith—take hold and do their work in a positive 
way. Immediately after Diana's encounter with the broken-down, drug-addled Nurse, 
she first hears the Pope's voice (65), having been forced by circumstance to forget 
herself and to reach out to another in need. Conversely, Bernadette shakes loose her 
monomaniacal focus on the Pope and embraces a bit of Princess Di’s independence. 
This development in Bernadette's character is evident when she first hears Princess 
Di's voice: 
  POPE: All this puking makes me ill. 
  PRINCESS DI: Sook. 9 
  BERNADETTE: Sook. Just like George. (57) 
Bernadette echoes Princess Di’s evaluation of the Pope, then applies this evaluation to 
her husband, revealing her emerging impatience with her own quiet deference to those 
she serves spiritually and domestically, and with their excessive, self-indulgent 
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lamentations of minor hardships (an impatience that reflects her decreasing 
satisfaction with her own martyrly identity as well). 
In their blessing of Granny's ship at the end of the play, the Pope’s and 
Princess Di’s new complementarity is succinctly framed: 
  POPE: We wish you well. We wish you peace. 
  PRINCESS DI: We wish you a good strong arm.  (85) 
The Pope and Princess Di are transformed from idols to helpers, from objects of direct 
worship to symbols of principles that are deeper, more elusive yet more enduring than 
the images that have represented (and obscured) them. This accords with Rita Gross’s 
description of idolatry. For Gross, idolatry arises from a lack of recognition that the 
language of religion is inescapably metaphorical in character, because the objects of 
religious worship are not encapsulable in speech or reducible to human perception. 
She writes, “Every [religious] statement contains a bracketed ‘as if’ or ‘as it were’” 
(169). If the recognition of religious language as a set of “linguistic conventions” is 
lost sight of, Gross writes, “if what is focused on is the metaphor, instead of what it 
points to, religion becomes idolatry” (169). This is not to assert that Stapleton's play 
presents a clearly religious perspective; it does not. Rather, it draws on the culture and 
history of Christianity as well as aspects of Christian and Classical mythology to 
facilitate a dramatic exploration of, among other things, the personal and political 
power of symbolism. This symbolism, largely but not exclusively religious, intersects 
with experiences that operate in creative tensions with it. These intersections stop 
short of an utter chaos of colliding principles, while calling into question the value of 
symbolic orthodoxies through problematic depictions of “idolatrous” worship.  
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 In her book Pure Lust, which legitimates women’s desire as a positive, creative 
force, Mary Daly defines her coinage “Be-Friending” as a kind of ontological 
befriending that is subversive of patriarchal, patronizing, and controlling 
“befriendings” of those perceived as needy by those with power. For Daly as for 
Stapleton, Be-Friending does not operate on the premise “that every woman, or even 
every feminist, can ‘be a friend to’ or ‘be friends with’ every other woman.” Daly 
argues, however, that all women can share “the work of Be-Friending,” which  
  implies the creation of an atmosphere in which women are enabled to 
  be autonomous friends. Every woman who contributes to the creation 
  of this atmosphere functions as a catalyst for the evolution of other  
  women’s creative potential and for the forming and unfolding of  
  genuine friendships. (373-74) 
Among the echoes of Daly's hope for Be-Friending in the relationship between 
Bernadette and Diana is the importance of not being naïve about potential for 
individual friendships. Very nearly until the end of the play, Diana insists to 
Bernadette and to Princess Di that her relationships with them are “temporary 
alliances;” and Diana and Bernadette struggle to see eye to eye even after Diana gives 
her heart to Bernadette. Still, Bernadette’s and Diana’s abiding mutual influence is 
clear, and is affirmed in their exchange of relics near the play's end: Diana gives 
Bernadette the piece of lace from Princess Di's dress that functions as her relic, and 
Bernadette gives Diana the Pope teacup, which she has glued back together. Links are 
forged and walls come down, as the two struggle through a new set of challenges 
together.  
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Bernadette and Diana become friends in the sense described by Daly: they help 
each other to “Be” in a more complete and fulfilling way. But while Diana and 
Bernadette might Be-Friend each other, whether they can be regarded as friends in the 
pedestrian (and valuable) sense of pleasant companionship is doubtful. A funny 
exchange elucidates their struggle to relate to one another: 
 BERNADETTE: It's not like we're best friends or anything. 
  DIANA: It's not like we're bosom buddies, or anything. I don't even 
  really like you a whole lot. 
 BERNADETTE: I don't even really like you a whole lot too! We have 
 so much in common! (50) 
Though they do not pretend to be compatible when they are not, they are willing to 
provide needed support, a kind of solidarity in keeping with, though not reducible to, 
Diana's uses of the term “alliance.” The characteristics that make Bernadette and 
Diana difficult for each other are the same traits that make them valuable to one 
another. Diana’s irritation with Bernadette's attachment to self-mortification is 
transformed but does not dissipate once Diana begins to have empathy for her. When 
Bernadette suggests that her refusal of drugs to ease her pain is “just a little bit of 
penance,” an irritated Diana responds,  
 What wrong are you doing penance for? For having cancer? . . . Do you 
 think I should atone for having cancer too? Do you think we should all 
 crawl around on our hands and knees and say Fucking sorry for being 
 such snotty little unworthy cretins that we have to be stricken with 
 cancer? (42) 
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These irritated responses to Bernadette’s behaviour draw from Bernadette a measure 
of self-assertion and a willingness to be critical (initially through defending herself to 
Diana), ultimately encouraging her to question her perceptual framework and drawing 
her out of a morbid stability into a surprising relationship with someone whose 
priorities are far removed from her own. While at times shocking to Bernadette, 
Diana's irreverent nastiness liberates her to express her misgivings and her desires, 
ultimately improving her self-esteem and her relationships. Conversely, Bernadette’s 
enduring if flawed relationships raise questions for the self-protecting, lonely Diana, 
and Bernadette's general incapacity to see herself as valuable outside of a self-
sacrificial framework gives Diana's strength somewhere to go, gives her someone else 
to serve, in a more profound sense than that to which she has been accustomed. 
Bernadette undermines Diana’s insistence on independence while strengthening her 
capacity for it.  
 Diana guesses that, precious as it has been, their friendship might be too 
difficult to sustain in an active way, for reasons in addition to basic incompatibility: 
 BERNADETTE: We've been true shipmates, haven't we? We'll look 
 back and see the wake behind us and remember everything. 
 DIANA: No. We won't. We'll lose touch. We'll run into each other at 
 the mall, or the grocery store one day. And we'll be afraid to ask, you 
 know, how are you doing. Because we'll be afraid the news is bad. Or 
 worse, afraid the news is good. Afraid the statistics won't be working in 
 our favor. We'll smile at each other, and maybe not even stop to talk at 
 all. We'll just wave, and look busy. Years will pass. (83) 
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It is one of Diana's ambivalent gifts to be able to be candid about such possibilities, to 
admit the ambiguities of people’s motives and the less-than-altruistic impulses that 
often shape behaviour. But Diana also admits, though not to Bernadette, “I can't be her 
friend. Friends leave, they go, they die, they break your heart. I am not going to be her 
friend. It's just a temporary alliance. Just to get her through, for now” (65). Here she 
expresses an additional fear, which adds a touch of the bittersweet to her declarations 
of temporary alliances, a suggestion that her rationalizations for their future separation 
may, in part, be a fearful dodge of anticipated grief, a symptom of her lingering 
attachment to a ruggedly independent persona. 
In one striking scene, Bernadette demonstrates her understanding of Diana's 
need to feel strong and important, her own willingness to help fulfill this need, and at 
the same time her own receptivity to Diana's influence. Earlier, Diana laments, “I’m 
supposed to be the center of the universe” (60). When Bernadette returns from the 
intensive care unit, she recognizes that Diana is suffering, and tells her, “You are the 
center of the universe” (67). In context, this is not an invitation for Diana to return to 
narcissism. Rather, it is a badly needed affirmation of Diana’s value as a person, in 
language she understands. In the next moment, Bernadette shocks Diana by 
unselfconsciously lying on the linoleum floor. When reminded about the rules, 
Bernadette shows a new willingness to enjoy herself on her own terms, responding, 
“They are not the boss of me. C'mon down. Relax” (67). This rich scene depicts a 
softening of the lines between the two characters. In turn, Diana contributes to their 
developing mutual influence by allowing herself to become vulnerable through 
admitting her weakness, in her own cantankerous fashion. Having told Bernadette 
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about her ring, an imitation of the ring worn by Princess Diana during her fatal car 
crash, Diana says, “All right. I'm a fucking fool. All right? If you tell a soul I will 
personally haul what's left of your hair out through your ears” (55-56). As Bernadette 
says about herself, Diana tells Bernadette things that she does not tell anyone else. 
  Among the gestures that symbolize Bernadette’s and Diana’s newfound 
closeness as the play comes to a close, Bernadette’s agreement to share a martini with 
Diana “just this once” (87) reflects her new willingness to temper her idealism with an 
acknowledgment of the often surprising awfulness of experience and the utility of the 
will. And Diana’s confession in the same scene that she is “scared . . . shitbaked” (87) 
can be seen as an acknowledgment of her need for “tea;” that is, for a sense of safety, 
for trust, for a kind of faith. In The Pope and Princess Di, total healing is neither 
achieved nor expected, and moral imperfection is inevitable; Stapleton’s clear 
rejection of the notion of human perfectibility that haunts much of Western thought is 
consistent with her use of Christian themes. Self-sacrifice and the principle of 
empathy, dramatized as moral necessities in a world characterized by persistent and 
inevitable error, are symbolized through Bernadette's description of the Virgin Mary’s 
external heart. And their implied complementarity and compatibility with autonomy 
and strength of will are symbolized by Diana's (and later, Bernadette's) heart floating 
like a moon in the sky. 
 
6.6   Conclusion 
The humbling of the Pope relative to the play's female characters (and the legitimacy 
of his symbolic role in this humbled capacity) combines with the richness of the play's 
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female archetypes to acknowledge “the legitimacy of female power as a benificent and 
independent power.” This is how Carol Christ describes the “simplest and most basic 
meaning of the symbol of Goddess” (277). A central image for the play’s negotiation 
between its rejection of male-originated or male-defined salvation and its embrace of 
sacrifice as a necessary principle, however exploited it has been, is the shattering and 
subsequent re-gluing of Bernadette’s commemorative teacup of the Pope. The Pope is 
vulnerable now, stripped of deferential privilege, his symbolism of sacrifice falling 
into its proper place as a child of empathy. And, once the Pope is broken, they are all 
broken, since Princess Di has been missing her heart since the accident, and 
Bernadette and Diana lose breasts but have also lost the brittle comfort of their 
habitual modes of perceiving themselves and their relationships to the world around 
them. The process of new symbolic integrations itself symbolizes transformative 
growth and a kind of necessarily limited, morally weighted liberation from oppressive 
relationships to symbols and power.  
Despite its affirmation of women’s need and right to creatively subvert 
oppressive symbolism, The Pope and Princess Di ultimately problematizes the idea 
that one can adequately make or choose one’s own symbols or objects of worship. It 
does this by depicting the Pope as the representative of a crucial element of Diana’s 
healing, which she cannot foresee and in fact actively resists, and via Princess Di’s 
equally unforeseen influence on Bernadette. The characters do not have a thorough 
understanding of their own needs, and their habits and predilections resist principles 
essential to their well-being. Due to the limits of its characters’ self-awareness, 
transformative growth occurs in the play through a process of piecemeal intersections 
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between symbols and experiences, rather than in clear epiphanic moments. This 
interplay is crucial to the play’s implicit suggestion that ethics cannot remain too pure 
and also be genuinely helpful for people living in a rather vexing and messy world. 
The kind of ethics the play resultantly embraces is characterized by paradoxes. The 
play’s presentation of a range of paradoxes—sacrifice and autonomy, faith and will, 
death and life, brokenness and wholeness—suggests creative tensions that do not need 
to be (or perhaps cannot be) resolved into singular principles, that do not need to be 
“solved.” In The Pope and Princess Di, symbols are fluid, and the paradox of 
vulnerable interdependence and cagey self-preservation leads to both personal growth 
and community building. Accordingly, the play questions, in accord with the work of 
radical and Christian feminist theologians, the appropriateness for women of a model 
of service heavily oriented toward self-sacrifice. Conversely, it cautions against an 
excessive emphasis on the individual self, which is depicted as a frequent source and 
symptom of narcissistic insecurities, and hence as a roadblock to autonomy within 
community. 
Within this context of crucial moral tensions, the play’s undermining of the 
privileged status of dominant symbols, without an utter relinquishment of their 
importance, recalls Alfred North Whitehead’s vision of historical change at its best. 
Whitehead argues that it is necessary and good, whenever any “principle” (embodied 
by social, political or religious organizations) becomes dominant, for a new “principle 
of refreshment” to emerge. According to Whitehead, it is an historical truism that 
“[t]he moment of dominance, prayed for, worked for, sacrificed for, by generations of 
the noblest spirits, marks the turning point where the blessing passes into the curse” 
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(339). It is the illuminating struggle that is good; hence, a new struggle must emerge to 
prevent the falling into decadence of the previously sought-after, now-dominant 
principle. In Stapleton's play, the troubling of old orthodoxies is portrayed as 
necessary for the shaking loose of symbols that, shaped by “the old dominance” 
(Whitehead 339), have come to act more as shackles than supports, and for the 
provision of access to new possibilities. Ideally, for Whitehead, the dominant order 
will recognize the need for an infusion of newness. He argues, “It belongs to the 
goodness of the world, that its settled order should deal tenderly with the faint 
discordant light of the dawn of another age” (339). In a healthy transformation, access 
to the new does not undermine the value of the waning order, but builds on the “firm 
foundations” of what is best in it, in a striving toward “the faint discordant light” that 
is inevitable in any case, and in the movement toward which the “requirements” of the 
old order ought to be handled “tenderly,” as it gradually “sinks into the background 
before new conditions.” In Whitehead’s view, this gentle transition is far from an 
inevitable process. He acknowledges the prevalence of two errors that disrupt such 
“tender” transformations, and writes, “In either alternative of excess, whether the past 
be lost, or be dominant, the present is enfeebled” (339). In The Pope and Princess Di, 
the past has been dominant, and has enfeebled Bernadette’s and Diana’s capacities to 
deal with new chapters in their experience. But the Pope (and to a lesser extent 
Princess Di), while at first resistant to the giving way of the entrenched to the new, 
ultimately comes to see the insufficiency, for the creation of a healthy new 
arrangement, of his own habitual ways. And Diana’s and Bernadette’s new 
Huntress/Holy Mother hearts, the emergent alliance of the Pope and Princess Di, who 
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leave together to help “the faint of heart” (86), and the anecdotal presence of Granny 
throughout the play, depict a world in which the old has not been sacrificed at the altar 
of the new, but instead has nourished it organically. 
In The Pope and Princess Di, the new symbolic order is tentative, and rooted 
(despite its fantastical elements) in the perplexities of lived experience. Granny 
repeatedly undermines the adequacy of any singular approach by emphasizing life’s 
messiness and by embodying an eclectic wisdom. And no one saves Nurse from her 
ambivalent fate. Nurse relinquishes “the truth” and embraces a future in plastic 
surgery because she is exhausted from being an overworked, underappreciated witness 
to suffering, which is the only meaningfulness “the truth” currently has for her. 
Perhaps Nurse is the “faint of heart” whom the Pope and Princess Di are off to help, 
but her future is uncertain. The transformations that have brought Bernadette and 
Diana through a crucial epoch do not help Nurse. Her refusal to be labeled as either a 
martyr or an Amazon (81) suggests that she has her own needs. And like the others, 
her own vision of salvation is not sufficient to these needs. The world of cosmetic 
“improvements” toward which she aspires, while understandable given her experience 
in oncology, is, like Bernadette’s and Diana’s initial fantasies of fulfillment, 
embedded in damaging, patriarchal expectations, and shows all the signs of being 
receptive to idolatry. Ultimately, the play presents symbols—any symbols, no matter 
how privileged—as servants to experience. If the Pope and Princess Di are to help 
Nurse, they will have to reconfigure once again, because it is her need that must be 
served, not theirs. 
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 In some respects, Stapleton’s play reflects the institutional preoccupation of 
most politicized literary responses to Christian religion in Newfoundland: it sustains a 
strong emphasis on institutional sources of repression, for instance, as well as on 
attempts by regular people to liberate themselves from a “repressive milieu” (Murphy 
3-4).10 And it tends to question religious orthodoxies without rejecting the possibility 
of the renewal or reintegration of Christian values and ideas within new complexes of 
social and political values. But while The Pope and Princess Di sustains this 
institutional interest, it also goes further, through a detailed, feminist engagement with 
the perception-shaping power of symbols, which extends Smith’s engagement with 
images of God within the Christian tradition, and develops his latent embrace of 
postmodernism's understanding of values as partial and contingent.  
The Pope and Princess Di also reflects the prevalent use of the fantastic among 
women writers with satirical or otherwise socially critical intentions. Within 
Newfoundland, Stapleton’s own work, as well as plays such as Liz Pickard’s The 
ALIENation of Lizzie Dyke, and novels such as JoAnne Soper-Cook’s Waking the 
Messiah, attest to the potential of fantasy for women writers' explorations of political, 
moral, and in these cases religious themes. Further afield, writers such as Margaret 
Atwood and Ursula K. Leguin regularly exploit the critical potential of story 
environments unconstricted by current social (and sometimes physical) limitations. 
Like The Pope and Princess Di, much feminist fantasy writing is religiously 
subversive while tending at the same time to demonstrate a fascination for mythic 
structures and grand moral struggles. While much of this work is fully embedded in its 
imagined worlds (though with critical implications for this world), Stapleton blends 
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the two worlds throughout the course of her play, so that the audience is rarely able to 
forget the “real-world” role of the play’s fantastical elements. Real and mythic realms 
intertwine, and the real is infused with a sense of the mythic as the mythic is perceived 
as a means of exploring the real. In combination with sustained, intricate symbolic 
play, this grounding in a “real” world that is never more than partially receptive to 
symbolic movements reflects The Pope and Princess Di’s (and Stapleton’s general) 
tendency toward balancing the didactic and the doubtful, as well as the accessible and 
the esoteric. The presence of comic demystifiers like Granny and Nurse ground the 
play in the familiar world of quippy folk comedy and blunt social satire, and the 
symbolic obviousness of Princess Di and the Pope render the play didactic in a way 
that recalls the work of the other authors in this study. Yet the intricate interplay of 
relics, images, and symbolic figures, with their various and shifting relationships to 
each other and to other characters, invites a good measure of focused, critical attention 
in its own right. 
 The Pope and Princess Di embraces a far-reaching epistemological skepticism, 
though it also dramatizes a necessary negotiation of ethics and political relations 
within this uncertain context, as per the feminist and postcolonial writers Linda 
Hutcheon describes. According to Hutcheon, such writers embrace postmodernism’s 
deconstructive potential without committing themselves to the politically useless 
nihilism that lurks at its extreme (Canadian 70). Concordantly, Stapleton’s creative 
realignments and integrations of existent symbolism declare a kind of creative 
agnosticism, or something akin to the symbolic fluidity of Goddess feminists for 
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whom symbols are crucial to a healthy spirituality, but are also inextricable from (and 
typically subservient to) questions of political relations. 
 256
  
                                                          
Notes 
1 This is an aspect of Bernadette’s fantasy; her Pope is not the real-life Pope, 
and the real-life Pope did not give her the teacup. The cup was actually given to her by 
Granny. 
2 Diana's association of her sensuality with particular physical attributes and 
with a desiring male gaze also characterizes the monologist in Stapleton’s earlier play 
Woman in a Monkey Cage, in which a former beautician, now locked in a cage and 
relentlessly observed by a creature only referred to as her Watcher, begins to despise 
the natural processes now interfering with her carefully controlled image, and begins 
desperately to miss the reassurances of physical contact with an observing male (and 
more broadly, physical contact in general).  She states, 
 I’d like to shave all the hair off my body so there'll be nothing . . .  
 animal about me. God, I’ve got hair comin’ in on my legs like weeds 
 and bushes growin’ under my armpits and my eyebrows are takin’ over 
 my face. I’d like to scrape myself bald from head to toe, everywhere, 
 just to feel . . . human . . . just to feel soft again and smooth and clean. 
 (353) 
She pleads with her strange, leathery Watcher, “Just open the door and let me touch 
you, just a touch, I need someone to touch me” (357).  
3 In the Artistic Fraud production, Diana’s second dance is hardly a dance at 
all, and was not seductive as indicated in the script; it was a quiet, almost sad moment, 
which has significant interpretive ramifications.  
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4 The politicized adoption of the term “crone” is particularly common among 
pagan feminists. The term is a staple, along with “hag,” in Mary Daly’s Gyn/Ecology 
and Pure Lust; and websites and books published by feminist pagan groups and 
oriented around the crone abound. 
5 It is a poetic essay, or a discursive poem. 
6 In the December 2004 Artistic Fraud production, much of this is muted, 
apparently due to technical choices that omit visual cues Stapleton scripted. 
7 Although Diana is also frequently a symbol of chastity, this does not appear 
to be meaningful in Stapleton’s play. 
8 Elton John’s song “Candle in the Wind,” originally written about Marilyn 
Monroe, was modified in dedication to Princess Diana after her death. 
9 “Sook” is a regional term for one who laments one’s circumstances 
exceedingly, or is given to whining or pouting. 
10 While Murphy writes about Ireland, many of her observations of Irish 
literature and religious politics are usefully applied to Newfoundland. 
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7.   Conclusion 
Like much of contemporary Newfoundland culture, the island’s humour about 
Christian churches and religion has been influenced by a range of broadly influential 
schools of philosophical, political, and religious thought that have tended to conspire 
against traditional religious (and political) authority. The availability and apparent 
desirability of ideas and beliefs drawn from a variety of movements including 
liberalism, secular humanism, religious ecumenism, and, in recent years, feminism and 
even postmodernism, have fostered a culture increasingly critical of Newfoundland’s 
established ways of viewing and doing Christian religion. The character of religious 
ridicule in Newfoundland has shifted accordingly, from conventional ridicule of one 
religious group by another (still observable to varying degrees in the joke books), 
toward ridicule of Christian religious figures, institutions, and beliefs in a general 
sense, or else of particular denominations by their own apostate “strays.” Alleged 
narrow-mindedness, and abuses of too-little-questioned authority, have been typical 
objects of religious ridicule in Newfoundland professional humour in recent decades; 
and some form of pluralistic outlook, drawing on various combinations of the broad 
movements listed above, has routinely been presented as a favourable alternative. The 
writers in my study have created worlds in which one set of long-dominant, presently 
waning beliefs and modes of relation is ridiculed or otherwise humorously 
problematized, in favour of an emergent set that not only appears to provide 
alternatives to these beliefs and modes, but whose own roughly conceived, liberal-
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pluralist ideology is premised on the very availability of multiple alternatives. 
While it is tempting to suggest that Newfoundland religious humour has been a 
causal factor in the secularization and pluralization of Newfoundland culture, such an 
argument, generally proposed, would distort the role of such humour on the island 
(despite exceptional examples such as CODCO’s satirical depictions of priestly abuses 
of children well before such activity entered public debate). Humour tends not to be a 
prominent characteristic of vanguards. As Mulkay discusses at length, socially critical 
humour tends most often to enter the picture within movements once they have gained 
some footing in the culture (177). In Fun on the Rock, Herbert L. Pottle supports 
Mulkay’s basic argument in a Newfoundland context. Pottle writes that the 
susceptibility to humour, and especially to satire, of traditionally dominant institutions 
such as the churches followed the loss of a degree of their power. A Newfoundland 
amenable to a robust tradition of humour about the churches was a Newfoundland in 
which their authority had already been disturbed sufficiently for serious questions to 
be asked of them and their role in the society. 
 As is true of Ray Guy’s earlier religious satire, socially critical humour may 
ridicule mainstream actions and tendencies (though these generally have already been 
unsettled to some extent), and may favourably present somewhat marginal (though 
familiar) alternatives. Just as often, however, humour’s predilection for unsettlement is 
turned upon marginal positions, in order to reaffirm a status quo or to strengthen a new 
ascendancy (cf. Mulkay). By the time Kavanagh’s The Confessions of Nipper Mooney 
was published, for example, pluralistic values and open criticism of ecclesiastical 
authority had become mainstream in Newfoundland’s creative and policy circles and 
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in the popular media, and “traditional” ways of conceiving Christian religion were on 
shaky grounds. The Confessions’ attacks on institutional Catholicism are hardly 
surprising; they amount to a retroactive reprimand (and perhaps a caution against 
authoritarian relations more generally), composed in the context of a culture that 
largely has become comfortable with the author’s point of view. A decade previous to 
the publication of Kavanagh’s novel, the predominance of “lapsed Catholicism” in a 
1990 issue of Canadian Fiction Magazine dedicated to current Newfoundland fiction 
was roundly criticized by Harold Horwood in a review for the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, on the grounds that its grappling with Catholicism had become needless 
and uninteresting (“New Writing” 2). While Horwood’s criticism suggests that 
decisive political and cultural shifts on the island had stripped such literary responses 
of much of their political and religious urgency, he seems to have underestimated 
writers’—and readers’—need to sort through the legacy of institutions central to their 
history, culture, and belief traditions.  
The obvious injection of opinion into imaginative writing—even at the 
expense of a measure of craft—ought not to be regarded simply as a deficiency, 
though it often is regarded as such. One might instead consider didactic literature as 
literature that expresses a cultural moment, and might regard the prevalence of 
politically opinionated works in a culture as an indicator that its artists are self-
consciously engaged by public life, rather than by the standards of a relatively narrow 
artistic/scholarly class. One might even argue that the prominence of sophistication as 
a literary standard is suggestive of elite control over the production, reception, and 
interpretation of literature, in a way that is not so much engaged in the edification of a 
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broader public as indifferent or even hostile to it. John Ralston Saul makes this 
argument in his 1993 book Voltaire’s Bastards, in which he describes the evolution of 
the novel as a socially engaged form of literature that was for a long time disrespected 
by the literati. He argues that the public relevance of “serious” novels waned as they 
gained respect within an increasingly professionalized literary-critical establishment. 
According to Saul, the seeking of elite approval led novelists who wished to be taken 
seriously to reflect elite values both ethically and aesthetically (536-76). I do not assert 
that the prominence of “sophisticated” literature within a culture is a sign of decadence 
or blithe self-satisfaction, but I do think it is inaccurate to suggest that the prevalence 
of literature that favours clarity of ethical expression over psychological or aesthetic 
sophistication signifies an immature literary culture, as critic Lawrence Mathews 
sometimes does in his well-intended praise of the sophistication of a current crop of 
Newfoundland writers (cf. “New Writing;” “Report”).  
 Like the prominence of didacticism, the general prevalence of humour within a 
culture’s professional arts may be a sign that the public matters to artists. Smith’s 
folksy humour, Guy’s love of satirical shock, Kavanagh’s conversational wit, and 
Stapleton’s caricatures might be taken as signs that the tastes of the huge numbers of 
Newfoundlanders who have bought joke books since their production took off in the 
early 1970s are not only of interest but of appeal to these authors. These writers’ blend 
of humour and political opinion, in works that by turns are also sophisticated and 
artful, is suggestive of an artistic class balancing multiple loyalties, drawn to the lives, 
struggles, and tastes of a broad Newfoundland public; to pluralistic values, which have 
gained prominence in many social classes, but which reject the ethical and religious 
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perspectives of a substantial portion of the public; and to the artful experimentation 
and psychological focus that characterize “serious” contemporary literature. 
Artists in contemporary Newfoundland frequently reflect, and often openly 
grapple with, a broad struggle on the island, between attachments to tradition and 
modernization, local culture and cosmopolitanism, simplicity and sophistication. This 
is evident in this study, and has generally been evident in the island’s literary and 
dramatic arts for decades. To some degree, Newfoundlanders, including its artists and 
policymakers, have determinedly fostered a sense of themselves as a “peripheral 
people, . . . who hold fast to the particular, the familiar, the traditional in a world based 
on individualism, hedonism, materialism, [and] progress” (Davies, Ethnic 47). As 
there is among Québecois, there is among Newfoundlanders a powerful sense that 
their culture is unique and important; this sense has been invoked countless times in 
contemporary writing on the island. Yet, paired with this often nostalgic attachment to 
a regional heritage is a perception that one relinquishes at one’s peril a critical 
relationship to the cultural legacy one has inherited, and that this legacy in 
Newfoundland has in many important respects been fraught with error and abuse. As 
Newfoundland has absorbed and adapted contemporary “Western” values that tend to 
radically refashion the priorities of traditional, village-based cultures, such values have 
largely come to shape contemporary criticisms of alleged failings in Newfoundland’s 
cultural and institutional legacy.1 Shifts in social and educational policy on the island 
make it evident that the values which have gained ascendancy in contemporary 
Newfoundland accord with an understanding, reflected in the works in my study, of 
Christianity’s claim to transcendent authority as being problematic at best.  
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Accordingly, all of the works are imbued to varying extents with a religious 
skepticism that is amply reflected in the increasingly secular culture in which they 
have been produced. Among them, Smith’s and Stapleton’s explore the question of 
religious belief most extensively (while some of the jokes take belief most for 
granted). Their work presents religious symbolism as something highly plastic: it can 
by its nature be adapted to many ends and outlooks. The plasticity of religious 
symbols and concepts is a sufficiently striking feature of Newfoundland literary 
responses to Christianity to merit study in its own right, far beyond what I was able to 
achieve in Chapter Five’s explorations of religious symbolism in The Pope and 
Princess Di. To take one example that is typical of CODCO and several of its alumni, 
in his one-man comedy special Pocket Queen, comedian and social activist Greg 
Malone observes that people’s notions of God tend strikingly to reflect their own 
character, then launches into impressions of Jim Bakker and Jimmy Swaggart in self-
reflective, self-gratifying conversations with “God.”2 Pushing such plasticity to its 
extreme, eminent Newfoundland playwright and poet Al Pittman denies human beings 
a solid, meaningful reality beneath our constructions. Pittman presents readers with a 
world in which fantasy is the fabric of human reality: one cannot hope to avoid it. This 
theme in his work has repeatedly been implied by critics, but has not received the 
sustained attention it merits. At the same time, Pittman’s work suggests that our myths 
are not all equal: some are preferable to others, depending upon their capacity to help 
people thrive and maintain a sense of dignity. Pittman’s existentialist vision does not 
unproblematically support the humanism that generally underpins the works in this 
study, since The Pope and Princess Di’s implication that people might require their 
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“illusions,” and perhaps cannot be stripped of them without harmful effects, is at the 
heart of much of his work. Yet Pittman’s implicit standard of thriving shares with the 
works I have discussed, and with other contemporary Newfoundland writing that 
addresses the island’s religious legacy, a reliance on standards resembling the 
“common moral decencies” described by secular-humanist ethicist Paul Kurtz.  
As I discuss in Chapter Two, certain moral principles recur, according to 
Kurtz, with remarkable consistency as behavioural standards across time and cultures. 
He argues that such principles do not require a coherent worldview, and have not been 
proven by history to require—or even particularly to benefit by—the dominance of a 
religious outlook (63-96). To The Wall, a 2003 one-man show by renowned comedian 
and CODCO alumnus Andy Jones, is an outstanding example of a contemporary work 
of Newfoundland humour that embraces a Kurtzian outlook. While To The Wall’s 
moral explorations are not inconsistent with the politically loaded humour of the 
works in my study, it is a more philosophical work, and appears to depend less on the 
ascendancy of a particular framework for the values it favourably presents. Sensitive, 
sophisticated, and wise despite its heavy employment of slapstick, silliness, and 
physical comedy, To The Wall merits a separate study for its complex use of often 
coarse comedy to nuanced philosophical and moral ends. Ostensibly premised on 
Jones’ own prayerful response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, after an 
adult lifetime of atheism, To The Wall comically explores two premises—the 
existence of God, and the capacity of science to save humanity—both of which are 
described as crucial to the “theoretical underpinnings of the evening” (10). As the 
show proceeds, God’s existence, not to mention benevolence, comes increasingly into 
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question, as does the saving power of science.3 Twice in the show, Jones declares that 
science is “the answer and the hope for the future . . . ‘science!!’ and ‘love’ of course . 
. . and . . . and hope and freedom and openmindedness, generosity of spirit, 
understanding, originality and boldness. . . . You know, science” (7). Following the 
second instance of this highly compromised claim—just after he has been struck down 
and paralyzed (by God?)—Jones’ character ardently quotes the Lord’s Prayer: 
“Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us and lead us not 
into temptation but deliver us from evil. Amen” (27). While this prayer seems largely 
to be an effort at spiritual compensation, based on fear of divine punishment, it is 
nonetheless striking that the moment at which Jones quotes the Lord’s Prayer is a 
moment in which “science” once again fails to respond to crucial human needs, and 
further, that the passage echoes Kurtz’s “common moral decencies.” Its ethics are 
paralleled in a variety of religious and secular traditions, and are consistent with 
Jones’ character’s twice-stated list of values compensating for science’s shortcomings: 
values, the show ultimately suggests, that do not require science or religion. 
Jones portrays human existence as fragile, beautiful, and perilous, in need of 
great care and attention in each moment, rather than in need of a saving system. This 
may be its major departure from the more ideological tendencies of the works in my 
study. In its particular comic vision, which marries absurdity and flights of comic 
imagination to a broad sense of pathos, To The Wall recalls the comic novels of 
Wayne Johnston, who has become an exemplar of the new, “sophisticated” 
Newfoundland literature (cf. Mathews, “Report”). The humorous ribbing in The Story 
of Bobby O’Malley and The Divine Ryans, Johnston’s two comic novels with a 
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substantial religious focus, is largely undiscriminating—more like the Tulks’ 
freewheeling joke books in this sense than like any of the other works in my study. All 
Johnston’s characters are subject to the comic gaze, the religious characters not 
substantially more than others. In their freewheeling use of humour and wild 
imagination, and in their psychological penetration, Johnston’s comic novels achieve a 
Robertson Davies-esque sense of wonder and wisdom. Both novels hint at some of the 
issues grappled with more explicitly in the works upon which I have chosen to focus. 
But Johnston’s religious humour is not politically didactic in the way that most of the 
works in my study are. Rather, it participates in a comic vision within which humour 
arises through often tragic circumstances, in narratives that foster sympathy for 
characters who live an often bleak and unsatisfying existence. Within this framework, 
Christian religious belief is often presented as a means of protecting a sense of 
coherence and structure from an imagined chaos which looms and threatens from the 
margins, waiting for cracks in the religious armour. 
While this presentation is not obviously political in Johnston’s work, its brand 
of vision of the psychology of zealous religiosity seems partly to underpin the abuses 
of religious authority that are so prevalent in the works in my study. In these works, 
defensive religious postures foster a skewed sense of the good, oriented around the 
protection of a beleaguered religious order, and abuse arises from the marriage of 
power to such a skewed moral sense. Through this marriage, all manners of difference 
and dissent are regarded as evil (cf. Vanier 74), and the status quo is mistaken for the 
sacred. If Neil Postman is correct in asserting that irreverence is an “answer to 
idolatry,” (167) and if one accepts that the irreverent attacks directed by Guy, Smith, 
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and Kavanagh at the churches’ power over education in Newfoundland (to take one 
example of religious power abuse in the works studied) are genuine idol-smashing, 
one might also ask whether this smashing merely paves the way for a new set of 
unasked questions and a corresponding new set of exclusions. Concordant with 
Postman’s liberatory understanding of irreverence, Northrop Frye has argued that 
satire “break[s] up the lumber of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious terrors, 
crank theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all other things that 
impede the free movement of society” (233). The power to facilitate “free movement” 
that Frye ascribes to satire is a power too freed from particular interests to accurately 
describe the genre. Satire overwhelmingly implies specific standards, if only via 
ridicule of their opposites. Rather than simply “freeing up” the discursive landscape, 
these standards typically reflect reasonably prominent trends in the culture, which 
constrain certain actions and tendencies even as they facilitate others. In the case of 
the works in my study, one prominent trend reflected with considerable consistency is 
the increasingly liberal, pluralistic character of Newfoundland’s contemporary 
political culture. 
For ways of living and perceiving grounded in a deep commitment to a 
religious tradition, the ramifications of the pluralistic, generally liberal outlook 
typically reflected in these works may be profound. To take a prominent contemporary 
Canadian example, some critics of Canadian multiculturalism argue that it fosters a 
trivial, showy plurality, while demanding substantive conformity to a basically liberal 
standard. Beneath its outward embrace of diversity, one may question whether 
multiculturalist pluralism, or the pluralism that has come to dominate social thought in 
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Newfoundland’s circles of influence, genuinely fosters diversity at deeper levels of 
conviction and practice (or, to take the argument further, whether this is practically 
possible). It is probable that the ascendancy of a pluralistic outlook works to constrain 
belief and practice within a new set of fairly narrow parameters, imposing one set of 
standards upon many people who do not necessarily share its values but are 
nonetheless bound by its rules.  
At the same time, in consideration of Newfoundland's increasingly plural 
demography, the pluralistic standards underpinning the works in my study may be 
seen to foster a culture that protects the rights of individuals and minority groups—
including religious groups—in substantive if limited ways. One may consider a 
competing criticism of Canadian multiculturalism: that the guise of harmonious 
multiculturalism protects those who harbour hostility toward the state and toward 
“Canadian” values (however one conceives these). To concede to a pluralistic outlook 
is, to some extent, to accept the legitimacy of a measure of opposition to ascendant 
values (if not of the seditious activity that some envision is likely to arise from such 
opposition), as an acceptable risk of a robust pluralism in which individuals and 
groups are given space to sustain and adapt their own beliefs and traditions. 
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Notes 
1 One would be remiss not to acknowledge, in addition to the continued 
popularity of the major denominations in Newfoundland, the spread and enduring 
popularity of evangelical Christianity within Newfoundland’s contemporary religious 
landscape, especially in some of the outports, and to recognize it, at least in part, as a 
village-based reaction to an objectionable contemporary milieu, rejecting the secular 
in favour of the transcendent, reason in favour of revelation, and individualism in 
favour of obedience in their moral and spiritual life. But, despite the presence of this 
ardent strain of Christianity and the continued, if diminished, influence of the mainline 
churches, the island’s political culture has continued to secularize. 
2 Malone’s Pocket Queen won the Gold Award for Comedy at the 1999 
Houston International Film and Television Festival. 
3 Throughout the show, Jones elaborates on a far-fetched mathematical 
equation that will, he assures the audience, explain not only the nature of the universe 
but the nature of God. Variables in this equation include “the [number] of beef buckets 
of sand you'd have to toss to accidentally get . . . two perfect maps of Newfoundland 
and Labrador,” (7) and “[e]verything ever there was or is or ever will be” (or “the 
teddy bears picnic”) (23). 
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